Author: Narendra Gupta
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: February 4, 2002
Threats to use force are as old
as the arts of warfare and diplomacy themselves. In 400 BC, there were
instances of Athens and Sparta threatening to use power as a means of influence.
Subsequently, there were others by Bismarck, Charlemagne and Richelieu.
Frederick the Great once declared that diplomacy without power was like
an orchestra without a score.
Coercive diplomacy is employed when
national interests are not being met by normal diplomatic means, and going
to war is still not worth it. This becomes more important between countries
equipped with weapons of mass destruction. In these circumstances, war
is no longer an option. The present has become, therefore, the era of coercive
diplomacy when possession of the implements and structures of force and
their projection in intimidatory and deterrent roles have become important
aspects of international relations.
However, for the use of force wit
h or without war, the primary consideration has to be a seeming asymmetry
of military capability and a demonstrated will to use it. To that extent,
the classic Clausewitzian concept of war as an instrument of politics has
undergone a change.
Coercive diplomacy requires a continuous
projection of the image of military capability even while conducting diplomacy
to avoid adverse consequences to security interests. So the success of
this diplomacy is in the exploitation of the potential of the capability
rather than in its actual use.
In order to apply the strong form
of coercive diplomacy, it is important to know the preconditions that are
necessary. Alexander L. George, in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, says
that these are: strength of motivation, asymmetry of motivation favouring
the coercer, clarity of the objectives of the coercion, sense of urgency
to achieve the objective, adequate domestic political support, usable military
options, opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation, clarity concerning
the precise terms of settlement.
To apply the strong form of coercive
diplomacy in order to bring Pakistan to book, India had managed all the
necessary preconditions on its side. The strength of motivation was very
high, particularly after the attack on Parliament on December 13. India
was clear in its objectives: that transborder terrorism must stop at the
earliest. There was absolute domestic political support for the government.
The total deployment of the relatively strong Indian armed forces displayed
India's will and the desire to exercise the usable military options. Under
these circumstances Pakistan had an obvious fear of unacceptable escalation.
The precise terms of Indian demands were clearly spelt out. Be it the return
of the 20 most wanted fugitives, renunciation of terrorism against India
as a policy of state by Pakistan, no infiltration by terrorists into Indian
areas and the effective ban and dismantling of terrorist organisations.
The Indian polity, having the resilience
and strength of many centuries, did not falter to Pakistani coercion through
low intensity conflict. But, after December 13, the time had now come to
respond to the Pakistani challenge and the Indian establishment reacted
strongly in a determined and well-considered manner, using all the instruments
of state to coerce Pakistan to reverse its Kashmir policy.
Although the Pakistani president
has made the right sounds and has impressed the international community,
we need to be very circumspect in agreeing to de-escalate our military
build-up or reconsider our diplomatic decisions, regardless of the pressure
by various major powers. Were we to accept any lowering of our guard without
Pakistan implementing irrevocably on the ground all its promises, the efforts
made by India in the last month will be irretrievably wasted and lost without
any gains whatsoever. Were that to happen, we would never be able to replicate
our actions from the same moral high ground and get Pakistan to agree to
what it has now.
When dealing with the USSR about
reducing their respective nuclear holdings, US President Ronald Reagan
always maintained, ''Trust, but verify.'' We need to follow the same principle.