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It pays to be coercive

It pays to be coercive

Author: Narendra Gupta
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: February 4, 2002

Threats to use force are as old as the arts of warfare and diplomacy themselves. In 400 BC, there were instances of Athens and Sparta threatening to use power as a means of influence. Subsequently, there were others by Bismarck, Charlemagne and Richelieu. Frederick the Great once declared that diplomacy without power was like an orchestra without a score.

Coercive diplomacy is employed when national interests are not being met by normal diplomatic means, and going to war is still not worth it. This becomes more important between countries equipped with weapons of mass destruction. In these circumstances, war is no longer an option. The present has become, therefore, the era of coercive diplomacy when possession of the implements and structures of force and their projection in intimidatory and deterrent roles have become important aspects of international relations.

However, for the use of force wit h or without war, the primary consideration has to be a seeming asymmetry of military capability and a demonstrated will to use it. To that extent, the classic Clausewitzian concept of war as an instrument of politics has undergone a change.

Coercive diplomacy requires a continuous projection of the image of military capability even while conducting diplomacy to avoid adverse consequences to security interests. So the success of this diplomacy is in the exploitation of the potential of the capability rather than in its actual use.

In order to apply the strong form of coercive diplomacy, it is important to know the preconditions that are necessary. Alexander L. George, in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, says that these are: strength of motivation, asymmetry of motivation favouring the coercer, clarity of the objectives of the coercion, sense of urgency to achieve the objective, adequate domestic political support, usable military options, opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation, clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement.

To apply the strong form of coercive diplomacy in order to bring Pakistan to book, India had managed all the necessary preconditions on its side. The strength of motivation was very high, particularly after the attack on Parliament on December 13. India was clear in its objectives: that transborder terrorism must stop at the earliest. There was absolute domestic political support for the government. The total deployment of the relatively strong Indian armed forces displayed India's will and the desire to exercise the usable military options. Under these circumstances Pakistan had an obvious fear of unacceptable escalation. The precise terms of Indian demands were clearly spelt out. Be it the return of the 20 most wanted fugitives, renunciation of terrorism against India as a policy of state by Pakistan, no infiltration by terrorists into Indian areas and the effective ban and dismantling of terrorist organisations.

The Indian polity, having the resilience and strength of many centuries, did not falter to Pakistani coercion through low intensity conflict. But, after December 13, the time had now come to respond to the Pakistani challenge and the Indian establishment reacted strongly in a determined and well-considered manner, using all the instruments of state to coerce Pakistan to reverse its Kashmir policy.

Although the Pakistani president has made the right sounds and has impressed the international community, we need to be very circumspect in agreeing to de-escalate our military build-up or reconsider our diplomatic decisions, regardless of the pressure by various major powers. Were we to accept any lowering of our guard without Pakistan implementing irrevocably on the ground all its promises, the efforts made by India in the last month will be irretrievably wasted and lost without any gains whatsoever. Were that to happen, we would never be able to replicate our actions from the same moral high ground and get Pakistan to agree to what it has now.

When dealing with the USSR about reducing their respective nuclear holdings, US President Ronald Reagan always maintained, ''Trust, but verify.'' We need to follow the same principle.
 


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