Author: L.K.Advani
Publication: BJP Today
Date: August 1-15, 2000
Thanks to the Ekta Yatra,
(December 1999- January 1992) there has been a lot of animated public debate
these days on Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, the provision that
confers a special status on Jammu and Kashmir State. The discussion has
not been confined only to its content or to its desirability. Several writers
have sought to probe its genesis and history. This piece has a look at
a very significant facet of this history.
Going through parliamentary
records, I felt intrigued by a remark made by the then Prime Minister Pandit
Nehru in which he suggested that this particular provision was Sardar Patel's
contribution. In the course of a longish statement on Kashmir made in the
Lok Sabha (July 24, 1952) Pandit Nehru defended the Article on the ground
that as the issue had been referred to the United Nations "the whole matter
was in a fluid state". He went on to add that the matter relating to Jammu
and Kashmir's position in the Constitution was clinched in November, 1949,
and that it was Sardar Patel who was "all this time dealing with it".
Pursuing the matter further,
I discovered that factually Pandit Nehru was quite correct inasmuch as
when the Constituent Assembly adopted this particular provision, Pandit
Nehru had gone abroad, and all affairs of Government were being looked
after by Sardar Patel.
But thereby hangs an
interesting tale, recounted in some detail by Mr. V. Shankar, Private Secretary
to the Minister of Home Affairs at that time.
In his two-volume book
"My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel", V Shankar says that Sheikh Abdullah
"did not trust the Indian Government and while he accepted a constitutional
relationship with the Indian Union, he wanted to reserve to the Government
of Jammu and Kashmir of his choice the final word as to the detailed context
of the accession on three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communication
and any further accretion to such accession". Sheikh Abdullah also wanted
full freedom for the Constituent Assembly to form its own constitution.
Before leaving the country,
Pandit Nehru finalised the draft provisions relating to Jammu and Kashmir
with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and entrusted to Mr. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar
the task of piloting these provisions through the Constituent Assembly.
Obviously, Mr. Ayyangar had no idea as to how daunting this task was going
to prove.
Before formally moving
the Article in the Constituent Assembly, Mr. Ayyangar spelt out his proposals
in the Congress Parliamentary Party. His presentation, Shankar notes, provoked
"a storm of angry protests from all sides and Gopalaswamy Ayyangar found
himself a lone defender with Maulana Azad an ineffective supporter".
According to Shankar,
"In the party, there was a strong body of opinion which looked askance
at any suggestion of discrimination between the Jammu and Kashmir State
and other States as members of the future Indian Union and was not prepared
'to go beyond certain limits in providing for the special position of Jammu
and Kashmir. Sardar Patel was himself fully in accord with this opinion,
but due to his usual policy of not standing in the way of Pandit Nehru
and Gopalaswamy Ayyangar who sorted out problems in their own light, he
had kept his won views in framing the draft proposals, with the result
that he heard the proposals only when Gopalaswamy Ayyangar announced them
to the Congress Party".
Dismayed by the rough
reception he had to face at the Congress Party meeting, Mr. Ayyangar rushed
to Sardar Patel and "appealed to him to come to his rescue". What transpired
subsequently has been recounted by Shankar thus: "Sardar heard him (Ayyangar)
and lapsed into silence, To my query as to what reply he would like to
give, he said he would think it over.
"Later in the evening
he rang me up and said that he had sent for Satyanarain Sinha, the Chief
Whip, and had asked him to convene a meeting of the Party Executive, together
with some of the prominent stormy petrels and they would discuss the matter;
he wanted me to be present at the meeting".
The meeting was held
at the appointed hour and Maulana Azad was also present. The meeting was
one of the stormiest I have ever witnessed. The opinion in opposition to
Gopalaswamy's formula was forcefully and even militantly expressed ...
even Maulana Azad was shouted down. It was left to Sardar to bring the
discussion down to the practical plane and to plead that because of the
international complications, a provisional approach alone could be made.........
Reluctantly it seems,
the Congress Party fell in line with Sardar's wishes, Indeed, it is this
that explains why in the Constituent Assembly the discussion on this provision
was so vapid and sketchy. Apart from Ayyangar's own speech, there was not
a single worthwhile intervention, either for, or against. The steam, obviously
had been let off at the party meeting.
Curiously, Sardar's success
at persuading Congressmen to reconcile with this "temporary" provision
- Article 370 - brought about an estrangement of sorts between Patel and
his lieutenant.
Writes Shankar, "I was
somewhat taken aback at Sardar's acquiescence in the draft formula of Gopalaswamy
Ayyangar and strongly felt that Sardar had compromised the position of
the Indian Union and other States in accepting that formula as the basis.
Frankly speaking, I was resentful of Sardar's attitude and when we returned
to his residence during the lunch break, I was silent and sullen and repaired
straight to my office room. Maniben came to call me for lunch; I declined
to go and told her about the pain and anguish inwardly felt, adding that
for the first time I nursed a grievance of betrayal on the part of Sardar.
She conveyed my feeling of resentment to Sardar who sent her back to tell
me that I should join the lunch table at least for a talk. I did so, accordingly.
As soon as I was seated, Sardar spoke, "So you are annoyed with me for
having accepted Gopalaswamy's formula. I queried that if he felt that way,
why did he not indicate his mind earlier. He said, "I was deeply concerned
at the situation. Gopalaswamy had acted under Panditji's advice. If Jawaharlal
Nehru were here I could have had it out with him. But now could I do so
with Gopalaswamy who was only acting under order? If I did, people would
have said that I was taking revenge on his confidant when he was away.
Gopalaswamy had appealed to me for help. How could I have let him down
in the absence- of his Chief.
"I then asked why he
had let down the country and the other States whose Constituent Assemblies
had been scrapped in accordance with his advice and policy. He conceded
the validity of the criticism but pointed out the delicate international
position of the State and the issue of its relationship with India. We
felt that the present situation had to be tided over without giving up
the eventuality and this had been done under the formula. He said that
after all, neither Sheikh Abdullah nor Gopalaswamy was permanent. The future
would depend on the strength and guts of the Indian Government and if "we
cannot have confidence in our own strength we do not deserve to exist as
a nation".
And here is a postscript
to this. revealing episode. On July 24, 1952, the day on which Pandit Nehru
made the Kashmir Statement and affirmed that it was Sardar Patel who was
dealing with the Jammu and Kashmir provision, V Shankar, at that time Joint
Secretary in Ayyangar's Ministry ran into his Ministry and exchanged notes
about the happening. Ayyangar's comment on Panditji's remark was sharp.
"It is an ill-return to Sardar for the magnanimity he had shown in accepting
Panditji's point of view against his better judgement".
Courtesy: Indian Express,
February 17, 1992.
