Author:
Publication: www.stratfor.com
Date: December 7, 2000
Analysis
Pakistan's National Command
Authority held its second meeting in Rawalpindi Nov. 27 at the Strategic
Plans Division, The Nation reported. Pakistan's Chief Executive Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, who leads the NCA, chaired the meeting. During
this last session, the NCA made decisions to consolidate its nuclear weapons
management system.
Musharraf is reforming
Pakistan's nuclear sector and command system as a strategic deterrent to
India. He wants to consolidate his power in the country, which is
driven by different and antagonistic forces. Musharraf needs the
added strength in order to negotiate with the international community -
and within his own country.
The NCA was established
in February 2000 to create command and control mechanisms for Pakistan's
nuclear weapons and missile systems. It is responsible for policy
formulation, employment and development control over all strategic nuclear
forces and strategic organizations. Besides Musharraf, the NCA includes
foreign affairs, defense and interior ministers, chiefs of all military
services and heads of strategic organizations.
After the meeting, the
Pakistani government released a statement saying, "The meeting reviewed
the strategic and security environment facing Pakistan and took important
decisions on nuclear policy matters that included, amongst others, strategic
threat perception, restructuring of the strategic organizations and export
control mechanisms," according to the Nov. 28 Times of India.
Pakistan has no intention
of abandoning its nuclear program, at least in the near future; when a
country enhances its nuclear weapons command and control system, it generally
reveals the opposite. For Islamabad, nuclear weapons provide a final
trump card in a possible conflict with its much bigger rival, India.
India has Pakistan out-manned
and outgunned, both overall and in conventional forces and arms.
There are approximately 980,000 active Indian troops and another 800,000
in reserve. In comparison, Pakistan has an estimated 562,000 active
soldiers and 500,000 reservists. India boasts 3,600 tanks to Pakistan's
2,200, and the Indian air force maintains 890 fighting aircraft as compared
to Pakistan's 620.
Pakistan has worked hard
to gain the advantage in number of conventional arms. Once Pakistan
achieves some success, India once again upsets Pakistan's hard-earned advantage.
For example, this year has witnessed the beginning of production of Pakistan's
new major battle tank, Al-Khalid. This 46 tonne, three-man tank was
built with Chinese help and has a maximum speed of 40 mph. With a
cruising range of 250 miles, it is indeed superior to India's Arjun tank.
But India signed a $3 billion package with Russia last month, and New Delhi
is building and will receive 310 of Russia's newest major battle tanks,
the T-90s, which beat Al-Khalid in every parameter. The same is true
of combat aircraft and naval ships.
Pakistan maintains a
first-strike option in its nuclear doctrine. With India outgunning
Pakistan's conventional forces at every turn, the accepted use of nuclear
weapons in response to a conventional attack sends a message to New Delhi
that, despite its larger military, Pakistan is not incapable of defending
itself.
Pakistan also had a nuclear
advantage because its chief of the army staff had been in charge of nuclear
planning and deployment, even when there was a civilian head of government.
Last month, India hoped to catch up with Pakistan on the issue of nuclear
planning and management by introducing a new high command structure.
Islamabad's response
was to integrate all research, design, production, planning and deployment
of nuclear weapons in the NCA under Musharraf's control, once again positioning
itself above its archrival. India still does not have a centralized
nuclear authority body such as Pakistan's NCA, and its political and military
branches of power are not linked together with regard to nuclear weapons.
India's civilian government executes full control over design, research
and production of nuclear weapons, while the Indian military is in charge
of operational control over nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's government
is concerned with not only nuclear but also missile capability. Gen.
Musharraf also has established a Strategic Force Command led by a serving
army general responsible for deployment of strategic missiles. Pakistan
possesses two versions of a medium-range nuclear-capable missile called
Ghauri. Its Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-11 also belong to the same class
of missiles. The existing version of the Ghauri missile is operational
and has a range of 800 to 1,200 miles; the ability to carry nuclear, biological
and chemical warheads; and the ability to be launched from land or air.
The missile is said to be equipped with an extremely accurate guidance
system.
By all these parameters,
the Ghauri is superior to the India medium-range missile Prithvi.
It means Pakistan's missile-launching abilities are higher than those of
India. Pakistan also may have tested a new version of the Ghauri
with a range of up to 1,800 miles that amounts to a new class of missile
- not medium range, but the so-called long-range missiles. To counter
Pakistan's temporary superiority, India is actively working in two directions:
first, to improve characteristics and range of its medium-range missiles,
and second, to create its first inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM)
with a range of 5,000 to 8,000 miles.
By further integrating
and strengthening its nuclear command system under the NCA, Pakistan is
trying to better position itself for future challenges in the region.
The first test is probable talks with India, in which Pakistan would be
able to talk from a position of strength, not weakness. The NCA will
guard the work of organizations such as the Khan Research Laboratories
(KRL) led by Dr. Qadeer Khan, who is considered the mastermind of
Pakistan's nuclear program, the National Development Complex (NDC) and
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Thus, Musharraf is
reining in the very strong, nearly autonomous civilian nuclear research
and development agencies. This will add to consolidation of his authority
in the country as a whole and in the nuclear field in particular.
Musharraf has made himself
the sole caretaker for the country's nuclear arsenal. This will make
it much more difficult for someone else to use Pakistan's nuclear weapons
and strategic missiles without Musharraf's authorization. He faces
the threat of some hard-line factions within the military, Inter-Service
Intelligence and radical Islamic circles whose influence in the country
grows. Any of these internal threats may try to gain access to the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal - either for striking India or "the enemies of
Islam."
Musharraf also may have
more authority and negotiation power while dealing with the United States
and other Western powers. He needs it for discussing the nuclear
proliferation problem and Pakistan's adherence, or non-adherence, to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Musharraf can demonstrate the international
community should not worry about Pakistan's non-adherence to CTBT because
its nuclear weapons are now under complete control of secular- and reform-minded
Musharraf.
Restructuring export
control mechanisms through the NCA also means Musharraf is strengthening
his control over the export of fissile materials and nuclear technology.
In addition to Musharraf taking this important field under his tight control,
the move is also an attempt to reverse the worsening of Pakistan-U.S.
relations. It is meant to send a positive signal to America that
Pakistan is making an effort to tighten its export controls on nuclear
materials and technology.
Putting everything under
Musharraf's control does give him better leverage both inside and outside
the country. But it also gives him little flexibility to place the
responsibility on others if he is in a tight spot and blamed for Pakistan's
current and likely future failures.
Also, it remains to be
seen whether this full control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will be
transferred from Musharraf as the top leader of Pakistan to the country's
civilian supreme authorities after elections are held next year.
In the status of the NCA, there is no wording on the role of the Pakistani
prime minister or other top civilian authority as a future head of the
NCA. Also, if another military ruler replaces Musharraf, there is
no guarantee his successor would pursue the same nuclear policy.
Nevertheless, integrating
all decision-making power over nuclear weapons within the NCA represents
the opportunity to gain full control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Provided the military does not rebel, a future civilian government of the
country would have a chance to assert its authority over the whole nuclear
complex, since the NCA is not a military body.
