Author:
Publication: The New York Times
Date: September 15, 2001
War Without Illusions
[T] here is no doubt that this week's
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were the opening salvos
in the first American war of the 21st century. Less clear is
just what sort of war this will be and how the United States can
ensure that it prevails. George W. Bush, suddenly thrust into the
unaccustomed role of commander in chief, faces fateful decisions
about the use of American military power in distant, difficult corners
of the world. He must design an effective battle plan and couple
it with a skillful diplomatic campaign that sustains strong international
support.
Some of the initial war talk we
have heard from Washington is disconcerting. Paul Wolfowitz, the
deputy secretary of defense, spoke of "ending states who sponsor
terrorism." That may work as a form of intimidation, but we trust
he does not have in mind invading and occupying Iraq, Iran, Syria
and Sudan, as well as Afghanistan, nations with a combined
population of more than 160 million people.
To be realistic ? and successful
? in fighting terrorism, the United States will have to rely on intensive
diplomatic pressure, severe economic sanctions and united international
support to deal with some of the nations that support terrorist activities.
Forcing a change of governments in places like Iraq or Syria
would require in each case the application of military power on the
same scale that was used in the Persian Gulf war, or greater. Changing
the behavior of the present governments, however, may be possible
through concerted and sustained pressure from the coalition of
nations that Mr. Bush is trying to assemble.
For now, at least, the one state
where American military power might be effectively used is Afghanistan,
where the Taliban-led government is host to Osama bin Laden, the
prime suspect in Tuesday's attack. But removing the Taliban from
power and hunting down Mr. bin Laden's Afghanistan-based followers
would be no easy task, even for America's powerful armed forces.
Trying to dislodge the Taliban,
capture Mr. bin Laden and eradicate terrorist training camps from
Afghanistan would be extremely difficult if American and NATO
forces had to operate from afar, using air bases in Turkey, aircraft
carriers in the Indian Ocean and airborne assault troops. Afghanistan,
a mountainous land of widely dispersed villages and fiercely
independent people, is a general's nightmare and guerrilla commander's
fantasy, as the Soviet Union learned after it invaded in 1979.
Even a military campaign launched
from nearby nations like Pakistan and the former Soviet republics
of Central Asia would be arduous. Ousting the Taliban would
probably require a ground invasion leading to the capture and occupation
of Kabul, the capital, and other main cities. That would still leave
the rugged countryside, where the terrorist base camps are
located, beyond American military control. Difficult ground expeditions
would have to be launched against the bin Laden organization's scattered
hillside encampments.
No warm welcome can be expected
from Afghanistan's 26 million people, who have traditionally greeted
outside armies with hostility. Controlling Kabul has never
given any government or occupier mastery over the rest of Afghanistan.
If Mr. Bush wants to wage war there he must understand the risks
and plan a campaign crafted to overcome the dangers that American
forces would encounter.
The cooperation of Russia, Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia, all with airfields and military staging areas within
striking distance of Afghanistan, is likely to be critical to success.
Some form of Russian support seems possible, and Saudi Arabia is
now considering American requests for various kinds of help. Pakistan
is more problematic, despite its government's pledges of cooperation.
Even if Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the country's military dictator, agrees
to support American military action, other army leaders and powerful
Islamic fundamentalist groups are closely aligned with the
Taliban. Any American victories in Afghanistan would quickly turn
into a catastrophic defeat if the war there turned Pakistan, with
its 142 million people and nuclear weapons, into an Islamic fundamentalist
state.
In the anger and revulsion generated
by this week's attacks, it is all too easy to wish for a quick and
decisive American military response. But the nature of the enemy,
and the sanctuaries where he hides, promise to make this a long and
unpredictable war. As it begins, Mr. Bush and the nation must be
under no illusions about the battles ahead.
