Sub-title: Take on Army within
an Army
Author: C Uday Bhaskar
Publication: The Times of India
Dated: February 6, 2002
General Pervez Musharraf's announcement
in late January that elections would be held in Pakistan as promised in
October 2002 has not elicited the same degree of interest that his more
historic January 12 speech did. Perhaps this is a reflection of the deep
scepticism that attaches itself to the doughty general's statements in
India and the perceived mismatch between word and deed. However, this is
a significant articulation and if the spirit of the January 12 speech is
realised, then Pakistan's internal political developments may be poised
for a beneficial transformation.
The caveat 'may' is necessary for
the general also added that the Pakistani variant of democracy would be
fine-tuned "according to our requirements". A sense of deja vu is inescapable
for Pakistan's first military dictator General Ayub Khan embarked upon
a similar made-to-order variant of democracy in the late 1950's that ensured
his continuation in office. In the present case, General Musharraf has
stated unambiguously that notwithstanding the October ballot activity,
he is not walking away into the sunset. On the contrary, he hopes to continue
in office till 2007 and asserted that it was important for the future of
Pakistan and the democratic process that he remains in power.
The bottom-line is that the military
will continue to remain central to the power structure in Pakistan and
the country's legal brains are now engaged in making the necessary changes
to the constitution to allow for such a dispensation. In itself, this is
not a new phenomenon and Indonesia comes to mind, wherein the military's
role in politics and governance was enshrined in the concept of dual functions
for the military. But it is here that one notes a basic contradiction that
is relevant to India.
States nurture the military as an
institution in the extension of certain political objectives and the defence
of the nation and safeguarding territorial integrity is axiomatically paramount.
Normatively, the military represents the legitimate tool of violence and
force at the disposal of the state and Clausewitz offered a useful postulate
when he posited that war is an extension of politics by other means - and
only to be embarked upon when other options have proved ineffective or
inappropriate. But the general principle is that war, or any other military
initiative, is a function of the political objective and, therefore, a
dependent variable. It is not autonomous unto itself and cannot be divorced
from the political umbilical. Hence, the tenet that political judgment
must direct the use of the military capability in the larger interest of
the state. And the operative part of the political perspicacity is in defining
what determinants constitute the interest of the state and its people.
In the Pakistani case, the Clausewitzian
dictum has been inverted and the military function has subsumed the political
dynamic. Predicating its nascent national identity and related objectives
in inflexible anti-India contours, the military soon occupied the political
space in the first decade after the bloody birth of Pakistan. The national
interest was defined by the military imperative and hostility with India
was nurtured - albeit abetted considerably by the prevailing regional and
global geo-political ambience. Gradually, the political discourse of the
state was subordinated to this military objective - hostility with India.
Kashmir and a sense of incomplete territoriality was identified as the
causis belli. This inversion of Clausewitz was further strengthened after
the trauma of the 1971 war and the ignominious loss of the erstwhile East
Pakistan that invalidated the two-nation theory based on religion.
Pakistan's internal discourse and
military initiatives as related to India since 1971 need little reiteration
and whether it is the acquisition of nuclear weapons or the adoption of
low intensity conflict imbued with religious jehadic fervour as a strategy,
the military imperative has shaped crucial state policy formulation. The
Kargil war of 1999 that followed the Lahore Declaration is the most recent
such example of Pakistan's military defining the politics of the state.
One could infer in hindsight that Lahore was congenitally still-born since
the military was loath to renounce the recourse to the use of force - covert
in this case - to realise its perceived national interest. The Musharraf
coup that unseated Nawaz Sharif is thus an extension of this distinctive
politico-military co-relation in the Pakistani case.
The Pakistani military apex and
the intelligence agency, the ISI that is deeply entrenched in state and
society, were able to ensure that the October 1999 coup was successful.
In keeping with his flamboyance, General Musharraf invoked Napoleon when
he recounted that his decision to land in Karachi despite lack of clearance
was largely based on information received and an analysis of the situation
on the ground - and partly a leap in the dark. Like a good commando he
landed on his feet.
The Pakistani military is undoubtedly
the most credible instrument of the state currently but here we come up
against yet another inversion. If the military has occupied the political
space and become a veritable state within a state, the ISI since its halcyon
Afghanistan days when it forced the former USSR to withdraw, has become
an army within an army. This is an anomalous situation and cannot be sustained
without deep internal fissures - and this was evident when the ISI was
seen assisting the Taliban in the US war in Afghanistan.
Thus, while General Musharraf's
current efforts are commendable in addressing the internal mess in Pakistan,
the political discourse is still being shaped to subserve the inflexible
military objective - hostility against India. The French political philosopher
Michele Foucault noted that ultimately power is about shaping narrative
and discourse and unless the Clausewitzian politico-military equilibrium
is restored, the Musharraf endeavour would not have addressed the real
'core' issue that ails Pakistan.
General Musharraf's penchant to
cast himself as a Kemal Ataturk who will moderate Islam in Pakistan is
part of his persona and while he is well versed with Napoleon's tenets,
perhaps lurking in the wings is another general - (Ike) Eisenhower. The
latter was a World War II hero and post-war, won an election as US president.
But Ike, in his wisdom, cautioned the American people about the excesses
of the military as an institution and the military industrial complex.
In the Pakistani case, the basic contradictions in the politico-military
relationship and the dangers of a military (ISI)-jehad complex warrant
deep introspection by the Musharraf team - spin doctors and all.
