Title: Kosovo: The United
States Looking For an Exit
Author:
Publication: Global
Intelligence Update <http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/020700.asp>
Date: February 7, 2000
Summary
The United States is
moving to redefine its policy in Kosovo. The immediate reason can be found
in the deteriorating situation on the ground. Last week, violence intensified
between ethnic Albanians and Serbs; this was not something that the United
States bargained for when it intervened last year. For this and a host
of other reasons, it appears that Washington is now in the process of redefining
its role and quite possibly preparing to withdraw its forces.
Analysis
Increasingly, there
are signs that the United States is looking for a way to reposition itself
in Kosovo, nearly a year after leading NATO forces into a conflict over
the province. Last week in Europe, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen
suggested that U.S. forces are facing "mission creep" which neither military
commanders nor political leaders want. In addition, a case is building
in Washington that blames Europe for doing too little to help control Kosovo.
And in the last week, the city of Mitrovica in Kosovo has been the scene
of the very violence and chaos that NATO has always sought to avoid.
Ever since NATO intervened
in Kosovo nearly a year ago, one of the most interesting exercises has
been the attempt of serious analysts and Balkan residents to uncover the
hidden reason behind the U.S.-led intervention last March. The official
reason for the conflict was that the United States wanted to stop genocide
in Kosovo. Particularly in Europe, this was seen as a public justification
masking a hidden agenda. Theories suggested that hidden mines or even the
control of the telecommunications industry were the true reasons for intervention.
An entire industry was spawned to uncover the motives behind the two and
a half month-long conflict.
The reality, however,
is far more prosaic and, in some ways, more alarming. The U.S.-led intervention
was prompted precisely by what the U.S. government said. There were reports
of an impending holocaust in Kosovo. Criticized for failing to prevent
genocide in Rwanda and accused of sitting idly by in Bosnia, the Clinton
administration was afraid of another public relations nightmare - at a
time when domestic scandals were tarnishing the administration anyway.
The administration viewed
Kosovo as a low-risk, high-yield operation. The administration did not
expect an extended conflict, having drawn the belief in Bosnia that Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic was incapable of enduring an extended bombing
campaign. Expecting a repetition of events in Bosnia - when a brief bombing
campaign was followed by quick capitulation - the administration was caught
flat-footed when the war dragged on. The United States had been suckered
into a war of limited strategic interest from which the United States could
not withdraw. Milosevic, after all, had been portrayed as a monster. And
the administration could not negotiate with a monster.
NATO and the United States
ultimately engineered a victory, of sorts, last June when NATO forces occupied
Kosovo. But their arrival did not bring anything like closure. Quite to
the contrary, the alliance began an open-ended occupation in which the
mission did not correspond to the reality on the ground. The mission of
NATO forces was to ensure the security of all residents. The reality was
that NATO forces were, quite against their intentions, acting as the agents
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The ethnic Albanian guerrillas used
the NATO peacekeeping mission as a means for institutionalizing KLA rule
in the province. The effect was to turn victims into victimizers and NATO
peacekeepers into unwitting tools of ethnic Albanian revenge. In this situation,
NATO has never managed to find its balance or its center of gravity. NATO
troops have managed to alienate all sides - a fact underscored by the ongoing
violence in Mitrovica. On a larger scale, neither Washington nor Brussels
had ever faced a simple fact. In the region, the prevailing view is that
neutral benevolence is impossible; for NATO troops, there was no neutral
standpoint from which to mount their operation. It was inevitable that
the peacekeepers would find themselves caught in the crossfire between
Albanians, determined to keep what they think they have won, and Serbs,
increasingly determined to recover what they have lost.
Milosevic remains in
control in Belgrade. Nothing has been settled. For the United States, the
Kosovo experience violates the key lessons of the Vietnam experience. Withdrawing
from Southeast Asia nearly 20 years ago, the United States swore never
to again become embroiled, on the ground, in a civil war in another country.
In Kosovo, the United States has been involved in something worse: a civil
war that offers no clear exit strategy. The war, after all, cannot truly
end until one warring ethnic group, or the other, is completely expelled
from the region. Worse, this civil war is one in which the United States
has no real stake. In Vietnam, at least, some sort of strategic logic could
be asserted.
But this has not been
the case in Kosovo, where the driving motive for U.S. involvement has been
based on humanitarian motives. The humanitarian question is now cutting
the other way as peacekeepers are turned from saviors into confused bullies
in the minds of even the Albanians. This transformation is not the fault
of the troops, who are still mostly combat soldiers, trained to respond
to threats with overwhelming force. Keeping the peace, particularly in
a chaotic situation, requires a very different sort of training - the sort
that is given to police, of which there are still precious few in Kosovo.
More than having the
right training, a policeman is someone who is local. NATO has taken people
who were never trained as police in the first place, tossed them into an
utterly alien culture - and is now discovering that the solution is not
working. It appears that the administration is slowly recognizing the insanity
of the situation. In Munich last week, Cohen reportedly said, "I think
it has reached the level of concern on the part of not only members of
the U.S. Congress, but military commanders. They are concerned about the
possibility of mission creep - that the military is being called upon to
engage in police functions for which they are not properly trained and
we don't want them to carry out." The administration has acknowledged that
the situation is getting out of hand, that forces are not trained for the
mission and that no one now wants them to carry out the mission.
Most intriguing is Cohen's
reference to mission creep; there has, of course, been none. The nature
of the mission has remained the same. But increasingly, there is perception
of creep: the administration's perception has finally caught up with the
reality of the mission it so enthusiastically undertook nearly a year ago.
As a result, administration
officials and Congress members are looking for the exit. Since total withdrawal
of NATO forces is impossible without even more chaos, another solution
is appearing: Blame the Europeans and demand that they shoulder more of
the burden. Sen. John Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
has claimed that the real problem in Kosovo is that Europeans have not
fulfilled their obligations. They were supposed to send police, as well
as $35 million for policing functions, but only a few of the former and
none of the latter have arrived. European countries have agreed to take
command of the peacekeeping operation. By April, a Eurocorps contingent
is scheduled to command the NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR). More than
350 personnel from the five Eurocorps countries - Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg and Spain - are to take command of the 50,000 troops in Kosovo.
This of course does not solve the core problem. It may even compound it.
The United States, desperately wanting to minimize exposure and casualties,
will now find its forces under the control of a headquarters with its own
agenda.
The Europeans, however,
are not eager to undertake full responsibility for KFOR. Except for the
British government, the rest of Europe was more than a little restrained
in enthusiasm for the war. Most European governments foresaw precisely
the situation that has developed. The European view has always been that
the United States stumbled into a situation for which they had counseled
caution.
But there are far deeper
issues for European governments at this point. One is Russia. The emergence
of acting President Vladimir Putin and a much more assertive, anti-Western
Russia is a result of last year's war. European governments regard the
end game of Kosovo, in which the Russians were outmaneuvered and humiliated,
as a Pyrrhic victory. The Germans in particular now must deal with an increasingly
truculent Russia - in which they have invested billions that they will
never again see - and are not eager to be the flag-bearers of an operation
that continues to irritate the Russians.
Indeed, the Russian factor
is likely one reason that the United States wants out. Washington's relationship
with Moscow is increasingly dangerous. Rhetoric aside, the upcoming Sino-Russian
summit in March presents a serious threat to global American interests.
The United States does not want to see a deepening of the Sino-Russian
relationship. Instead, Washington needs to signal that the U.S. presence
in Kosovo does not present a strategic threat to the Russians. Beginning
the process of withdrawal would help enormously.
The problem with this
strategy is that Europeans are not likely to replace Americans as the objects
of Russian ire. As U.S. troops are caught in the crossfire between Kosovo
factions, the basic irrationality of the operation becomes apparent. Having
entered a civil war, the United States lacks both the will and resources
to impose a settlement. The settlement at hand, a fully Albanian Kosovo,
cleansed of Serbs, is intolerable. A NATO withdrawal, and the re-entry
of the Yugoslav Army, is unthinkable. In addition, U.S. forces are strained
by their dispersal around the globe with little strategic reason.
An exit from Kosovo will
emerge as an issue in the months to come, particularly in the context of
an American presidential election. The Clinton administration is setting
the stage for the withdrawal of at least some forces from Kosovo, leaving
the Europeans to handle it. It is far from clear that the Europeans will
do it. With both strategic and political considerations coinciding, Clinton
seems likely to try to trim the military commitment in Kosovo. However,
having stumbled into it, it is not clear that he will now be able to stumble
out. Nevertheless, he seems to be cranking up to give it his best shot.
