Author: Meenakshi Jain
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: May 8, 2001
Non-ideological newspaper readers
may be forgiven for wondering if there is more than meets the eye in the
high-voltage Leftist hysteria over moves to re-examine the contents of
NCERT history textbooks. Indeed, by raising the bogey of 'saffronisation'
before an academic review could even begin, Leftist historians have shown
nervousness that the biased nature of their work, and their political agendas,
may well be exposed.
That their history is both partial
and partisan is evident from even a cursory reading of the Medieval India
textbook for Class VII, a rough summary of collective Leftist scholarship
on the subject. The Leftist claim to historical objectivity suddenly appears
vulnerable as well-known historical facts are found deliberately obliterated
or undervalued.
The arbitrary pre-dating of the
medieval period by a couple of centuries, for instance, and the forcible
application of the concept of feudalism to this period, seem inspired by
political considerations. The intention, in both cases, is clearly to draw
attention away from the cataclysmic northern invasions and focus instead,
on the alleged political, economic, and cultural decay in India on the
eve of the Muslim advent. Credible Western scholars have questioned this
methodology and cast serious aspersions on the Indian Marxists' understanding
of history as well as their fidelity to facts.
The problem of historical accuracy
is compounded as we proceed into the medieval era. Key civilizational issues
raised by the Islamic arrival are not even hinted at. While the Dark and
Feudal Ages in Europe are mentioned, there is deafening silence on the
basic tenets of Islam, the nature of the Muslim polity, the status it accorded
to non-Muslim subjects or its treatment of ancient civilizations and cultures
in conquered Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Syria. In the entire discussion on the
Delhi Sultanate, the words dhimmi and jaziya are deliberately omitted,
though they are crucial to understanding the dynamics of that epoch. There
is a complete glossing over of the closed nature of the governing class
and the extreme racialism of the rulers.
Instead, there are innumerable misleading
references to Hindu participation in the governmental process. If Indian
involvement at the lower levels of administration did not make the colonial
state an Indo-British venture, surely the same logic applies here as well?
Yet the text insists that Hindu princes, landholders and priests of the
time became constituents of the 'new aristocracy' that arose. The fact,
however, is that leaving aside the ruling houses of Rajputana, Rajput resistance
even in the neighbouring Katiher region remained intense till the last
days of the Mughal Empire. The participation of landholders in the ruling
class was, likewise, extremely restricted even under the Mughals. Hence,
to assert that involvement of these groups was the norm in the Sultanate
period is taking liberties with truth.
Overlooking all forms of Hindu persecution,
the book states that Brahmins and ulema were equally permitted to propagate
their respective faiths. References to the infamous 'pilgrimage tax' are
conveniently dropped.
A crucial feature of the political
philosophy of the Sultanate was its pan-Islamic aspect. All Sultans, without
exception, looked to the Caliph as the source of their legitimacy, and
even after the Caliph was murdered and the Caliphate abolished, his name
continued to appear on the coins of the Sultans of India. Yet the phenomenon
of pan-Islamism is neither mentioned nor discussed anywhere in the text.
The section on the Sufis is of a piece of this deception. There is no mention
of "warrior Sufis," their participation in frontier warfare, or their role
in bringing fresh territory under Islam. Instead, we are blithely told
that the Sufis advised Hindus to be better Hindus!
The Mughal period, too, is selectively
purged of its unpleasant facets. Akbar's early measures like the re-naming
of Hindu holy cities, the imposition of the jaziya and forced conversions
are ignored, as also the fact that as much as seventy percent of his nobility
consisted of foreign Muslims. The limited Hindu participation in the upper
echelons of the nobility (besides the Rajputs, just four other Hindus)
is not alluded to.
Much is made of the translation
of Hindu epics into Persian on the orders of the Emperor, but it is nowhere
mentioned that the objective of this enterprise was to wean away the Hindu
administrative and political class from its own language and script. The
so-called patronage of Hindu writers needs to be examined afresh in view
of the fact that the greatest Hindu writer of the age, Gosain Tulsidas,
certainly never received any state patronage, either before or after the
Ramcharit Manas.
The discussion on Din-i-Ilahi is
similarly misleading. It was not intended to dilute the Islamic content
of Akbar's regime, and in the words of a leading non-Marxist scholar, showed
"a surprising indifference of Hinduism." Predictably, Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi
is not mentioned in the narrative on either Akbar or Jehangir (through
whose successive reigns he lived); his name only crops up later in the
midst of a discussion on Aurangzeb!
The brief treatment of the half-century
reign of Aurangzeb, who is merely appended to the chapter on Jehangir and
Shah Jehan, is a masterly exercise in evasion. That is why the reader (and
presumably also the poor student) is unable to comprehend the Leftist explanation
for the sustained revolts of Marathas, Sikhs and Jats against Mughal rule.
Incidentally, the word jaziya makes its appearance here for the first and
last time (page 109 of the 123-page book), though the reader is even now
not told what the tax was about. If this is objective history, subjective
history might be something to look forward to.
