Author: A. M. Khusro
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: June 16, 2001
Introduction: Hurriyat, the torch-bearer
of affiliation with Pakistan, has lost ground heavily and has declined
to a weak position, with virtually no influence in the Valley.
If one were in Srinagar or anywhere
in the Kashmir Valley in the late 1980s or early 1990s, one would find
that nearly everybody had fallen foul of India, whatever the reasons, and
had turned a votary of Pakistan. That, for most Pakistanis, confirmed the
simple, or simplistic, logic that Muslims would always vote for Muslims,
and hence, the demand for a plebiscite, which had been relatively dormant
for many years, witnessed a strong revival. Most Pakistanis robustly hoped
and most Indians secretly feared that in the event of a plebiscite, the
whole of Kashmir might go to Pakistan.
But the reality does not always
follow a simplistic logic; many latent factors intervene. As the border
between India and Pakistan was for a long time a soft border, Kashmiris
from India kept going to the Pakistan-held Kashmir and saw for themselves
an amazing phenomenon which, in course of time, was to turn their minds
away from Pakistan. They saw again and again that India had been investing
a good deal in Kashmir, though not enough, and that this had raised the
economic levels perceptively. But they also noticed clearly that Pakistan
had not made it its business to invest in its side of Kashmir (and the
Northern areas) and hence, the levels of living there were awfully depressing.
The visiting Kashmiris also observed that while the state under India's
control had a rough-and-ready democracy, Pakistan was in the grip of dictatorship.
The conclusions were too obvious
to be put aside and were a continuous talking point among the people of
the Valley - that Pakistan was not the place to hanker for, that their
own home was the place to be preferred by far. Opinions thus took a somersault
and for the Kashmiris of Srinagar and the Valley, as well as the people
of Jammu and Ladakh, there remained no question of opting for Pakistan.
The most positive proof of this new-found aversion to a link with Pakistan
is that there are no migrations of Kashmiris from the Valley to Pakistan-held
Kashmir. Consequently, Hurriyat, the torch-bearer of affiliation with Pakistan,
has lost ground heavily and has declined to a weak position, with virtually
no influence in the Valley.
I have closely examined this turnaround
of Indian Kashmiri opinion and was able to tell the Hurriyat leaders, in
particular Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Abdul Ghani Lone and Abdul Ghani Bhatt,
that in the numerous dialogues we had with all sorts of leaders in the
Valley, we found that the Hurriyat was in a minority of one, that their
idea of linkage with Pakistan had melted away. I have also noted that the
alternative idea of an independent Kashmiri state, which had many followers
on the Pakistani side, had virtually no takers on the Indian side. In the
35 or so individual or group interviews, which some colleagues and I once
had in five days, and another 27 interviews which we had on another occasion
over three days, with all shades of opinion, we found not a single respondent
advocating or even initiating a reference to an independent Kashmir. It
was clear that the Kashmiris on the Indian side had, for good reasons,
reconciled themselves to an Indian linkage and had discarded the other
options. And the most glaring expression to this reconciliation was the
two state assembly elections in which the Indian Kashmiris had participated
with more than a 50 per cent turn-out on each occasion. Of course, the
declared and undeclared linkage with India was conditional upon the Central
Government removing the various grudges and grumbles which they had.
These grudges can be summed up as:
(a) Why doesn't the Government of India promote autonomy for the state?
(b) Why aren't counter-guarantees given by the Central government to the
hydro-electric projects which would benefit other parts of India as well
as Kashmir? (c) Why is the size of the Indian Army in Kashmir not reduced
substantially? (d) Why are the numerous bunkers in towns and cities not
removed to soothe public opinion? (e) Why do the Indian Army and para-military
forces continue to be as insensitive, brutal and arrogant even after the
installation of a democratic and popular government as they were when terrorism
and foreign incursions into Kashmir were the order of the day? (f) Why
can't the more than 1,50,000 unemployed people in the Valley be employed
partly within the Valley and largely in public enterprises and other avenues
in the rest of the country, in the manner of the Tamils, the Biharis, the
Maharashtrians etc.?
The Central government and, perhaps,
the state government have been awfully slow in recognising this change
of opinion and its tremendous importance for the future of Kashmir. Central
governments have been missing great opportunities of winning over the Kashmiris
in the Valley who seemed ready to be won over. If the reasonable demands
of the Indian Kashmiris were met, as they should have been met long ago,
the scene in Kashmir would have been totally different. It can still be
different, if these are conceded.
Moreover, if the people in Pakistan
and, in particular, in Pakistan-held Kashmir, came to know clearly that
the Kashmiris of the Valley are strongly in favour of staying put and remaining
linked with India and are not going to favour a link with Pakistan or with
such outfits as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, then with what hope would they be
agitating for a plebiscite?
Furthermore, when they come to realise,
as they might already have, that the idea of a plebiscite has taken a serious
knock after the Pakistani incursion into Indian Kashmir and that the line
of control (LoC) has acquired a new sanctity in American and international
political circles, better sense would dawn on both sides. In fact, it is
conceivable now that the world opinion, hugely supporting India on its
stance on the Kargil issue and accepting the sanctity of the LoC, might
even bring a resolution in the United Nations one of these days, asking
Pakistan and India to agree to a conversion of the LoC into an international
border for the sake of world peace in which India and Pakistan are agents
- thus making redundant the 1948 resolutions about plebiscite which, in
any case, have lost their edge.
The worst that has happened recently
is that the Government of India, totally misjudging the Kashmir situation,
has unnecessarily begun to raise the stature of the Hurriyat to a level
which it no longer commands. It is heartening that the prime minister is
now going to be in direct touch with the chief executive of Pakistan. While
the issue of Kashmir may not be resolved at one go, various other improvements
in the relations between the two countries cannot be ruled out - with a
decline in the relative importance of the Kashmir question.
(The writer is former chairman of
the Finance Commission.)
