Author: Swapan Dasgupta
Publication: India Today
Date: September 18,
2000
Strange, it would seem,
are the ways of the certifying engineers of secularism. At its National
Council meet in Nagpur, new BJP President Bangaru Laxman advises the party
to shed a "pre-conceived approach" and "actively work to bring more and
more dynamic and socially respected Muslim activists into our party".
A long-overdue step you would imagine and one that is imperative to the
healthy functioning of our democracy. And how do the secular fundamentalists
respond? By instantly dismissing it as a sham and a complete charade.
Reactions not very dissimilar to the vicious communalist outbursts that
greeted the Congress' Muslim "mass contact" programme in 1937.
To those familiar with
history, the analogy shouldn't seem far-fetched. In the 1937 elections
to the newly established provincial assemblies, the Congress won handsome
victories in eight of the 11 provinces. It swept the general seats
but drew a near blank in the Muslim (reserved) constituencies-except in
the NWFP. To offset this imbalance, Jawaharlal Nehru initiated a
"mass contact" programme to attract Muslims to the Congress. The
Muslim League, whose separatist existence was threatened by this move,
retaliated viciously. It levelled grave charges of anti-Muslim bias
against the Congress ministries-citing the teaching of Hindi and the singing
of Vande Mataram as examples-and ended up in 1940 demanding Pakistan.
This paid dividends. In the 1946 election, the Muslim electorate
throughout India voted unambiguously for Pakistan, unmindful of the consequences.
Examine today's situation.
The 1999 Lok Sabha poll led to a conclusive victory for the BJP-led NDA,
the first clear mandate since 1984. Exit polls indicated a swing
(with regional variations) to the NDA among the middle classes, youth,
backward castes, Dalits and Adivasis. The only community that defied
the trend was Muslims, who swung to the Congress. Even non-Hindutva
NDA partners like the Samata, TDP, DMK and Trinamool Congress failed to
secure any significant Muslim support. The net result was that for
the first time since 1951-52, a government was elected minus the backing
of India's largest minority. Except in Kashmir, the Muslim electoral
behaviour was contrarian, despite Hindu nationalism being a non-issue.
The Muslim voters gambled heavily on Sonia Gandhi and lost.
Among other things, the
1999 outcome demolished the dangerous and self-serving theory of a Muslim
veto-a theory that has its origins in the 1937 and 1946 elections that
led to Pakistan. But it has led to an unhealthy situation of Muslims
not having a stake in the power structure. Laxman's initiative must
be viewed in that context as an attempt to broaden the social base of the
ruling coalition. A legitimate political exercise.
Admittedly, there is
a deep-rooted Muslim aversion to the BJP. It is unrealistic to expect
it to disappear overnight. But it is possible to expect the community
to forge an expedient working relationship with the BJP centred on the
NDA manifesto. The BJP has made a gesture; it merits a degree of
reciprocity. It won't happen if the Muslim League's derision of nationalist
Muslims like Maulana Azad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and R.A. Kidwai is
mindlessly replicated against the Bakhts and Naqvis. It won't also
happen if the community retreats into fundamentalist ghettos sustained
by dubious foreign funding. History should warn India's Muslims of
the grim consequences of a contrived alienation, fuelled by mullahs and
modernists.
