Author: Kunwar Idris
Publication: Dawn, Karachi
Date: March 25, 2001
When Maulana Akram Awan threatened
to march on Islamabad to compel the government to enforce the rule of Islam
in the country, official emissaries - minister for religions affairs, home
secretary and inspector-general of police - went to Chakwal to propitiate
him. The Rawalpindi corps commander also rang up, the Maulana claimed,
not to warn but to pacify him.
But when an alliance of moderate
politicians announced plans to hold a rally at Lahore on March 23 - Pakistan
Day - for the restoration of democracy hundreds of them were hauled up
and carted away. In the face of this contrast in the administration's treatment
of a single religious leader and an alliance of almost all mainstream political
groups, General Musharraf should not be wondering why the whole country
is held to ransom by one per cent extremists.
Religious extremism has always influenced
public policies in Pakistan more than its support in the public. Every
government has avoided confronting extremists to save all its might, and
guile, to confront its political adversaries. Ironically, this military
regime which held out the promise of reversing that policy has instead
made it into a fine tool of statecraft.
The turning point, it seems, came
when the traders unexpectedly put up stiff resistance to the government's
plan to widen the tax net. The administration, contending against the scheming
politicians and chafing bureaucrats, thought it prudent not to let the
religious parties and groups join their ranks. Thus a government which
started on a liberal, modernistic note has ended up practically as an ally
of religious elements. The series of concessions it has made to appease
them are too well known to be repeated here but a note must be taken of
the ever lasting damage done by the system of separate electorates by driving
the minorities into a state of sullen isolation.
The government's policies aimed
at securing popular support and yet maintaining law and order have created
a situation where the murderous sectarian gangs freely attack mosques but
the organized political parties cannot hold meetings even within the limits
the law may prescribe. Sadly for the government, its exertions to prevent
the March 23 meeting have promoted the cause of its sponsors and won them
sympathy much more than the meeting, however large or turbulent, would
have. The world media which might have ignored the meeting gave full play
to the travails of the political leaders.
The survival and progress of the
country undisputedly lie in its economy. Bad weather and worse politics
have combined to undermine it. The Musharraf administration in the second
half of its allotted tenure should try to enlist the support of all sections
of the people within the country and of broad sections of international
opinion for its plans. For that the government and political parties shall
have to place economic revival above power tussle in their programmes.
At present, while the government
is concerned only with the local government, the political parties think
and talk of nothing else but the restoration of suspended assemblies or
new elections. Neither the local councils nor the restored or new assemblies
would help the economy in the short run. For that Pakistan as a polity
has to appear enlightened and peaceable to its neighbours in the region
and to the rest of the world. This has to be an enduring image of the nation
whatever the composition or democratic credentials of its passing governments.
Pakistan should not pass for a country
bristling with guns and fanatics responsible for terrorism, as India alleges,
or for Islam-driven instability as the Central Asian countries describe
it. For economic survival Pakistan has to rely on regional trade, not militancy.
For that the obvious course is known to the government as also to the parties
aligned with it or opposed to it. They have only to muster the political
will. Broadly, confrontation with the neighbours or regional and big economic
powers has to give way to conciliation. With a debt exceeding the total
national income, we cannot fight even our own battle, much less of others.
To start the conciliation process
at home, the government must declare its constitutional scheme for the
parties and people to know and comment on instead of their coming to know
of it from the foreign press. The Constitution indeed calls for changes
to ensure political stability, provincial autonomy and a merit-based public
service which can administer laws in the face of political pressures. However,
to endure, the changes must come through national consensus. If the government
can wait endlessly for consensus to evolve on the question of the CTBT,
it is far more important for constitutional amendments.
The local council elections are
proceeding ahead and the haranguing of the councillors by the officials
has also started but the law under which the councils are to function is
not yet framed. What the law would be is known but only to the all-knowing
National Reconstruction Bureau. The people can only speculate. The draft
law must be circulated for public comments. The government need have no
worry even if the comments are adverse. The president would still readily
promulgate the ordinance needed for its promulgation. To allay many suspicions
created by the propaganda surrounding the local councils in pursuit of
the NRB's "genuine democracy" plan, the government should not assign any
political or regulatory role to the councils till the constitutional scheme
is approved, national elections are held and the parliament and provincial
assemblies come into being. Till then the councils may perform only their
traditional civic and development functions.
The final verdict on the new constitutional
structure and distribution of powers should vest neither in the military
nor in the political or religious factions but in the gamut of the electorate.
