archive: A 'sell-out' and some hard-sell
A 'sell-out' and some hard-sell
Amit Baruah, Islamabad
Frontline
July 30, 1999
Title: A 'sell-out' and some hard-sell
Author: Amit Baruah, Islamabad
Publication: Frontline
Date: July 30, 1999
THE countdown has begun. If Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Army
stay the course, the Pakistani pullout from Kargil, already under way,
will be completed in a few days. There could be twists and turns in
the withdrawal process, but Sharif has so far given no indication that
he will resile from his July 4 agreement with U.S. President Bill
Clinton.
There is little doubt that Pakistan has capitulated: it buckled in the
face of sustained international pressure and a determined operation by
the Indian Army. Sharif's action in ordering the pullout from the
Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) may have angered the hawks in
the Pakistani establishment, but it has not caused many ripples on the
streets of Pakistan. Officially, since it was a "war" between the
Kashmir mujahideen and the Indian Army, the Pakistan Army was not
"involved". The Army is angry but has gone along with the course
steered by the political executive.
The July 11 meeting between the Directors-General of Military
Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan was on the cards ever since
Pakistan made the first move of "appealing" to the mujahideen to pull
back. Whether it was the visit to India of special envoy Niaz Naik or
the three visits to Pakistan of R.K. Mishra, editor of the Observer of
Business and Politics, as the official emissary of the Bharatiya
Janata Party-led government, diplomatic channels of communication were
always open. Finally, of course, there was the Sharif-Clinton meeting
and the U.S. President's telephonic conversation with Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee.
The very fact that the pullout from the Kaksar and Mushkoh sectors was
announced by both India and Pakistan shows that the contacts have been
productive and that in the days to come the pullout will be extended
to the entire Kargil sector.
Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz said at a briefing on July 11: "Following
the mujahideen's positive response to our appeal to de-escalate in
Kargil, the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India have
been in contact on the question of the restoration of the LoC. The
DGMOs of the two countries met today and agreed on the modalities for
de-escalation including sector-wise cessation of ground and air
hostilities to facilitate the mujahideen's disengagement."
Aziz further said: "We have been informed that disengagement from the
Kaksar sector which began yesterday has been proceeding
satisfactorily. The disengagement from the Mushkoh sector will
commence tonight. Gradually the disengagement will be completed in the
entire area..." He said that it had "always been our position that
both Pakistan and India should respect the Line of Control, make
efforts to de-escalate and promote peace through dialogue and contacts
between civil and military officials. We also believe that both India
and Pakistan should honour their commitment to implementing the Lahore
Declaration in letter and spirit. The Lahore process, which envisaged
an early solution of the Kashmir dispute, should be revived
immediately."
Not so surprisingly, Pakistan claims that the militants are
"dispersing", not withdrawing to the Pakistan side of the LoC. This is
consistent with Pakistan's position that the militants are "indigenous
Kashmiris". In effect, by making such an "appeal", Pakistan has sought
their "withdrawal" into Indian territory. Clearly, such a position
does not belong in the real world.
Militant groups which are branded together under the United Jehad
Council (UJC) first rejected the Pakistan Government's call for a
withdrawal from Kargil, but that appears to be a case of posturing:
after all, can "jehadi elements" be seen to be withdrawing from their
religious "duty" of liberating Kashmir? It may therefore be better to
declare premature martyrdom, save face and prepare for the same job at
another place and another time.
Sharif is under fire at home, and ironically the fiercest attacks have
come from a constituency that the Government has all along pandered
to: those journalists, analysts and former Generals for whom
India-baiting is a profession. They have accused him of having sold
out in Washington after raising expectations of a profitable "war" for
the "liberation" of Kashmir.
In the whole process, Sharif has demonstrated that he is a man not to
be trusted by India, a man who has no consistent policy towards India
and a man who presides over an imperfect, unstable and adventurist
nation. The real danger to India, however, does not flow from Sharif
himself, but from Pakistan's inability, after 52 years of existence,
to conduct itself as a mature and democratic international player.
When it comes to India, Pakistan appears to suffer from schizophrenia.
If bilateral talks are to have meaning, Pakistan must first emerge as
one nation, not a sum total of different centres of power.
In an action that is characteristic of Sharif, he rushed to Washington
after he realised that the Kargil misadventure could not be sustained.
He called up Clinton, requested an appointment and rushed over as soon
as the President said yes.
Despite all the spin and twist Islamabad seeks to put on it, the
Clinton-Sharif joint statement is quite clear about what is required
of Pakistan: "It was agreed between the President and Prime Minister
that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of the Line of
Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement. The President urged an
immediate cessation of the hostilities once these steps are taken,"
the statement said.
It added: "The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the
bilateral dialogue begun in Lahore in February provides the best forum
for resolving all issues dividing India and Pakistan, including
Kashmir. The President said he would take a personal interest in
encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of those
bilateral efforts, once the sanctity of the Line of Control has been
fully restored."
So what exactly does Sharif have to do? The first concrete step must
come from Pakistan - it must "restore" the LoC by pulling back the
intruders. (The fact that the joint statement does not use the term
"intruders" does not in any way twist its meaning around.) And then
Clinton will take a "personal interest" in encouraging a resumption of
bilateral talks between India and Pakistan.
According to a report in the Pakistani newspaper The Nation (July 9),
the U.S. and Pakistan had prepared their own drafts of a joint
statement. In its draft the U.S. had described Pakistan as an
"aggressor" and called upon Islamabad to withdraw its forces from
Indian territory. "The process of marrying the two (Pakistani and U.S.
drafts) saw many ups and downs. Finally, Sharif and Clinton personally
gave it a final shape," the newspaper reported.
The "compromise solution" is obvious. The U.S., which has repeatedly
called for a withdrawal of the intruders, did not want to embarrass
Pakistan. Equally, it did not want to dilute its concerns. This
explains the final formulation. The "gain" for Islamabad was also
clear - Clinton would take a "personal interest" in "encouraging an
expeditious resumption and intensification" of bilateral efforts to
resolve Kashmir and other disputes. Clearly, this phraseology reflects
Pakistan's concerns and represents the "only gain" for Islamabad.
Whether it will find any concrete meaning, of course, remains to be
seen.
The joint statement also reflects another major climbdown by Pakistan.
Sharif agreed with Clinton that the Lahore process was the "best
forum" to resolve all disputes between India and Pakistan, including
Kashmir. So, what will happen to the United Nations and to Pakistan's
calls for intervention by third parties? Has Pakistan changed its mind
suddenly after shouting from the rooftops that the international
community must intervene?
The significance of the Sharif-Clinton statement will become more
evident in the weeks and months to come. It shows that the U.S. is
more than willing to play a role in resolving disputes between the two
countries. Today such an intervention may favour India, tomorrow it
may not.
After his return from London on July 8, where he met Prime Minister
Tony Blair, Sharif went into a meeting with Chief of the Army Staff
Gen. Pervez Musharraf and other senior aides. The next day he presided
over a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC),
Pakistan's highest decision-making body on security matters. It
comprises the Prime Minister, the three Service chiefs, the Foreign,
Finance and Interior Ministers, and special invitees, depending on the
issue under discussion.
An official statement said that the DCC expressed "satisfaction" that
the Clinton-Sharif joint statement had incorporated the "main
elements" of Pakistan's position. The DCC "decided that Pakistan
should appeal to the mujahideen to help resolve the Kargil situation".
Soon after the DCC meeting ended, Sharif met with leaders of the Jehad
Council in the presence of Gen. Musharraf and made an "appeal" to them
to "help resolve" the Kargil situation. An official statement issued
after a Cabinet meeting on July 10 said: "The Cabinet noted that the
mujahideen have responded positively to the appeal of the Government
of Pakistan to help resolve the Kargil situation." The statement
further said that the Cabinet believed that Sharif's "peace initiative
had helped to internationalise the Kashmir issue in a manner that had
never been done before while peace in the region had been preserved...
The Cabinet acclaimed the heroic contribution of the Kashmiri freedom
fighters, particularly the martyrs of Kargil, who laid down their
lives for a just and legitimate cause. While stating that their
sacrifices would not be in vain, the Cabinet underlined Pakistan's
principled policy of providing moral, diplomatic and political support
to the freedom struggle of the people of Jammu and Kashmir."
After their meeting with Sharif, the militants denounced appeals for
their withdrawal from Kargil. Denying press reports that the militants
had agreed to consider the appeal, Council spokesman Abu Shahbaz said
that a withdrawal from Kargil would deliver a body blow to the "jehad
in Kashmir". The mujahideen, he said, would "fight to the end". "Not
all the international conspiracies against the freedom movement of
Kashmir can prevent us from moving towards the liberation of Kashmir,"
he said.
Clearly, the militants cannot be seen as sabotaging their own cause.
Since their movement, backed by Pakistan's "political support", is to
continue, withdrawal may prove to be disastrous for a movement that is
looking for new volunteers from the "jehadi madrasas" in Pakistan.
Aziz Siddiqui, a former editor of The Frontier Post, wrote in Dawn on
July 11: "It is hard to see that the defiant refusal of the mujahideen
groups to climb down can be much more than a sort of whistling in the
dark, a bid to acquire some dignity in defeat. Any indefinite
continuance of their operation will require maintenance of a supply
line of men and material which may not be easy without the cooperation
of the Pakistan Army."
Despite the spin put on the Kargil developments, Pakistanis will find
it hard to believe that they have gained from the enterprise. If the
intrusion was part of a well-thought-out policy, why was it not
pursued to its logical conclusion? If it was doomed from the
beginning, why was it executed in the first place? Convincing answers
will be hard to come by since the tradition of fudging and flattery,
which characterises the Pakistani politico-military establishment,
will not permit such a debate.
Siddiqui wrote in Dawn: "Humiliation at India's hand is hard to bear
in any circumstance; it is the worst sin a government (or a cricket
team) can commit. It shocks the people even more when they have been
made to expect the opposite."
Asad Durrani, a former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence,
argued in The News on July 9: "We had chinks in our armour, but as the
events unfolded it was the Indian external pincer that forced us to
agree to restore the LoC... Pakistan was pressured to restore the
status quo ante, not only because the West desired to prevent turmoil
in the region, but also due to our comparative vulnerability to
coercion... It (Kargil) has not only brought home the realities of
international politics... it has also taught us to regard events in
their correct perspective, rather than getting carried away by
self-serving hopes and hypes."
KARGIL was a result of the Pakistani establishment's anti-India
posture. Cross-border bus rides have not altered this ground reality.
Pakistan has been stoking the fires in Kashmir for 11 years; can a
single bus trip change anything? Vajpayee's bus diplomacy was a media
event - it was intended to project him as a peace-maker after the
nuclear tests of May 1998. However, India had hardly done its
homework, policy was absent and there was pressure from the United
States.
An excellent Pakistani perspective on the bus diplomacy was provided
by The Friday Times soon after the Lahore summit: "The transition from
a status-quo, jehad-oriented, hawkish foreign policy vis-a-vis India
to a forward-looking, moderate, peace-oriented foreign policy which
Mr. Sharif appears to be advocating is going to be very difficult.
Such a transition cannot take place without Mr. Sharif first cobbling
a broad political consensus for it and then nudging the national
security establishment to review its historic assumptions and accord
its approval to a change of tack... but Mr. Sharif has made no effort
to take the security establishment or the Pakistani people into
confidence. He has taken no steps to bring the political opposition on
board his non-ideological foreign policy agenda... Therefore, our fear
is that, like his many other hastily assembled initiatives on equally
contentious areas of economy and law, this (Lahore) initiative too is
likely to flounder on the rock of institutional confusion, political
indecision and jehadi counter-pressure."
The post-Lahore scene seems to match these words - in a sense, it has
been true to script. India had done nothing to jeopardise the Lahore
process. In March, in the cool climes of Nuwara Eliya in Sri Lanka,
Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and External Affairs Minister Jaswant
Singh were chalking out the methodology of implementing the Lahore
agreements. In April, the Indian High Commission was liberally doling
out visas to Pakistanis who wanted to travel to Mohali in Punjab to
see the India-Pakistan one-day cricket match. Special trains were
organised to take the Pakistani fans back and forth.
In May, when the Indian patrols returned to Kargil, they found
Pakistani intruders occupying Indian posts. So who was responsible for
the rupture - India or Pakistan? The finger must be pointed at
Pakistan - or, more specifically, both its civilian and military
leaderships - for having ruined what could have proved to be a long
roller-coaster ride to better relations.
As one diplomat in Islamabad put it: "Every Prime Minister who takes
power in New Delhi thinks that Pakistan is virgin territory waiting to
be explored." Clearly, the BJP does not have an understanding of the
dynamics of India-Pakistan relations, or it would not have used
persons like R.K. Mishra as emissaries.
At the other extreme, one sees the ludicrous spectacle of the Indian
Government banning Pakistan Television broadcasts and blocking access
to the Web site of Dawn. It is clear that notwithstanding the creation
of a new bureaucratic structure like the National Security Council,
the Indian establishment suffers from a poverty of strategic thinking.
Did the BJP ever consider the possibility that Pakistan would be
emboldened by its nuclear weapon status? There have been reports that
Pakistan had four times in the last 15 years planned to execute the
Kargil operation, but had to abort it on each occasion. But, now, when
it has the "ultimate weapon", Pakistan thought nothing of the Kargil
adventure. It may have backfired, but the absence of strategic
thinking shows the BJP establishment in a poor light.
Pakistan has begun calling back its men from Kargil, but it is clear
that there is no change in its policy of sending "jehadi elements"
into Kashmir. If anything, an Army that is smarting from the
experience of having to listen to political dictates may step up the
infiltration into Kashmir from other areas on the LoC - or try some
desperate actions elsewhere. The acknowledgement of "valiant actions"
by the mujahideen is not mere talk; the Pakistani establishment
genuinely believes it.
India must talk to Pakistan, but only on an equitable basis. Islamabad
should not be given any concession following its Kargil misadventure.
The infiltration into Kashmir must stop before a genuine dialogue
process can begin.
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