Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Times of India
Date: February 11, 2002
Introduction: Islamabad's Tokenism
Will not Work
There was a widely-held misperception
that General Musharraf had outsmarted India by joining the alliance against
terrorism in September when, in fact, he had to surrender to a non-negotiable
US ultimatum. There has been a similar sort of misunderstanding of his
speech of January 12, 2002. The speech was in response to the second ultimatum
delivered to General Musharraf through British prime minister Tony Blair
that the Pakistani ruler publicly denounce his country's extremist and
terrorist past and present and commit himself to taking Pakistan towards
Islamic moderation. It was only marginally to do with the Indo-Pakistan
border confrontation. In any case, the speech did not make much difference
to Pakistan's Kashmir policy.
The US and UK understood fully that
the speech was only the beginning of the long road to reform on which Pakistan
had to embark to move away from a social culture which has nurtured terrorism
and extremist politics. That is a time-consuming process and General Musharraf
needed time, not from India but from the international community. He will
be given the time provided he proves that the commitment made in the speech
is genuine. The international community also needed to watch the Pakistani
public response to his speech. At the same time, the Indian mobilisation
on the border effectively curbed the mischief- making potential of any
of his corps commanders and so also the presence of US forces in Pakistan.
Almost a month has passed since
the speech. The rest of the world has been watching carefully what he has
done to implement his commitment in the speech. Beyond arresting a couple
of thousands of terrorists - of whom we do not know how many have been
released - he has done nothing. On the other hand, a US journalist has
been taken hostage and others are under threat. Omar Sheikh who was involved
in the IC-814 hijacking and the transmission of funds to Mohammed Atta
is now the prime suspect, highlighting that General Musharrafs crackdown
on terrorism was only superficial.
One would expect that following
his speech there will be massive attempts in the Pakistani media, academia
and political class to mobilise support for his commitment to make the
country a moderate Islamic state. If the assertion is true that the Pakistani
middle class was not extremist and not supportive of terrorism, one would
expect an upsurge of support for General Musharraf's commitment. There
would have been debates in the Pakistani media, academia and political
class on the implications of the reforms he had promised. The Pakistani
government media, both electronic and print, would have been harnessed
fully for the purpose. Did such developments take place? The facts on the
ground speak for themselves.
Let us forget about India giving
General Musharraf time. Beyond keeping up the pressure, India does not
propose to do anything further. But how much time will the US and UK give
the general? He has been summoned to Washington presumably to explain his
action programme. If the economic aid programme to Pakistan is linked with
benchmarks of the reforms he has to undertake, it will be the general who
will find himself running short of time. Meanwhile, thousands of Al-Qaida
and Taliban leadership cadres have slipped into Pakistan and are presumably
fanning out all over the country. Even as they are quietly settling down
in Pakistan, the Americans are interrogating Al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners
in Guantanamo and collecting enormous amounts of data on the Pakistani
army-ISI-Al Qaida- Taliban-jehadi nexus.
Except for the initial changes in
the Pakistani ISI and army leader- ships, there have been no changes in
the last four months? Does it imply that the entire army and ISI leadership
are totally committed to policies which are against the Al- Qaida, Taliban
and jehadi policies now promised to be implemented by General Musharraf?
Or based on past experience, will the Pakistanis assume that the Americans
will go away without pursuing the Al-Qaida and Taliban cadres to the bitter
end after which Pakistan can revert to business as usual? President George
Bush's speech, his hike in the defence budget, the increase in the allocation
for home-land defence, the interrogation of Al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners
taken together should make it unmistakable to the Pakistanis that this
time the Americans are going to stay and clean up Pakistan. What should
be unnerving to the whole world is the silence on the part of both the
Pakistanis and the Americans. It looks as though both sides are preparing
themselves for a final showdown.
That showdown can come about in
several ways. The US may spot a concentration of Al-Qaida or Taliban and
ask the Pakistanis to arrest and hand them over. They may spot a training
and assembly area of Al-Qaida or Taliban and may choose to bomb and destroy
it. The US may demand, on the basis of evidence collected from interrogating
Al-Qaida and Taliban detainees, the handing over or removal of certain
ISI or army officers. It is also possible after a reasonable wait of a
few more weeks that the US authorities may present Pakistan their third
ultimatum on how they would like it to fulfill their next set of demands
for dejehadising Pakistan.
Some clarity in the situation may
come about with General Musharraf's visit to Washington, which takes place
a month after his speech. This gives him enough time to explain what steps
he had taken to implement his commitments. In these circumstances, there.
are very grave uncertainties enveloping further developments in Pakistan.
General Musharrafs future and his ability to fulfill the commitments he
undertook on January 12, 2002 cannot be taken for granted. The best strategy
for India is to be prepared for the damage limitation that may be called
for because of the uncertainties in Pakistan.
It is a great victory for the US
information campaign in this war on terrorism that it has been able to
cloak its strategy of coercion towards Pakistan so well as to make it look
like Islamabad's surrender is actually voluntary cooperation. Even as the
US increases its pressure on the Pakistani leadership, it tries to confuse
the issue by mixing it up with the Indo-Pakistan tension. While these are
permissible aspects of strategic deception on the part of the US establishment,
it is extremely unfortunate that relevant issues on the state of affairs
in Pakistan which is the epicentre of this war on terrorism are not adequately
focused on in India.
