Author: Philip Saunders,
and Jing-dong Yuan, with Gaurav Kampani
Publication: Rediff
on Net
Date: August 22, 2000
If you thought that China
had become a serious missile nonproliferation convert, then think again.
New evidence produced by US intelligence agencies suggests that Chinese
ballistic missile-related technology transfers to Pakistan remain a serious
proliferation concern. Between 1988-1994, China sold approximately
34 complete M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan; in this period China also
allegedly built a turnkey missile plant for Pakistan at Tarwanah, a suburb
of Rawalpindi.
During the 1990s, the
United States used a combination of sanctions and incentives to persuade
China to halt missile exports and related technology transfers to Pakistan.
For a while it appeared the US had succeeded in achieving the above goals.
However, it is now clear that China, despite assurances to the US government
to the contrary, has resumed missile-related technology assistance to Pakistan.
To be fair to China,
there is no international law or treaty that bans the trade in missiles
or missile-related technologies between sovereign countries. The
only restrictions that exist are the consequence of the US-led Missile
Technology Control Regime, MTCR, to which China is an informal and partial
adherent. Nevertheless, because China interprets its MTCR obligations
very narrowly and treats missile proliferation as a function of its larger
strategic and commercial interests, the question of regime compliance continues
to dog US-China relations.
What is the MTCR?
The United States and
its G-7 partners formed the MTCR in 1987. The MTCR is an informal
cartel which seeks to ban the export of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles
and rocket systems capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over a range
greater than 300 km.
The MTCR's annex of controlled
equipment and technologies is divided into two categories. Category
I items, which include complete rocket and ballistic missile systems, cruise
missiles, their production facilities and complete sub-systems, are subject
to a presumption of export denial. On the other hand, Category II
items, which cover a wide range of missile parts, components, and subsystems
such as propellants, structural materials and flight test instruments,
can be exported at the discretion of an MTCR partner government on a case-by-case
basis for acceptable end uses.
The MTCR initially focused
on nuclear capable delivery systems; but in 1993, after the experience
of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the guidelines were amended to cover all delivery
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological,
and chemical.
MTCR and the M-11 controversy
China reportedly began
negotiating the sale of M-11 ballistic missiles with Pakistan in the late-1980s
and signed a sales contract in 1988. In 1991 US intelligence discovered
that China had begun transferring the M-11s to Islamabad. Despite
Chinese denials, the United States imposed sanctions against Chinese and
Pakistani entities engaged in the trade in May 1991. In November
1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State James
Baker reached a verbal agreement whereby China agreed to "informally abide
by the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime,
MTCR" in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions. After China sent
a letter to the US State Department in February 1992 affirming the agreement,
sanctions were lifted.
China's 1991 commitment
to informally adhere to the MTCR guidelines did not end the M-11 controversy.
In December 1992, reports surfaced that China had transferred 34 complete
M-11 missiles to Pakistan in violation of its 1991 pledge. As a result,
in May 1993, the Clinton administration re-imposed MTCR-related sanctions
on Chinese entities after determining that Beijing had engaged in missile
trade with Pakistan.
During post-sanctions
negotiations with the United States, China argued that the deal did not
violate the MTCR as the M-11 could deliver only a 500 kg payload over an
advertised range of 280 km; in a narrow technical sense therefore, the
missile's capabilities did not exceed the MTCR parameters. But the
Clinton administration held its ground.
The impasse was resolved
in October 1994 when the United States agreed to lift sanctions in return
for a Chinese pledge that it would abide by Category I of the MTCR and
ban exports of all ground-to-ground missiles exceeding the primary parameters
of the MTCR. More significantly, China also agreed to the concept
of "inherent capability" which binds it from exporting any missile that
is inherently capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over 300 km.
For example, the Chinese M-11 can deliver a 500 kg payload over a range
of 280 km; but the missile's range can be extended to cover distances beyond
300 km with a reduced payload. Hence, by agreeing to the inherent
capability clause, China agreed to prohibit future exports of the M-11
missile and other longer-range missile systems.
Persistent US diplomatic
efforts since then led China to reaffirm its 1994 pledge. China also
agreed to actively consider joining the MTCR. In June 1998, after
India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, China and the United States
issued a joint statement affirming that they would strengthen their export
control laws to "prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology
that could in any way assist programmes in India and Pakistan for nuclear
weapons or ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons."
However, several issues
pertaining to China's missile export policy remain unresolved. According
to US government sources, China has interpreted its missile export controls
very narrowly. Although Beijing has complied with the MTCR's Category
I restrictions and had stopped the transfer of complete missile systems,
it has not extended the ban to cover specific missile components and related
technologies covered under Category II of the MTCR. In addition,
China has kept the precise scope, content and extent of its internal missile
export control list a secret. It is also unclear if this control
list approximates MTCR guidelines.
Continuing Chinese Transfers?
New US intelligence reports
suggest China has violated its 1994 pledge and has resumed missile-related
technology transfers to Pakistan. Suspicions persist that Pakistan's
Shaheen-1 and II medium-range ballistic missiles correspond closely to
China's M-series of ballistic missiles, although there is no concrete evidence
that Pakistan obtained either missile from China.
For example, a CIA report
on global weapons sales submitted to the US Congress in August 2000 states,
"Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during
the reporting period (July-August 1999)." Similarly, another CIA report
made public in February 1999 stated, "Chinese and North Korean entities
continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile programme
during the first half of 1998. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's
efforts to produce ballistic missiles..." This allegation was repeated
in a February 2000 CIA report to the US Congress which said, "Some [Chinese]
ballistic missile assistance [to Pakistan] continues."
Predictably, China has
dismissed these reports as "groundless." However, an alarmed Clinton administration
recently dispatched John D Holum, senior advisor for arms control and international
security affairs in the State Department, to take up the matter with the
Chinese. But Holum failed in his mission and admitted, "The issue
remains unresolved."
Another senior US official
who also attended the talks was more candid and told The New York Times
that the two- day talks, "Did not allay concerns about recent Chinese help
to Pakistan's ballistic missile programme."
Explaining Chinese Behavior
Why does China continue
to transfer missile related technologies to Pakistan? Some analysts argue
that the Chinese are the ultimate realists. China's proliferation
and nonproliferation policies are governed by strategic and commercial
interests. Even more significantly, China calibrates its proliferation
behaviour and compliance with global arms control regimes and cartels to
gain bargaining leverage in negotiations with the United States over Taiwan.
Pakistan is China's "all
weather" ally in South Asia and the two countries are united by their rivalry
with India. In negotiations with the United States, China has described
Pakistan as its "Israel." Therefore, China is committed to Pakistan's security.
In the context of the nuclear arms competition in the region, China views
Pakistan as the underdog and has therefore accepted the task of underwriting
Pakistan's security against advances in the Indian nuclear and missile
programme. The Chinese have also probably calculated that aiding
Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies will divert India's military
attention and prevent it from focusing on China. This goal might
have assumed added priority after May 1998, when India decided to deploy
a minimum deterrent with China as its primary target.
But China's policies
are not monocausal. China also uses missile sales and the ambiguity
of its commitment to MTCR standards as a bargaining chip to achieve other
foreign policy goals with the United States. For example, during
negotiations with American diplomats, China linked the M- 11 transfers
to Pakistan with the US sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan. Similarly, continuing
technological assistance to Pakistan may be linked to US threats to transfer
theater missile defense systems and other sophisticated conventional arms
to Taiwan. China probably hopes to use the threat of ballistic missile
proliferation and the carrot of full MTCR compliance to persuade the United
States to forego any potential transfer of theater missile defense systems
currently under development to Taiwan.
Finally, commercial motives
often merge with strategic concerns to determine Chinese decisions about
arms sales. After Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping launched his modernisation
drive in the 1980s, state-owned firms came under enormous pressure to adhere
to market principles and operate on profit principles. Exports of
dual-use nuclear technologies, ballistic and cruise missiles, especially
those that were regulated by international cartels or subject to export
denials by other countries, became a lucrative means of generating profits.
For example, China earned nearly $ 3 billion from its CSS-2 intermediate-range
ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. Similarly,
Chinese cruise missile sales to Iran and short-range ballistic missile
sales to Libya and Syria were primarily guided by profit motives.
Policy Implications
Continuing Chinese missile
proliferation to Pakistan will have the unfortunate effect of accelerating
the nuclear domino dynamics in South Asia. During the 1980s China
helped Pakistan acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It followed
up this policy in the 1990s by proliferating ballistic missiles to Islamabad.
India's own nuclear and ballistic missile advances played a role in China's
decision to help Pakistan develop missile capabilities; but India cited
China's policy of covert proliferation as one of the principal reasons
why it made its own nuclear capability overt. Renewed Chinese missile
assistance will not only help Pakistan weaponise its nuclear forces, but
it will also increase pressures in New Delhi to operationalise India's
proposed minimum deterrent.
Weaponisation and deployment
of nuclear forces by India and Pakistan will further obstruct the US goal
of arranging a formal cap or nuclear "restraint regime" in the region.
Fledgling nuclear arsenals are usually characterised by complex organisational
and management problems such as weak command and control, poor real-time
surveillance and intelligence gathering, force stability, etc. These
problems will increase the chances of a dangerous nuclear crisis in South
Asia significantly.
Regardless of whether
Pakistan's ballistic missile programme is the result of India's own advances,
analysts in New Delhi have interpreted the Chinese transfers as another
example of Beijing's attempts to contain India. In the United States,
conservatives and China-bashers have begun citing China's recurring missile
transfers in apparent violation of its earlier pledges as an example of
Chinese perfidy. They have used the episode to press their case for
robust theater and national missile defenses and have threatened to enact
a China nonproliferation law that would mandate sanctions if China continues
its recent proliferation behaviour.
As a result, the emerging
nuclear and missile race between India and Pakistan has the potential to
damage US-China relations and affect both regional and global stability.
Indeed, unraveling the proliferation connection between China and Pakistan
remains one of the most important and difficult challenges for global nonproliferation
efforts.
(Phil Saunders is Director
of the East Asia Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey,
CA. Jing- dong Yuan and Gaurav Kampani are Senior Research Associates
at the Center.)
