Author: Vinod Sharma/Udayan Namboodiri
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: September 20, 2001
It was a speech of a soldier, a
Muslim, a promoter of the Taliban and a President all rolled into one that
General Pervez Musharraf delivered to his countrymen on Wednesday night.
He betrayed the limited options at his disposal while deciding to back
the United States. And his India baiting reflected the darkest fears of
militarist Pakistanis about possible loss of strategic depth in Afghanistan
in the absence of the proxy Taliban regime.
Since 1971, the Pak Army has assiduously
developed Afghan-istan as a backwater to make up for the loss of Bangladesh.
So, the fact that an Indian representative had attended a Moscow-sponsored
meeting on Afghanistan at Tajikistan, was interpreted by the General as
a grim signal that India may be up to something.
That was his fig leaf also. Musharraf
probably understands that he can counter Pakistan's lunatic fringe by delinking
Islam from terrorism and projecting India as the main threat to the Muslim
faith in the sub-continent. In doing so, he sought to kill two birds with
one stone - mobilising support for himself on the home front and against
Indian participation in the coalition against the Taliban.
Given the centrality of Pakistan's
role in Washington's game plan, his categorical stand against New Delhi
almost rules out India's direct enrolment by the Bush regime. The American's
first impulse would be to protect their newly recruited hatchetman in the
sub-continent. In this limited sense, the unfolding scenario also obviates
the use of Indian bases by US forces set into motion for D-Day, whenever
it comes.
While publicly indicating their
willingness to go the whole hog in the fight against terrorism, senior
Indian functionaries had, over the past few days, been privately stating
that they were-n't expecting any request for op-erational assistance from
the US.
After Musharraf's address, their
worries are that India would seem to have been kept out of the big league
at Islamabad's bidding. Also linked to this perception are the fears of
a US-Pak trade off on Kashmir.
Indian security analysts feel the
US would require Pakistan's whole-hearted co-operation if the South Asian
theatre of the "war against terrorism" was to yield results. "The Americans
want revenge and may not tolerate an unproductive exercise. The Pak Army
and the ISI have full knowledge of Afghanis-tan's political and geographical
terrain. Without their help, the US wouldn't achieve anything," a senior
fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses said.
India's role could unfurl if Mu-sharraf
cracks under pressure or is overthrown. As of now, Del-hi will have to
lurk in the background, waiting for its turn. There is a perception that
the Pak refusal to be seen in India's company is a blessing in disguise:
"Why should we fight the US war without an assurance that they'll also
fight ours in Kashmir?"
