Author: Harold A Gould
Publication: The Observer
of Business and Politics
Date: August 22,2000
On July 31, Congressman
David O Bonior published an op-ed in The Washington Post, which is a grievously
inaccurate analysis of the Kashmir dispute. While he was correct in saying
that the roots of the Kashmir crisis run deep, almost everything that follows
this truism betrays a blatant anti-Indian bias. One of the principal respects
in which he reveals his bias is by equating India and Pakistan as "two
unstable nuclear powers... on a collision course".
He goes on to say that
the roots of the Kashmir crisis lie in the fact that a United Nations plebiscite
which was to be conducted in 1948, 'in the wake of Indian and Pakistani
independence', for the purpose of determining Kashmiri self-determination
was never honoured. The implication was that the failure to hold this plebiscite
was due to India's refusal to give up its military occupation of Kashmir
and that, indeed, the reasons why the crisis persists to this day is because
India "continues to occupy Kashmir".
He also claims that Pakistan's
preoccupation with maintaining a large war machine and spending inordinate
amounts of its national wealth on the military (to the detriment of efforts
to combat poverty and illiteracy) is India's fault. It stems from the "belief
that war with India is all but inevitable", he says. Finally, the Congressman
advocates a more active role by the United States in resolving the Kashmir
dispute, because he sees this as the only way that eventual nuclear war
in South Asia can be averted.
Bonior's analysis does
not help because it avoids or ignores certain basic historical facts that
must be recognised and acknowledged before a serious discussion of the
South Asian crisis can take place. We must start with the 1948 UN call
for a plebiscite on self-determination for Kashmir. No mention is made
of the fact that the UN call for such a plebiscite occurred only after
a UN-negotiated cease-fire was brought about between India and Pakistan,
following the first war that was fought between them over who should control
Kashmir.
In the stalemate that
followed, with Pakistani forces occupying half the state, and refusing
to withdraw so that a fair election could be held (which was what the UN
mandate required), something the Indian side was prepared to do on a mutual
basis, a de facto partition occurred and remains in place to this day.
In other words, both India and Pakistan 'occupy' portions of Kashmir state,
not India alone. The skirmishes and wars that have subsequently followed
have occurred mainly because Pakistan has repeatedly attempted to impose
its version of what the final solution for Kashmir should be (viz., total
accession to Pakistan), rather than accept a negotiated settlement which
recognises the existing realities and the legitimate rights and interests
of all parties to the dispute, that is, the Kashmiri people, India and
Pakistan, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.
To an important extent,
Pakistan's prolonged intransigence was reinforced by the US's misguided
South Asia policy of recruiting it into its anti-Soviet alliance. It led
two generations of Pakistani leaders to believe that, tacitly at least,
America favoured their version of the dispute. It also contributed to the
growth of Pakistan's military culture, whose existence Congressman Bonior
appears to blame on the Indians.
As early as the 1950s,
Jawaharlal Nehru grasped the dangerous implications of this misbegotten
alliance. He foresaw that it would encourage Pakistan's reactionary dominant
elites to resist needed social and political reforms, such as India undertook,
and result in the emergence of a war economy that would divert precious
resources away from addressing the country's pervasive poverty, illiteracy
and social inequality.
These are the things
that explain Pakistan's impoverishing, obsessive belief that 'war with
India is inevitable'. Pakistan's failure as a nation, born of its client
status and failure to face the challenges of major social reform, are responsible
for this state of mind, not India and not Kashmir. The war threat has perennially
emanated from Pakistan, not India. The three wars that have been fought
between the two (1948, 1965 and 1971) were all initiated by Pakistan. This,
in itself, should give pause to Bonior's opinionations.
In the most recent instance
of military conflict between the two, it is again Pakistan which fired
the first shot, crossed borders and launched an invasion of the Kargil
region. Yet, Bonior depicts what is known to have been an outright act
of aggression as just another 'clash', for which he implies both sides
were equally culpable. Nothing could be further from the truth. That this
act of wanton aggression did not escalate into full-blown war, nuclear
or otherwise, is a tribute to India's self-restraint and maturity in the
face of the most dire provocation.
The tragedy of this breach
of the peace is further compounded by the fact that, only months earlier,
an accord had been reached at Lahore that seemed to offer a real chance
for conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. It was Pakistan's descent
once again into political fratricide, military dictatorship and sabre-rattling
that doomed this crucial initiative to failure. Bonior makes much of the
nuclear threat in South Asia and exhorts the US to appoint some sort of
'special envoy for Kashmir'. Such American meddling is not the answer.
The Indians will not accept it and the Pakistanis have unreasonable expectations
for the role they want the US to play.
They have not recovered
from their Cold War illusions about what the American relationship should
be. And, anyhow, tying the nuclear issue exclusively to Kashmir, coupled
with the insinuation that India bears all the responsibility, is an unrealistic
and unworkable strategy.
Kashmir is more symptom
than cause of the deepest threats to peace in South Asia. The greatest
threats emanate from the fragility of public institutions in Pakistan and
the imminent danger arising from this that Pakistan may soon politically
implode.
If this occurs and the
politics of desperation, driven by Taliban-style fundamentalist fanaticism,
takes hold, then the nuclear trigger could slip from the hand of what remains
of responsible government in Pakistan with what terrible consequences one
can only imagine.
When Bonior had his meeting
with Pakistan's latest military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf he might
have done well to have stressed these points. At the same time, Bonior
should have urged the General to open a mature political dialogue with
his robustly democratic neighbour, India, which is institutionally and
temperamentally equipped to engage in mature diplomacy
Surely these measures
would provide great reassurance not only to the people of Kashmir and South
Asia, but to the entire world as well. (IANS)
(Mr Gould is professor
at the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Virginia, US)
