Author: Ted Galen Carpenter
Publication: Cato Institute, National
Review Online
Date: June 12, 2002
With the diplomatic missions of
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, the United States is playing an increasingly active role in trying
to defuse the dangerous confrontation between India and Pakistan. It is
appropriate for the United States to engage in such diplomacy and encourage
India and Pakistan to step back from the brink of war. An armed conflict
between two states armed with nuclear weapons is obvious cause for alarm.
As they take these diplomatic steps, however, U.S. officials must be careful
that the parties to the dispute do not succeed in manipulating the United
States into advancing their parochial policy agendas.
That danger is acute with regard
to Pakistan. Pakistani leaders have long sought to entice or pressure Washington
into seeking to mediate the Kashmir dispute. Islamabad's conduct in the
latest crisis is consistent with that objective. President Pervez Musharraf
not only repeatedly provoked India by allowing Kashmiri insurgents to operate
from Pakistan's territory, but when the crisis flared, he seemed willing,
if not eager, to intensify it. Pakistan's decision to test its missiles
on three separate occasions in the midst of an already tense situation
is testimony to that fact.
During the current crisis (as well
as during the crisis last December and January), Musharraf has also been
less than subtle about rattling Pakistan's nuclear sabers. Although the
primary purpose of such bellicose actions undoubtedly is to deter India
from launching a military offensive, they also seem calculated to alarm
the United States and pressure Washington to become more actively engaged.
Is it a coincidence that Islamabad's belligerent actions are invariably
accompanied by calls for outside mediation of the Kashmir dispute?
It is not a far-fetched scenario
to imagine the United States becoming so worried about the prospect of
an Indo- Pakistani war that it would abandon its reluctance to become involved
in the emotional and complex Kashmir dispute. Indeed, the recent "trial
balloon" by officials in London and Washington about possibly deploying
U.S. and British troops as "monitors" along the line of control in Kashmir
could easily become the first step in an attempt to mediate the underlying
dispute.
But trying to play such a role would
be a grave mistake. U.S. mediation would suit the military regime in Islamabad
just fine. India, however, would resent such a diplomatic intrusion by
the United States. Indian leaders have made it clear on numerous occasions
that outside mediation by the United States, the United Nations, or anyone
else is unacceptable.
Washington would be wise to respect
India's wishes. India is not only the leading power in South Asia, it is
a rising great power with increasing influence outside that region. The
growth rate of India's economy in recent years has been brisk, and New
Delhi is spending the money needed to create a first-class military. In
another decade or two, India is likely to be firmly ensconced in the ranks
of the world's major powers.
The United States needs to be on
good terms with that rising great power. Relations between Washington and
New Delhi have improved in recent years. But the legacy of decades of suspicion
(when India and the United States were often on opposite sides in Cold
War controversies) has yet to be fully overcome. Any U.S. attempt to intrude
into the Kashmir dispute will "reignite" those suspicions.
Moreover, trying to be a mediator
would be a frustrating, thankless role for the United States. Once entangled,
Washington would be continuously prodded by Pakistan to pressure India
to make concessions. We've seen a similar scenario before in another part
of the world. Yasser Arafat routinely intensifies a crisis environment
whenever he wants the United States to exert pressure on Israel. Washington
already has one diplomatic headache in the Middle East; it doesn't need
another one in South Asia.
The United States should continue
exerting its influence to get India and Pakistan to retreat from the abyss
of war. But the Bush administration needs to understand that Islamabad
is also trying to maneuver Washington into playing a role that would advance
Pakistan's policy goals regarding Kashmir. It is imperative that the United
States not play that game. America must not jeopardize an important long-term
relationship with India by becoming Pakistan's unwitting pawn.
(Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president
for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the
author or editor of 13 books on international affairs.)
