Author: Ajai Shukla
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: February 27, 2002
URL: http://www.indian-express.com/ie20020227/ed3.html
An Indian threat is needed to maintain
US pressure on Pakistan
Over the last fortnight, several
articles have questioned whether any purpose is being served by the continued
deployment of the Indian armed forces along the border with Pakistan. The
show of force, goes the argument, has created the desired impact and since
troops cannot endlessly remain at peak readiness they should now return
to their peacetime cantonments.
Calls for military withdrawal also
hope to placate those sections of international opinion fearful of a nuclear
holocaust; proponents of de-escalation say that India is increasingly being
viewed as an aggressive, implacable state out to garner as much advantage
as it can from America's September misfortune. Pakistan, coincidentally,
advances exactly the same arguments.
This Nice Guy argument is based
upon two faulty premises. First, that the armed forces have reached an
optimum level of readiness for war, which is now degrading as time passes.
And, second, that the Indian government's political aim has been achieved
by the show of force along the border. Despite the enormous cost and effort
of moving the whole country's defence forces from their cantonments to
wartime deployment, most services officers agree that the exercise, codenamed
Operation Parakrama, has streamlined national mobilisation procedures long
relegated to dusty files in unopened cupboards. The swiftness and sweep
of the mobilisation did not leave just Pakistan breathless, but the Indian
Railways, police and paramilitary organisations, defence production factories,
the administrations of most border states and, indeed, large swathes of
the defence services.
Never before, not even when India
went to war in 1965 and 1971, have the armed forces been so comprehensively
mobilised. Weaknesses in the process, which are now being rectified would
never have come to light without actual mobilisation on this scale. Shortfalls
in weapons and equipment are even now being made up.
This continuing training for war,
the armed forces' primary task, is sorely required after years of counter-insurgency
duties. Even when India's exercise in coercive diplomacy has achieved its
aims, military withdrawal should wait until all follow-up action has been
completed. Much of the confusion about India's political aims stems from
the fact that the government has not actually articulated any so far. It
would be nice if this silence were rooted in some deliberate Machiavellian
opaqueness, but it is, alas, more probably due to inertia. If one is to
extrapolate the aim from the public statements of policy makers, it must
surely be the attempt stop Pakistani support to terrorism in India.
Until General Musharraf's declarations
are translated into a verifiable crackdown on jehadi groups across the
Line of Control, Indian mobilisation will have achieved little. Worse,
withdrawing our armed forces at this stage will only reinforce Pakistan's
long-standing belief that India lacks the stomach for a sustained hard-line
policy, even when vital national interests are at stake.
Despite American calls to scale
down tensions along the India-Pakistan border and the Line of Control,
Indian and American planners are coordinating closely to pressure Pakistan.
Whatever Colin Powell may urge publicly, Indian forces remain on the borders
with America's tacit approval, for their presence is a useful tool to jack
up pressure on Musharraf whenever he appears to be flagging in his jehad
against jehadis. While there are very few limits on the pressure that the
Sole Remaining Superpower can directly apply on Pakistan, it has chosen
a more sophisticated solution - to play the role of Good Guy, just barely
restraining a belligerent India from attacking Pakistan.
For God's sake, the Americans warn
Musharraf, take some real action against the jehadis, for we cannot keep
India at bay much longer. Why do we need America when our own armies are
poised in their launch pads? Because war is a risky, uncertain option.
Besides the risk of nuclear conflict, it is far from certain that even
conventional war would achieve India's aims. It is far safer to mobilise
Indian forces, get America to talk danger to Pakistan, and step military
pressure up or down depending on how Pakistan reacts. And the presence
of American troops denies Pakistan the nuclear option, making the Indian
threat even more daunting.
This is not the first time that
Indian military pressure on Pakistan has been coordinated with American
diplomacy. That first time was during the Kargil war, when India's military
response to Pakistani incursions was restricted to the Kargil region; the
US evoked the worrying possibility of broadened conflict all along the
border to force a Pakistani withdrawal. Here again India employed a carefully
calibrated admixture of diplomacy and force without touching any trip-wires
that might have triggered a nuclear response. Today, the US is once again
catalysing Pakistan's acceptance of India's demands. India and America
are now honeymooning openly.
And in the convoluted dynamic governing
Indo-Pak relations, the Pakistani establishment needs American pressure
before it can accept Indian demands, even while realising the advantages
in doing so. Bowing to America is bad enough, but some skilled Musharraf-speak
can justify that. Bowing to Indian pressure, however, would be political
suicide.
While US support may look like manna
from heaven and, in India's present circumstances cannot be refused, America's
poor record in standing by its allies makes the longer term less rosy.
Both India and Pakistan are declared nuclear powers, with delivery means
that could someday reach mainland USA. To that extent, both figure as long-term
threats to American interests. The US, therefore, aims to reduce tensions
in South Asia, dampening both countries' incentive to enhance their nuclear
capabilities.
The US believes it is important
to resolve the Kashmir dispute, seen as the root cause of Indo-Pak animosity.
Despite understanding India's sensitivity to third-party mediation, USA
has already begun talking about ''facilitating a dialogue'' between the
two countries. Sooner or later, India will feel the pressure to arrive
at an agreement with Pakistan on Kashmir. Those negotiations will take
place in the full glare of the world media.
At that time, the strength of India's
position will depend only partly upon how well it has been able to control
Kashmiri militancy. Imposing a semblance of normality will certainly reduce
Pakistan's leverage, but the moral authority to demand a favourable settlement
can only come from winning back the loyalty of the alienated people of
Kashmir. If India does not wish its borders to be redrawn, it will need
to use every resource towards that end.
(The writer is Defence Correspondent
with NDTV. The views expressed in this article are his own.)
