Author: M V Kamath
Publication: Organiser
Date: September 30, 2001
Introduction: Washington's is currently
worried over the threat of Islamic extremism. And Pakistan's record of
the last fifty years has been poor.
But for the Himalayan ego of Mohammad
Ali Jinnah who felt slighted by the Congress leadership of the forties
and the Muslim psychology-seldom, if ever, analysed by professional historians-of
not wishing to be under 'Hindu' rule, Pakistan would never have come into
existence. Jinnah, in the first place, wanted to be. Number One; he should
have known that this he could never be; in the second place, once Pakistan
was set-up, he wanted it to be treated on par with India. Another ego problem.
Jinnah just could not and did not want to understand the realities of political
life. Soon after Pakistan was born, when the very first US Ambassador to
Karachi, Paul Ailing expressed America's hope for friendly India-Pakistan
relations, Jinnah's reply was that "nothing was nearer to his heart". Jinnah
said that he sincerely wished an Indo-Pak association similar to that between
the United States and Canada and "a defensive understanding with India
on a military level... with no time limit". All that could have happened,
had not the Cold War erupted, had not the United States, totally ignorant
of conditions in the Indian sub-continent courted Pakistan and had not
the egos of Acheson, Dulles and Nehru clashed. All that set the background
for the classic drama that followed, during which relations between the
United States on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other went
through a series of ups and downs. Kux who had served the US diplomacy
both in India and Pakistan earlier had described Indo-American relations
with a fair amount of insight in his book entitled Estranged Democracies.
Now he has described US-Pakistan relations with the same degree of objectivity
in his new book Disenchanted Allies. Both titles are very apropos. In the
thirties and forties, when the US government knew little about the sub-continent,
Washington wanted a free and united India. But once the original British
India was partitioned, opinions changed. Kux traces the changing pattern
of America's relations with Pakistan in great detail but in the early chapters
one does not see any meaningful study of the extent to which British views
influenced the US State Department. That calls for a separate study. For
quite some time the Americans were guided by the British Foreign Office
in matters relating to the Indian subcontinent And Britain, let it be remembered,
had its own axe to grind. America's approach to the entire sub-continent
was influenced by three factors: America's self-interest, the ego clashes
between Nehru on the one hand and American policy-makers (Acheson, Dulles,
Eisenhower, Truman) on the other and forces beyond the control of both
the parties. America's natural instinct was to be friendly towards India
but various forces identified by Kux operated in determining Washington's
relations with Delhi and Islamabad which explains the ups and downs experienced
by both India and Pakistan in their relationship with America. This first
began under Truman's presidency. Under Eisenhower America Started to get
closer towards Pakistan. The alliance started having trouble when Kennedy
became President. It began to unravel under Johnson's presidency. When
Nixon came to power, his chronic sense of inferiority and his hatred of
Indian things cause a US tilt towards Pakistan. The nuclear issue came
to the fore when Ford became president. US-Pak relations entered a low
phase under Jimmy Carter but brightened up under Ronald Reagan's rule.
The partnership collapsed when George Bush came to power and we are only
too well aware' how it fared during Bill Clinton's presidency. The half
a century of partnership between the US and Pakistan has been essentially
an unstable one and what Kux has done is to explain how it all happened.
The chapter on Nixon's 'tilt' towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pak War
of 1971-72 is revealing. The US was willing to aid Pakistan if attacked
by India and was determined to coordinate its plans with China if there
was a showdown at the United Nations. Indeed Secretary of State Kissinger
sought a meeting with China's Huang Hua "to suggest Chinese military help
to Pakistan" because the US had 'particular affection for Pakistan" and
also because it was afraid that if nothing was done to stop India from
attacking West Pakistan the latter would have become just another Nepal.
Had the United States not actively interfered in the Indo-Pak War, Indira
Gandhi would have effectively resolved the Jammu and Kashmir problem once
and for all.
Actually conditions were much more
serious during the Indo-Pak War than what was then generally realised.
The US thought (wrongly, as it turned out) that the Chinese would come
to the military assistance of Pakistan. Writes Kux coolly of what could
have been a blood-thirsty event: "Since the White House believed that the
Soviets would intervene to help India (if the Chinese helped Pakistan),
a Sino-Soviet shown-down seemed possible. President Nixon then decided
that the United States would not stand idly if the Soviets threatened China
and. would act in support of Beijing" and no doubt setting in motion a
nuclear war of frightening proportions. An India-hating mad-man was in
power in the White House.
The nature of US-Pakistan relations
was best described by Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in a moment of rare understanding
when he met US Secretary of State George Shultz in December 1982. That
relationship said Zia was "a union of unequals", "incompatible" in terms
of culture, geography and national power. Kux in his summung up says: "Zia
was right.... Indeed, except for the Afghan war years, Pakistan has been
rarely near the top of the US priorities." Not that India was ever better
placed. But Washington is currently worried over the threat of Islamic
extremism. And Pakistan's record of the last fifty years has been poor.
Says Kux: "Chronic political instability, failure to realize economic potential,
a poor record in meeting basic human needs and the continuing fixation
on India have left Pakistan teetering on the edge of national failure."
Yet, Kux believes that "although Pakistan faces grace difficulties, it
is not yet a failed state." Ha, ha!
This book is as good an account
of US-Pakistan relations in the last half a century as can be expected
from an American ex-diplomat and has involved a good deal of research though
the author concedes that Pakistani official documents were unavailable"
nor, presumably, Indian documents and clearly such British documents he
had access to did not reveal much. American rascality is seen in the 'official
assurances' sought by the United States from India that it had "no intention
of taking any territory, including any part of Azad Kashmir" during the
1971 war. For giving that assurance India paid very dearly. The US was
afraid that if India took 'Azad Kashmir', Pakistan would have disintegrated.
Which Pakistan deserved to be. In 1971 we had a golden opportunity to teach
Pakistan a lesson. Foolishly, we missed it.