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The United States and Pakistan: 1947-2000

The United States and Pakistan: 1947-2000

Author: M V Kamath
Publication: Organiser
Date: September 30, 2001

Introduction: Washington's is currently worried over the threat of Islamic extremism. And Pakistan's record of the last fifty years has been poor.

But for the Himalayan ego of Mohammad Ali Jinnah who felt slighted by the Congress leadership of the forties and the Muslim psychology-seldom, if ever, analysed by professional historians-of not wishing to be under 'Hindu' rule, Pakistan would never have come into existence. Jinnah, in the first place, wanted to be. Number One; he should have known that this he could never be; in the second place, once Pakistan was set-up, he wanted it to be treated on par with India. Another ego problem. Jinnah just could not and did not want to understand the realities of political life. Soon after Pakistan was born, when the very first US Ambassador to Karachi, Paul Ailing expressed America's hope for friendly India-Pakistan relations, Jinnah's reply was that "nothing was nearer to his heart". Jinnah said that he sincerely wished an Indo-Pak association similar to that between the United States and Canada and "a defensive understanding with India on a military level... with no time limit". All that could have happened, had not the Cold War erupted, had not the United States, totally ignorant of conditions in the Indian sub-continent courted Pakistan and had not the egos of Acheson, Dulles and Nehru clashed. All that set the background for the classic drama that followed, during which relations between the United States on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other went through a series of ups and downs. Kux who had served the US diplomacy both in India and Pakistan earlier had described Indo-American relations with a fair amount of insight in his book entitled Estranged Democracies. Now he has described US-Pakistan relations with the same degree of objectivity in his new book Disenchanted Allies. Both titles are very apropos. In the thirties and forties, when the US government knew little about the sub-continent, Washington wanted a free and united India. But once the original British India was partitioned, opinions changed. Kux traces the changing pattern of America's relations with Pakistan in great detail but in the early chapters one does not see any meaningful study of the extent to which British views influenced the US State Department. That calls for a separate study. For quite some time the Americans were guided by the British Foreign Office in matters relating to the Indian subcontinent And Britain, let it be remembered, had its own axe to grind. America's approach to the entire sub-continent was influenced by three factors: America's self-interest, the ego clashes between Nehru on the one hand and American policy-makers (Acheson, Dulles, Eisenhower, Truman) on the other and forces beyond the control of both the parties. America's natural instinct was to be friendly towards India but various forces identified by Kux operated in determining Washington's relations with Delhi and Islamabad which explains the ups and downs experienced by both India and Pakistan in their relationship with America. This first began under Truman's presidency. Under Eisenhower America Started to get closer towards Pakistan. The alliance started having trouble when Kennedy became President. It began to unravel under Johnson's presidency. When Nixon came to power, his chronic sense of inferiority and his hatred of Indian things cause a US tilt towards Pakistan. The nuclear issue came to the fore when Ford became president. US-Pak relations entered a low phase under Jimmy Carter but brightened up under Ronald Reagan's rule. The partnership collapsed when George Bush came to power and we are only too well aware' how it fared during Bill Clinton's presidency. The half a century of partnership between the US and Pakistan has been essentially an unstable one and what Kux has done is to explain how it all happened. The chapter on Nixon's 'tilt' towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pak War of 1971-72 is revealing. The US was willing to aid Pakistan if attacked by India and was determined to coordinate its plans with China if there was a showdown at the United Nations. Indeed Secretary of State Kissinger sought a meeting with China's Huang Hua "to suggest Chinese military help to Pakistan" because the US had 'particular affection for Pakistan" and also because it was afraid that if nothing was done to stop India from attacking West Pakistan the latter would have become just another Nepal. Had the United States not actively interfered in the Indo-Pak War, Indira Gandhi would have effectively resolved the Jammu and Kashmir problem once and for all.

Actually conditions were much more serious during the Indo-Pak War than what was then generally realised. The US thought (wrongly, as it turned out) that the Chinese would come to the military assistance of Pakistan. Writes Kux coolly of what could have been a blood-thirsty event: "Since the White House believed that the Soviets would intervene to help India (if the Chinese helped Pakistan), a Sino-Soviet shown-down seemed possible. President Nixon then decided that the United States would not stand idly if the Soviets threatened China and. would act in support of Beijing" and no doubt setting in motion a nuclear war of frightening proportions. An India-hating mad-man was in power in the White House.

The nature of US-Pakistan relations was best described by Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in a moment of rare understanding when he met US Secretary of State George Shultz in December 1982. That relationship said Zia was "a union of unequals", "incompatible" in terms of culture, geography and national power. Kux in his summung up says: "Zia was right.... Indeed, except for the Afghan war years, Pakistan has been rarely near the top of the US priorities." Not that India was ever better placed. But Washington is currently worried over the threat of Islamic extremism. And Pakistan's record of the last fifty years has been poor. Says Kux: "Chronic political instability, failure to realize economic potential, a poor record in meeting basic human needs and the continuing fixation on India have left Pakistan teetering on the edge of national failure." Yet, Kux believes that "although Pakistan faces grace difficulties, it is not yet a failed state." Ha, ha!

This book is as good an account of US-Pakistan relations in the last half a century as can be expected from an American ex-diplomat and has involved a good deal of research though the author concedes that Pakistani official documents were unavailable" nor, presumably, Indian documents and clearly such British documents he had access to did not reveal much. American rascality is seen in the 'official assurances' sought by the United States from India that it had "no intention of taking any territory, including any part of Azad Kashmir" during the 1971 war. For giving that assurance India paid very dearly. The US was afraid that if India took 'Azad Kashmir', Pakistan would have disintegrated. Which Pakistan deserved to be. In 1971 we had a golden opportunity to teach Pakistan a lesson. Foolishly, we missed it.
 


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