Author: Aziz Haniffa
Publication: India Abroad
Date: May 30, 2001
India's evolving nuclear doctrine
is likely to be conducive to, rather than subversive of, strategic stability
in South Asia, according to a leading American strategic affairs expert
who works for a think-tank affiliated with the Pentagon.
Ashley Tellis, senior policy analyst
at the Rand Corporation -- considered the Pentagon's own think-tank --
and professor of policy analysis at the Rand Graduate School, has argued
in a paper that "since India believes that its nuclear weapons are useful
primarily for deterrence and secondarily for retribution -- in case deterrence
fails -- New Delhi can size its nuclear force accordingly."
In his paper prepared for the National
Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle, Washington, which is partially funded
by Congress, Tellis makes the point that India's nuclear doctrine "therefore
provides some assurance that its nuclear arsenal will ultimately consist
of a 'minimum' deterrent rather than something more expansive."
"But despite the claims of many
Indian analysts to the contrary," he notes, "India's nuclear doctrine does
not represent a new or particularly unique contribution to the theory of
nuclear deterrence."
Tellis acknowledges that "India's
deterrent posture, as exemplified by the notion of the force-in-being with
its separated weapon components, centralized but devolving control, and
strict civilian supremacy over its core strategic assets, does represent
a unique approach to maintaining a nuclear arsenal."
But he reiterates that the "doctrine
that regulates the development, deployment, and use of these capabilities
is not particularly exceptional because it exemplifies what the nuclear
revolution would demand of any state that was status quo in geopolitical
orientation and relatively secure as far as its basic geostrategic circumstances
are concerned".
Tellis declares that from America's
perspective, the "best news about India's emerging nuclear doctrine is
that it might dampen rather than accelerate strategic competition in South
Asia".
He notes that "as far as the competition
between China and India is concerned, both states have more or less strong
commitments to no-first-use policies; both states routinely maintain their
nuclear capabilities at relatively low levels of readiness; and, most important
of all, both states are doctrinally committed to using their nuclear weapons
primarily as instruments of retribution in case of deterrence breakdown
rather than as tools of defence and war-fighting in pursuit of operational
advantage."
In addition, Tellis points out that
"neither side currently possesses the technical capabilities to use its
nuclear weapons as war-fighting instruments in any but the most primitive
ways".
In the context of India and Pakistan,
he acknowledges that it is not so simple, "but nonetheless offers hope
for continued stability".
Tellis explains that the "Indo-Pakistani
rivalry involves dynamic security competition entailing a high degree of
routine violence that is manifested through the active struggle over the
disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir".
"Pakistan is also a weak state that
is highly concerned about Indian threats to its security," he adds. "Nonetheless,
the prospect that India will pursue any military option that places Pakistan
in a situation where it has no alternative but to use its nuclear weapons
in anger is unlikely."
Tellis points out as an example
that "India has made deliberate policy decisions not to expand the counterinsurgency
operations in Kashmir to include cross-border operations of any kind, and
instead has restricted the employment of security forces for military operations
within Indian territory."
"Moreover," he argues, "it is increasingly
believed that even in the context of a limited conventional war with Islamabad,
a nuclear-armed Pakistan would be unlikely to use its nuclear weaponry
against India. Islamabad's nuclear arsenal is also not maintained routinely
at hair-trigger, or even high levels of readiness."
"And if Pakistan were to consider
using its nuclear weapons against India," Tellis warns, "the stark geographic
vulnerabilities of Pakistan imply that even a relatively small Indian residual
reserve would more than suffice to destroy Pakistan as a functioning state."
On balance, therefore, "the precarious
equilibrium currently prevailing in South Asia is likely to continue for
some time to come. Many factors, like the conventional and nuclear balances
between India, Pakistan, and China, the political objectives pursued by
these entities vis-a-vis one another, and the non-proliferation pressures
emanating from the international community, contribute to the extant political
rivalries being kept with certain defined bounds."
He predicts that "the conservative
character of India's emerging nuclear doctrine -- if perceived as such
in Pakistan -- could enhance the prospects for future stability greatly
because, among other things, it coincides [roughly] with Beijing's owns
beliefs about the value of nuclear weaponry, even as it seeks to avoid
providing Islamabad with the excuses necessary to drive a race for counterforce
pre-eminence in the subcontinent".
Thus, Tellis declares that in a
region where "political instability appears to be an endemic fact of life,
even such a modest contribution could, if properly appreciated, be good
news".
In his preamble, Tellis says it's
about time the international community accepts the fact that India is a
nuclear weapons state and acknowledges the credibility of New Delhi's arguments
that it requires a nuclear deterrent "against its main nuclear rival, China,
or against an unstable nuclear-capable Pakistan, which maintains close
ties with China".
The paper by Tellis, who told India
Abroad that he did this paper for NBAR "because they wanted me to address
the stability question in the region", is significant in the development
of the Bush administration's policy because it knocks down the contention
by the nuclear non-proliferation hawks in the State Department who believe
that India's claim that it requires a nuclear deterrent adds to instability
in the region and is likely to set off an arms race.
These hawks have also argued against
lifting the sanctions against India.
But going by Tellis's paper, obviously
the thinking in the Pentagon is in stark contrast and lends credence to
what senior administration officials told India Abroad when Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld met External Affairs and Defence Minister Jaswant Singh
on April 6 -- that he [Rumsfeld] has no qualms about the US lifting all
the remaining sanctions against India so that New Delhi and Washington
can enter into a strategic relationship.
