Author: Rahul Shivshankar
Publication: The Times of India
Date: December 11, 2001
Introduction: Misplaced Hopes of
'Moderate Pakistan'
A day after Terrible Tuesday and
before anyone in the US administration had even thought about "hunting
down" Osama bin Laden, an Indian security expert had predicted that events
after 9-11 would impact on Pakistan the most.
"Pakistan will undergo monumental
changes as a result of the terror attacks on the US", he said, "the international
community will oversee the potentially most destabilising changes of all
- the dejehadification of Pakistan", which he likened to the allied "denazification"
of Germany after World War II.
Now almost three months since the
attack on the US, with the military campaign in Afghanistan seemingly drawing
to an end, that expert has proved prophetic.
In Pakistan, braving sectarian violence
General Musharraf, admittedly under intense US pressure, has been cracking
down on Islamic fundamentalists, closing down madrassas and sacking members
of his regime linked to extremist Islamists. In fact, a few weeks ago the
general publicly stated - something he wouldn't have turned into a refrain
before 9-11, that - "the nation is sick and tired of them (fundamentalists).
They are driving us into the pit of ignorance, when the nation does not
want to fall back into that pit again".
Of course, despite the insurmountable
nature of the task he is presented with, General Musharraf knows that shaking
off the jehadis and moving towards a more representative and liberal system
of governance would be in keeping with the stated principles of the "enduring
freedom" campaign and would, more than anything else, help in winning over
the international community, whose support he needs to legitimise his position
in Pakistan.
And though the international community
and, in particular, India appear to be very pleased with General Musharrafs
efforts, it shouldn't assume that a 'dejehadi-fled' Pakistan will be any
more "dependable or amiable" than it was before the attacks on the US.
There are many in Pakistan who believe
that the jehadis are only part of the problem. Though General Musharraf
has taken the trouble of distancing himself from them, conditions in Pakistan
do not lend themselves to stable and liberal governance which is necessary
for ensuring peace in the region.
First, civil society in Pakistan
remains feudal and highly militarised. Without any meaningful reforms -
even the widely publicised nazim elections were reportedly rigged and with
numerous restrictions on mainstream political parties, and non-governmental
civil institutions, marginalised elements have few options but to join
undemocratic single-leader ethnic or sectarian parties to articulate their
demands. Very often, because of the availability of arms, these groups
resort to violence. This polarises society, creates unrest and perpetuates
political instability forcing governments to act overbearingly - which
usually entails seeking the army's help - to assert their authority. This
invariably gives birth to a vicious cycle of repression and subversion.
Unfortunately, for Pakistan's neighbours,
till civil society evolves in Pakistan the country will continue to face
problems. As Pakistani security expert Shireen Mazari points out, "the
internal dynamics of Pakistan become a vital factor in defining its external
security parameters and policy".
Second, no one can say with any
degree of certainty if General Musharraf has been able to effect changes
in the traditional power structures in Pakistan. In fact, by all accounts,
his position remains tenuous. An opinion piece in a leading Pakistani daily
points out that as US intervention in Afghanistan and the West Asia is
intensifying, the moderates and liberals that have backed the general thus
far "are beginning to soften" and warns that, "an amazing configuration
may arise, soon the moderates and extremists in Pakistan may find themselves
on the same platform". On her visit to India, former prime minister Benazir
Bhutto said, "the general is as hamstrung as he was when he visited India,
he has not been able to, despite US support, neutralise elements within
his regime, loyal to the jehadis or the ISI. They are only biding their
time".
The danger, of course, is that these
elements could always assert themselves sooner rather than later. For one,
they have a clear motive to do so. There is reported resentment in the
military over the general's reversal of Pakistan's Afghan policy without
any attempt on his part to first secure its political and security interests
or negotiate the withdrawal of hundreds of Pakistani army regulars from
Afghanistan. Apart from this, hardliners are upset with the general for
signing an agreement with the US on September 17 which they feel has betrayed
the Kashmiri cause.
More important, there is the problem
of US support. The general is as good as gone without the US. And as the
US achieves its military objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan loses its
'frontline state' status - there are signs that this may already be happening
- General Musharraf will feel more isolated and consequently will be more
pliant. Undoubtedly, the hardliners will move swiftly to cash in. One can
only guess what concessions the military might extract in exchange for
his continuance in office.
In the past, whenever Pakistan has
been ruled by weak political leaders, they have always tried to buy peace
with the ISI and the army by allowing them to define and operationalise
external policy. And as we have seen, the policies adopted by the army
bureaucracy toward India have supported subversive activities in Jammu
and Kashmir. Clearly, then, even a "dejehadified" Pakistan is not likely
to make much of a positive difference to India's interests.
In fact, if recent events in Jammu
and Kashmir are anything to go by - there have been over half a dozen large-scale
militant strikes in the state over the past one month alone - the general
might already have begun to make concessions. Unfortunately, however, the
Indian government has chosen not to factor this into its Kashmir policy,
post-September 11.
Freeing the Kashmir movement from
the clutches of the jehadis must be the first priority of the Indian government
if it desires peace in Kashmir. In the past, the Central government's efforts
towards establishing peace have been repeatedly thwarted by Islamic fundamentalists.
They not only hijacked the Kashmiri movement, but also derailed any peace
process, by not allowing secular Kashmiri groups, fighting to preserve
their ethno-cultural identity, to negotiate with the Central government.
But instead of taking advantage
of the anti-terrorism sentiment prevalent in the world and moving to free
(read "dejehadify") the Kashmiri struggle from the clutches of Islamic
fundamentalism, the Indian state is enforcing laws like POTO seen as being
aimed at the minorities - which will only further alienate the Kashmiri
people.
