Author: Editorial
Publication: The Statesman
Date: September 22, 2001
The terror attacks on the US has
created several complicated new realities, among which is that while it
is necessary to take on global terror networks which are of religious inspiration,
it would be counter-productive if the international campaign against terror
were to appear to target Islam itself. The US public clearly demands that
the culprits be brought to justice as soon as possible, but the administration
has wisely refrained from precipitate action, with Secretary of State Colin
Powell working nonstop to put together an international coalition against
terror, and getting NATO and Russia to put out a joint statement that the
attacks would not go unpunished, while considerable time has been given
to the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden. Hotheads in the administration,
such as Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defence, who want an immediate
and all-out assault on Afghanistan, Iraq and the Bekaa valley in Lebanon
- playground of the radical Hezbollah - have been overruled. What is more
necessary than, say, carpet-bombing Afghanistan, is pooling of information
and intelligence by various states on the global terror network, which
is why Powell and Bush are courting West Asian states who can be a rich
source of information, particularly since most of the known terrorists
are from that part of the world. Besides, the participation of Muslim states
in the coalition means that it can no longer be seen as anti-Islamic, causing
Powell to contact even radical states like Syria, even though this is evoking
considerable unease in Israel and occasional defiant noises from the hawkish
Ariel Sharon.
There are some similarities with
the situation in the subcontinent, where unease has been aroused in India
at the fact that General Musharraf has been dragged kicking and screaming
into the anti-terror coalition. Pakistan has agreed to allow American troops
to be based at key airfields near the Afghan border, at Peshawar, Quetta
and further south at Kharan in Baluchistan. There is also the possibility
of the US Navy's armada of warships, which is assembling in the Arabian
Sea, using Karachi's main port. These forces will be used against Osama
bin Laden and the Taliban. Since the Taliban was created, to cite a Pakistani
general, to create "strategic space" for Pakistan, this 180 degree turn
in Pakistani policy is going to be a bitter bullet to bite for both the
army and domestic opinion. Musharraf had to take it at considerable risk
to himself; the specific counter-demands he has made include economic aid,
a lifting of the sanctions and mediation on Kashmir. If jehadis make war
on Musharraf when, as seems imminent, the Americans make war on the Taliban,
India's worst nightmares could come true if a radical Islamic regime, armed
with nuclear weapons, were to come to power in Islamabad. It is therefore
not necessarily against India's interests if the Americans were to prop
up Musharraf with economic aid. Besides, any degradation of the global
terror network by American action in Afghanistan will have knock-on effects
in Kashmir, since sources of funding and personnel are often the same.
As for Musharraf raising Kashmir,
Indian anxieties are understandable, but from the American point of view
it would hardly make sense to make war on Taliban-ruled Afghanistan while
allowing Kashmir to be turned into another Afghanistan. Indo-Pak relations
need not be turned into a zero-sum game, whereby any approbation for Pakistan
should give rise to debilitating anxiety attacks in Delhi. Nevertheless,
Indian diplomacy needs to be extraordinarily active and skillful in these
perilous times. It needs to impress upon the Americans, for example, the
necessity of toppling the Taliban if sanctuary is to be denied to future
Osama bin Ladens, and needs to stay in there to ensure that future political
arrangements in Afghanistan do not consist, once again, of Pakistani proteges.
To do so it will have its work cut out, but the rewards are worth it.
