Author: C Dasgupta
Publication: The Times of India
- Internet Edition
Date: November 10, 2001
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=484873326
One of Jawaharlal Nehru's most controversial
decisions was to refer the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council at
the end of 1947. The decision is commonly ascribed to his idealism and
unrealistic faith in the UN.
This explanation does not do justice
either to the man or to the complex nature of the decision. An examination
of the records proves that Nehru did not pin much hope on the UN.
While agreeing to approach the UN,
he simultaneously instructed the C-in-C to make preparations to strike
at the raiders' bases in Pakistan.
By mid-December 1947, the prime
minister had come to the conclusion that further talks with Pakistan did
not hold out any hope of an early solution.
Nor were the military prospects
encouraging. Nehru was deeply dissatisfied with the manner in which the
C-in-C, General Lockhart, conducted the war.
The C-in-C insisted that it would
not be possible to expel the raiders from the Jhelum valley until the spring.
Moreover, the service chiefs and
Mountbatten had effectively scuttled the government's directive to employ
the air force against the invaders along the border from Naushera to Muzaffarabad.
Nehru recorded his views in an incisive
policy note on December 19. ''I cannot get over the feeling that our tactics
have been unsuccessful'', he wrote. ''There is a certain heaviness of thought
and action which is peculiarly unsuited to a conflict of the type we are
waging...We cannot go on carrying on this little war for months and months
and maybe a year or more''.
The prime minister concluded that
the ''obvious course is to strike at these concentrations and lines of
communications in Pakistan territory. From a military point of view this
would be the most effective step''.
The prime minister's new approach
alarmed Mountbatten. A war between two dominions, both owing allegiance
to the British crown, was unprecedented in Commonwealth history.
In keeping with British policy,
the governor-general had striven to avert a full-fledged war between India
and Pakistan.
In a letter to the King, Mountbatten
had claimed that his presence as governor-general of India was the best
insurance against an actual outbreak of war with Pakistan.
Mountbatten had always viewed a
reference to the UN as an effective method of preventing an all-out war.
It was he who had first proposed
a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir. In early December, he had tried
unsuccessfully to persuade Nehru to ask for a UN team to be sent out to
the subcontinent in order to break the impasse with Pakistan and to stop
the fighting.
The new trend in Nehru's thinking
reinforced the governor-general's conviction that the only hope for preventing
an inter-dominion war lay in involving the UN.
The inevitable clash between the
prime minister and the agovernor-general occurred on December 20, in a
meeting of the cabinet's defence committee.
Nehru observed that a regular war
was being waged on Indian territory from bases in Pakistan. The talks with
Pakistan held out little promise of a settlement.
It might, therefore, be necessary
to take a political decision to conduct a limited strike into Pakistan.
The Indian army should be prepared
to enter the Sialkot, Gujarat and Jhelum districts of Pakistan in order
to deny the raiders the assistance they were getting at their bases.
Mountbatten, in his capacity as
chairman of the defence committee, stated flatly that no directive should
be issued on these lines.
The proper course would be to refer
the whole matter to the UN which, he said disingenuously, would promptly
direct Pakistan to withdraw the raiders.
After a stormy debate, the committee
agreed to proceed on both lines simultaneously. A reference would be made
to the UN in a last attempt to seek a peaceful settlement.
Meanwhile, the chiefs of staff were
instructed to draw up contingency plans for a military operation to evict
the raiders from their bases in Pakistan.
Nehru explained to General Bucher:
''We shall naturally continue our efforts in the political field, by reference
to the UNO etc...But I am sure that this will not result in fighting stopping
at present. We have thus to be prepared for every contingency and to be
prepared soon''.
Mountbatten, however, was determined
to thwart the cabinet. He promptly alerted Attlee about India's intentions.
Full details of his exchanges with
Nehru, together with relevant minutes of the defence committing meeting,
were passed on to London via the British high commissioner.
Attlee lost no time in warning Nehru
that it would ''gravely prejudice'' the Indian case if it were to send
its forces into Pakistan.
Prompted by London, Washington also
sought assurances about India's intentions. In the Security Council it
soon became clear that India would face condemnation if it were to send
its forces into Pakistan.
The planned counter-attack became
politically infeasible.
Meanwhile, the service chiefs dragged
their feet over the preparation of contingency plans.
The new C-in-C, General Bucher,
confided to the US charge d'affaires in early January that he had taken
no steps to prepare the Indian army for a cross-border operation.
Before the end of the month, in
the light of UN developments, Mountbatten was able to persuade Nehru that
there was no present need for the defence committee to consider the question
of a counter-attack across the border.
The diplomatic factor is particularly
important in wars among countries of the Third World. These countries are
vulnerable to a variety of pressures from the great powers - military,
political and economic.
The course and outcome of wars in
the Third World can, therefore, often be influenced by the great powers.
In such wars, surprise and speed
are vital requirements, not only in a military but also a diplomatic sense.
Decisive results must be speedily
achieved before the major powers can intervene effectively.
In 1947-48, it was virtually impossible
for India to meet the requirements for secrecy and surprise since the defence
committee and the armed forces were all headed by the British.
Contingency planning for a counter-strike
into Pakistan could be seriously undertaken only after the army leadership
had been Indianised.
Thus, in August 1952, Nehru was
able to inform Parliament that ''any further aggression'' in Kashmir would
lead to ''all-out war not in Kashmir only, but elsewhere too''. This was
the policy implemented in 1965.
