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A Tightrope Walk
A Tightrope Walk
Author: Editorial
Publication: The Times
of India
Date: August 1, 2000
Sunday's headline, "Guns
fall silent in Kashmir", was the most powerful in years, in a decade, to
be precise. The symbolism of the words cannot be missed because they
contain a glimpse of a future thought to be unattainable for Kashmir.
Whatever the eventual course of talks between the Hizbul Mujahideen and
the government of India, the fact that hostilities have ceased for now
is of enormous significance to the ordinary Kashmiri. Peace, or aman,
as the locals call it, has long been a fond dream in the Valley.
However, in all this time, there was hardly anything like hope for a people
caught between unrelenting militancy and excesses by the Indian security
forces. For the average resident of the valley, it had become something
of an everyday ordeal to be first used by the militants and then face harassment
from the security forces for being involved with the militants. So,
over the weekend when guns fell silent, the Valley for once cast aside
its scepticism and rejoiced in the promise held out by the ceasefire.
It is precisely this that places an extraordinary burden on the shoulders
of the Indian decision-makers. A single wrong step can set back the
negotiation process by many more years. Fortunately, the Indian side
appears to have realised the futility of holding on to words that are calculated
to upset the militant groups. As the now chairman of the Hurriyat
Conference, Abdul Ghani Bhatt, told The Times of India sometime ago, when
the Indian government offers to talk, it does so in its constitutional
capacity. To state this explicitly is to deliberately provoke the
other side and derail the prospects for talks.
With the subtle change
in the Indian government idiom, at least informally -- the Indian Constitution
will not be a pre-condition for talks, but it will be for a solution --
the two sides may have crossed one obvious stumbling block. However,
the trickiest bit is still to come. And that concerns the involvement
of Pakistan. The Hizbul and even much of the Hurriyat are pro-Pakistan
and it is only to be expected that they will insist on tripartite talks
between India, Pakistan and the militant groups. For India this is
not easy because to invite Pakistan for negotiations on Kashmir is to give
that country jurisdiction over territory we have always held to be ours
and ours alone. To be sure, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to
India was complete in all respects. Nonetheless, it was Jawaharlal
Nehru who took the issue to the United Nations and thus made it a dispute.
India also pledged to hold a plebiscite, which was not honoured because
Pakistan did not keep its promise to withdraw from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
(PoK). Even leaving aside all this, we cannot wish away Pakistan.
Pakistan is very much behind the Hizbul ceasefire move which came about
largely because of intense backroom manoeuvres involving intermediaries
from the United States. The obvious way out for India is to devote
the initial part of the talks to Pakistan's involvement. It might
be a good idea to ask the Hizbul, and other militant groups, to justify
an invitation to Pakistan. This will ensure that the talks do not
flounder even before they have begun.
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