Author: Selig S. Harrison
Publication: The International
Herald Tribune
Date: December 20, 2001
Washington The unconditional American
embrace of General Pervez Musharraf as an ally has emboldened government-sponsored
Pakistani terrorist groups to step up pressure on India, increasing the
danger of a new war over Kashmir. Secretary of State Colin Powell has responded
decisively to the attack on the Indian Parliament last week by placing
two of these groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, on the official
U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations. But much stronger action
will be needed to rein in President Musharraf and dissuade India from retaliating
militarily. To get Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan, the United States
has promised grant economic aid totaling $1.1 billion in cash. Half of
this aid has already been disbursed. Since this aid is not earmarked for
specific civilian projects, it can be used to subsidize military spending.
America and its allies are also giving Pakistan debt relief and a relaxation
of the conditions governing $1 billion in IMF aid, which will free up additional
funds for military purchases.
The United States should use its
new economic leverage in Islamabad to stop the drift toward a war that
could escalate to the nuclear level, and to promote the long-term stabilization
of South Asia.
First, before disbursing the rest
of its promised economic aid and making any new aid commitments, the Bush
administration should make certain that its assistance will not be diverted
to military spending by earmarking it for civilian uses. Second, it should
resist blandishments for the sale or grant of military equipment, spare
parts and components. Nearly $50 million worth of military spare parts
and components has been transferred since Sept. 11, and history shows that
this will be used to bolster Pakistan's military posture toward India,
not to fight terrorism.
Third and of the most immediate
importance, the United States should condition new economic aid and the
fulfillment of existing aid commitments on an end to Pakistani terrorism
in Kashmir. General Musharraf has commendably begun to restrain the use
of Islamic religious schools in Pakistan for military purposes. However,
Pakistani intelligence agencies continue to arm and finance both Lashkar-e-Taiba
and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which assassinate moderate Kashmiri leaders as well
as government officials and police.
Both groups consist mainly of Pakistanis,
not Kashmiris. Having designated them as terrorist groups, the United States
should insist that their military capabilities be dismantled. Finally,
and most important, the United States should condition the fulfillment
of economic aid commitments on steps toward a meaningful transfer of power
to a broad-based civilian government. General Musharraf has appointed himself
president in perpetuity and is planning to set up a façade of phony
civilian rule, with the armed forces continuing to maintain control through
veto power in the National Security Council.
Permanent de facto military rule
would lock in the power of the hard-line, anti-Indian generals who were
responsible for the rise of the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba and are waiting
for their chance to unseat General Musharraf. The Islamic parties are a
minority in Pakistan. Their strength rests primarily on their support from
powerful generals, and their power would be greatly diluted by democratic
elections. Past so-called democratic elections in Pakistan have been based
on gerrymandered National Assembly constituencies that have kept politics
confined to a small circle of landed oligarchs and their conservative allies
in monopolistic sections of big business and in the armed forces. This
inbred, closed system has encouraged corruption, made the rich richer and
blocked egalitarian economic reform measures targeted on the impoverished
majority of Pakistanis. The United States should press for a new electoral
system based on constituencies that would give the educated urban middle
class fair representation.
Some observers argue that putting
conditions on U.S. aid could lead to a withdrawal of Pakistani support
for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. But the importance of the
Pakistani contribution to the war has been greatly exaggerated.
Pakistan has provided the use of
airfields that have been valuable for close-in helicopter operations. At
the moment, the border is being patrolled to try to prevent Qaida units
from escaping to Pakistan. But the big U.S. planes used in Afghanistan
have come from aircraft carriers, bases in Diego Garcia and Central Asia,
and captured airfields in Afghanistan itself. The Interservices Intelligence
Directorate in Islamabad (ISI) is so divided between moderates and Taliban
sympathizers that Pakistani intelligence has been much less helpful than
expected. General Musharraf replaced the head of the ISI, but he has not
really purged it or the armed forces in general of hard-line, anti-Indian
elements allied with Islamic extremists. Nor can he do so without undermining
his own position. General Mohammed Aziz, the leading hard-liner, has been
kicked upstairs from corps commander in Lahore to chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff. But he has not been kicked out.
Another argument against conditionality
is that it could lead to General Musharraf's overthrow in a coup. But the
hard-liners appear to recognize that it is in the interests of Pakistan
to get as much from the United States as possible while the getting is
good. So they go along with General Musharraf and bide their time.
The danger now is not that Pakistan
will throw the United States out but rather that the Bush administration
will pay an exorbitant price for Pakistani cooperation at the expense of
the broader American interest in South Asian peace and improved relations
with India, a rising power that will be of growing importance to the United
States long after Qaida has dropped out of the news.
The writer is director of the National
Security Project at the Center for International Policy in Washington and
author of five books on South Asia. He contributed this comment to the
International Herald Tribune.
