Author: Manoj Joshi
Publication: The Times of India
Date: September 21, 2001
General Pervez Musharraf has turned
in another masterly TV performance. While ostensibly addressing his nation,
he aimed his message at the US and India.
For those who cared to read between
the lines, it spelt out the price for double-crossing the Taliban: Lift
sanctions, give us Kashmir and write off our $30 billion debt.
These demands do appear excessive
considering that the pay-off for supporting the US in the jehad against
the erstwhile Soviet Union in the 1980s never quite exceeded $10 billion
worth of arms and economic aid. They are also patently unrealistic.
While American leaders are sensitive
to Pakistan's need to manage its public opinion, there is nothing to suggest
that they will allow countries to impose conditions in exchange for their
support for fighting terrorism.
While in the medium-term, India,
like Israel, is bound to come under pressure to resolve situations as in
Kashmir that breed terrorist action, the US cannot but be aware of the
perils of condoning terrorist actions in the name of some or the other
cause.
The destruction and deaths at the
World Trade Center ought to be a major point of departure in world attitudes
towards terrorism. Having done the unbelievable, terrorists could tomorrow
do the unthinkable -- detonate a nuclear device in a city or unleash some
terrible biological virus.
America, the major target, is now
learning Terrorism Inc is an MNC. Terrorists rampaging in Kashmir and Chechnya
come from the same pool as those involved in attacks against the US.
General Musharraf's efforts aimed
at extracting whatever gain is possible from the terrible tragedy in the
US are true to type. Sociologist Dipankar Gupta once termed Pakistan's
nationalism as predacious.
The "Pakistani" movement against
British colonialism was prefunctory. Instead, Muslim League "nationalism"
preyed on the Indian national movement and managed to walk off with Pakistan.
Pakistan's successful hunt in the
cold war, one that paid huge dividends in terms of military and economic
aid, was formally predicated on fighting communism. But as even the Americans
are now willing to accept, these were false premises.
In 1980, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan provided Pakistan with yet another opportunity to display its
prowess as a predator of the international system. For the US, Pakistan
was a frontline state, in danger of imminent invasion.
For military dictator Zia-ul-Haq,
it was an opportunity to obtain military and economic gains for Pakistan.
Zia initially rejected American aid as "peanuts". For one full year, the
country that was under an allegedly imminent threat of "communist invasion"
held out till the Americans upped the ante.
Just how threatened Pakistan was
is borne out by the fact that Pakistan kept just one army corps facing
Afghanistan through the Afghan war, while the bulk of its army faced India.
But this time, in trying to obtain
concessions in exchange for its cooperation, Pakistan may not just be misreading
the situation, but seriously misjudging it.
The US response has been emphatic
and quite clear: This is not going to be a single-strike operation to capture
Osama, but a sustained long-term campaign to eliminate the Taliban and
fundamentalist groupings along the Pak-Afghan border.
Should it be successful, it will
mean a transformation of Pakistan's security and foreign policy. Afghanistan
can no longer be seen as strategic space for Pakistan vis-a-vis India,
and nor can it any longer nurture fundamentalist forces to attack India
in the name of Kashmir.
But this transformation will not
come easily. The ties that bind Pakistan to these two policies are very
firm. Given Pakistan's large Pushtun population, it has close links of
kinship and religion with the Taliban.
Pakistani military intelligence
officers played a key role in undermining the legitimate Afghan government
of Burhanuddin Rabbani in the mid-1990s. Thousands of Pakistani army personnel
fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Taliban to capture the country.
The border between the two countries
is virtually an open one, and dotted with madarsas and training camps that
gave birth to the Taliban in the first place.
Getting Pakistan to change its India
policy will not be easy either. For 50 years, Pakistan's central policy
goal has been to get parity with India.
After failing to balance India through
external alliances with the US and China, Pakistan embarked on more dangerous
routes after the Bangladesh war -- the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability
and aiding separatist movements in India.
In the 1980s, it provided sanctuary
and support to Sikh terrorists, some of whom still live in Pakistan. Beginning
1990, Pakistan aided and armed separatists in Kashmir, and when this movement
began to wane, Pakistani jehadis were sent in and a wider campaign to destabilise
India initiated.
But the US that is now putting Pakistan
through the wringer, is different from the one that came to the region
after a two-decade hiatus in 1980. US attitudes then were naive and in
their ideological zeal to defeat the Soviet Union, they did not look too
closely at Pakistan's motivations in joining its crusade or, indeed, the
consequences of the jehad it spawned.
It would be safe to say that despite
playing a role in encouraging the creation of the Taliban, the US today
would like to undo many of the things it did in the heat of the moment
in the past.
Its current strategy is to get the
Pakistani army to begin the process by first breaking the Taliban and in
the process confronting and defeating the fundamentalist forces within
Pakistan.
This could lead to civil conflict,
but moderate elements in Pakistan will be able to prevail. Should Pakistan
indicate that it is serious about abandoning jehad and jehadis, India could
undertake serious negotiations to end the Kashmir dispute.
It is in everyone's interest to
have Pakistan on board the anti-terrorist coalition and no one gains by
prolonged conflict in this region. Contrary to General Musharraf's fantasies,
India wants a peaceful and stable Pakistan.
Abraham Lincoln once said of an
America divided into slave and free states: "A nation divided against itself
cannot stand."
Neither can a country that says
it is eager to combat terrorism, and yet allows its soil to be used for
recruiting, funding and arming people who target non-combatant civilians,
in the name of a freedom movement or a religious cause. Pakistan must seize
the moment and overcome its jehadic inclination.
