Title: On South Asia
Trip, Clinton Makes Clear Cold War Is Over
Author: Pamela Constable
Publication: Washington
Post Foreign Service
Date: March 27, 2000
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan,
March 26 -- President Clinton's stern warning to Pakistan during his visit
here Saturday has left its military government facing a sober new reality:
The Cold War strategic alliance with the United States is over, and Pakistan
must move to restore democracy and control terrorism in Kashmir or fend
for itself in its mounting confrontation with India.
But the choice facing
Pakistan's leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, is one he may not be willing
or able to make, according to analysts here. If he cracks down on insurgent
groups fighting in Indian Kashmir, he risks igniting the wrath of powerful
Islamic forces inside Pakistan, including segments of the army. If he does
not, he risks forfeiting Western economic support and driving his struggling
nation deeper into poverty.
"Pakistan must do some
very hard thinking now. It cannot sustain its policy on Kashmir and build
a viable economy at the same time," said Talaat Massood, a former Pakistani
army chief. "We cannot afford to be marginalized, but there are those in
Pakistan who want to continue the Cold War for their own interests. I fear
the message from Washington is so harsh that it may strengthen those forces."
Before arriving in Pakistan
on Saturday, Clinton paid a cordial four-day visit to India and called
for a comprehensive economic and strategic relationship with New Delhi.
His trip signaled a clear preference for democratic India over military-ruled
Pakistan as a future U.S. partner in South Asia and marked the end of the
uneasy, arm's-length approach that dominated U.S.-India relations for decades,
largely as a result of India's tilt toward the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.
In addition, comments
by Clinton and his aides suggested that Washington was moving closer to
accepting India's position on Kashmir, the divided Himalayan border region
that both India and Pakistan claim. Indian security forces, which control
their country's portion of Kashmir, have been under constant attack by
Pakistan-based Islamic insurgents who want to "liberate" the predominantly
Muslim population there from rule by India, which is majority Hindu.
In interviews and speeches
during the week, Clinton said he believed that "elements" of the Pakistani
government were involved with the Kashmiri insurgents, that it was "wrong"
to attack across the Line of Control separating Indian and Pakistani Kashmir,
and that it would be very difficult for the two rivals to resume dialogue
as long as violence continues in Kashmir.
Indian officials were
delighted by the shift in U.S. policy, which they saw as a long overdue
acknowledgment of their country's economic ties and political commonality
with the United States. The visit promised to open new doors for U.S.-India
partnerships and technology sharing, even though U.S. sanctions imposed
after India's nuclear tests in 1998 still restrict such transfers.
Even more important,
New Delhi viewed Clinton's critical comments about Pakistan's role in Kashmir,
along with his repeated assertions that he would not mediate the dispute,
as a vindication of its tough stance on Kashmir and proof that, at long
last, Washington was finally casting off its Cold War blinders toward Pakistan's
pernicious role in the region.
"The whole purpose of
his visit was to tell the Pakistani people that the U.S. supports democracy,"
said K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian defense and national security expert. "At
the end, the lingering image in people's minds will be one of Clinton dancing
with village women in [India] and slipping into Pakistan with three decoy
planes. Those images will tell the whole world what the nature of states
in South Asia is."
In stark contrast to
his embrace of India, Clinton's brief stop in Islamabad was hurried, somber
and marked by unusually heavy security. There were no joint statements
or even photographs of Clinton with Musharraf, and the president's televised
speech to the nation made a polite but pointed demand: Pakistan must change
or face total isolation by Washington.
Thus, his stopover here
completed the shift in the American approach toward the region: an end
to the longstanding, Cold War era policy in which military rule in Islamabad
was tolerated because Pakistani collaboration was needed to confront Soviet
military designs on neighboring Afghanistan and bolster America's security
interests in the area.
Although Clinton's stop
in Pakistan was controversial within his administration, the combined impact
of his visit to both countries left an indelible impression in the region
that Washington has chosen democracy over dictatorship in South Asia, and
that its willingness to bargain on a range of thorny issues, from trade
to nuclear nonproliferation, is no longer hostage to the strategic calculus
of the past.
In Pakistan, "Clinton
almost behaved as if he were in enemy territory. His visit marks the closure
of the U.S.-Pakistani strategic alliance," said Rifaat Hussain, chairman
of the department of defense and strategic studies at Quaid-I-Azam University.
"Pakistan always assumed it could count on the U.S. to bail it out in a
confrontation with India. Now the message from Washington is clear: If
you are aggressive, we will side with India. If you don't become part of
our values, you are on your own."
Some military analysts
suggest that Clinton's rebuff could drive Pakistan to seek closer strategic
relations with three traditional and controversial allies in the region:
China, a nuclear superpower and longtime rival of India; Iran, a revolutionary
Islamic state led by Shiite Muslim clerics; and Afghanistan, an international
pariah headed by a fundamentalist Muslim militia.
No one predicts the chill
with Washington will prompt Pakistan's military to provoke a serious confrontation
with India, let alone a nuclear war between the two countries, both of
which tested nuclear weapons in 1998. But some analysts said it could remove
any remaining constraints on Islamabad's control over the insurgents in
Kashmir, whose violent attacks have escalated in the past several months.
"Clinton has chosen India,
and we must take a deep look at the new ground realities. It is time for
Pakistan to readjust its geopolitical priorities and rediscover its traditional
friends in the region," said Aslam Mirza Beg, a former Pakistani army chief.
"We don't need to enter into an arms race with India, but we cannot let
Kashmir go. Let Kashmir become a bleeding wound for India. The costs will
be heavy on both sides, but heavier for India."
But U.S. officials, whose
principal concerns in South Asia are to reduce the threat of terrorism
and nuclear war, are betting that a chastised Pakistan will be less likely
than before to launch any new aggression against India, and hoping that
a triumphant New Delhi may be more willing to reopen negotiations on Kashmir
now that it no longer need fear an American interventionist tilt toward
Islamabad.
Some Pakistani analysts
also say they hope Musharraf--who has said repeatedly he is willing to
resume negotiations with India and wants to gradually restore democratic
rule at home--will swallow his pride and realize that his best hope to
salvage his country of 140 million people from financial ruin and political
isolation lies in rescuing its longtime friendship with Washington.
U.S. aid to Pakistan
is limited, and economic sanctions have been in place since 1998 because
of the nuclear tests. But the ailing country, burdened with $140 million
in foreign debt, is heavily dependent on loans and credits from financial
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Those are likely to be cut off if the United States decides to isolate
Islamabad.
Some Pakistani observers
say the internal threat from Islamic groups has been exaggerated, and that
despite their emotional support for the Kashmiri cause, most Pakistanis
are more concerned about their financial problems than the abstract notion
of Islamic jihad, or holy war, espoused by the insurgent groups in Kashmir.
"Musharraf has to choose
between jihad and modernization, because they cannot coexist," said Ahmed
Rashid, a Pakistani writer and analyst. "The fundamentalists are ready
to pounce on him, but the people are much more worried about surviving
than about Kashmir. They still trust Musharraf and they still fear and
respect the army. If he does the right thing, they will respect it even
more."
While acknowledging Musharraf's
dilemma, Rashid said the general has little alternative if he wants to
keep what support he has from Washington and prevent his reformist agenda
from collapsing. After Musharraf seized power from a democratically elected
government in a coup d'etat in October, U.S. officials gave him the benefit
of the doubt because of his popularity inside Pakistan. Now they have warned
him that their patience is running out.
"Clinton's message was
that this is Musharraf's last chance," Rashid said. "He faces a stark choice,
with limited time to deliver, but he will not get another reprieve."
