Author: Editorial
Publication: San Francisco Chronicle
Date: October 23, 2001
In the past two days, U.S. forces
have finally done what they had previously been unwilling to attempt --
hit the Taliban where it hurts.
For the first time since attacks
began Oct. 7, U.S. planes bombed and strafed the Taliban's front-line positions,
giving the Northern Alliance hope that its forces may be able to overrun
the Taliban. This is a welcome change.
Until now, the Bush administration
had bombed and re-bombed Taliban sites far from the front lines. This strategy,
which seemed to do little but bounce the rubble at previously abandoned
bases, was the result of Pakistan's insistence on buying time while it
hosted talks to create a broad post-Taliban coalition.
But the Pakistanis seem to be playing
a double game -- helping the U.S. offensive while trying to ensure that
their old Taliban allies have a prominent role in the postwar government.
Pakistani generals reportedly even
want U.S. officials to accept Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Taliban's
hard-line army commander, as a leader of the new government.
Such Macchiavellian deception has
gone on long enough. Washington will need to suspend bombing during the
monthlong Muslim holiday Ramadan, which begins Nov. 18. And after Ramadan,
winter snows will make military campaigning difficult. So unless the Taliban
and Osama bin Laden's forces are dramatically weakened in less than a month,
they will remain in control of Afghanistan through the winter. This would
allow them to claim victory, embarrassing the United States and possibly
weakening the international coalition against terrorism.
To be sure, the Northern Alliance
must be forced to follow through on its promises to help Afghanistan's
former king, Mohammad Zahir Shah, call a loya jirga, or meeting of elders,
that includes a broad representation of Pashtuns and other ethnic groups.
The Northern Alliance has a major
trump card -- it is recognized by the United Nations as Afghanistan's legitimate
government. This status would be difficult for Washington and Pakistan
to take away after the war.
The Bush administration has legitimate
misgivings about putting Afghanistan in the Northern Alliance's hands,
but the rebels clearly remain the only short- term hope of toppling the
Taliban.
U.S. forces must provide the Northern
Alliance with a decisive battlefield advantage.
