Author: Manpreet Sethi
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: June 13, 2002
With Indian and Pakistani military
forces placed as they presently are, it is not surprising that the threat
of nuclear war is being talked about so casually.
In fact, the manner in which Pakistan
is showing off its nuclear arsenal is so bizarre that sane Pakistanis could
definitely not have given adequate thought to a matter so grim.
Several thinktanks across the world
have conducted elaborate calculations of the numbers that would be immediately
vaporised if a nuclear bomb was to be dropped on a city and those unfortunate
enough to survive and live through the unimaginable days after.
The miseries wreaked on any populace
would be of such unimaginable proportions and so widespread that one wonders
what could possibly be the motivations that could animate anybody to push
the nuclear button.
Even in the face of blatant Pakistani
pronouncements on its low nuclear threshold, in precincts no less hallowed
than the United Nations, India has reiterated that it shall not resort
to the first use of nuclear weapons. The country's draft nuclear doctrine
puts this across in no uncertain terms and umpteen official statements
thereafter, including those made in recent tense times, continue to uphold
this resolve. Pakistan, therefore, could be the only introducer of nuclear
arms into an India-Pak conflict.
There could possibly be two scenarios
in which the Pakistani leadership-political, military or whoever else has
control over the nuclear trigger-could resort to nuclear use:
a) In desperation, if the conventional
military might of India appears to totally overwhelm Pakistan as to put
its survival as a national entity in danger.
b) In despair, if the Pakistani
leadership finds itself in such a hopeless situation, domestically and
internationally, that it finds greater sense in self-annihilation than
life after war. Indications of this thinking were provided in an interview
of a retired Pakistani general who claimed to speak for others when he
said that the situation in the country was so despondent as to merit a
fresh start after a nuclear war!
If desperation or despair could
indeed be the two triggers for a Pakistani nuclear strike, then it would
be in India's interests to reason out both situations. In the case of the
first scenario, India could help avert nuclear war by clearly articulating
the military objectives of a conventional strike into Pakistan. It will
have to be stated, as has been done in the past, that removing Pakistan
from the face of the political map of the world is not an Indian political
or military objective.
New Delhi seeks to cohabit with
its western neighbour in peace, a goal that is realistically possible only
if Islamabad puts an end to the perpetration of terrorism.
Therefore, with Pakistan's survival
not at stake, there should be no reason for a resort to nuclear weapons.
Of course, this logic can work only if the survival of the military regime
is not equated with that of the nation-state. But this for the people of
Pakistan to decide and act.
In the second situation, because
Pakistan sees little hope of emerging out of the abysmal situation it has
fallen into, it needs to be pointed out to Pakistan by all those who have
a voice that despite the country being in such dire straits-economically,
politically, socially- things could still be salvaged if it could reorient
its priorities differently.
Ever since its independence, Pakistan's
attention and energies have largely focused on negating or eroding India's
achievements by fomenting trouble and fanning insurgencies. A proxy war
has been sustained through terrorism based on the ideology of jihad. While
India has been badly bled by such policies, it has not been possible for
Pakistan either to escape the effects of playing with fire.
Terrorist organisations have acquired
a mind and agenda of their own. The easy availability of weapons, an illicit
drug trade and the impact of madrassa education has let loose its own dynamics
over time. It is estimated that nearly two million small arms are in circulation
in Pakistan while about three million rest in clandestine stockpiles available
to a militant outfit ready to take up the cause of Kashmir. Money is available
from the narcotics economy that is believed to have an annual turnover
of $2.5 billion.
Meanwhile, distorted development
priorities have led to a decline in social sector spending on public education
so that madrassas or religious schools remain the only option for many.
With an unemployment rate of nearly 16% and madrassa-trained youth anyway
unable to compete for modern jobs in the government or the limited private
and services sectors, joining jihad presents itself as a means of gainful
employment for the majority.
Isn't this then too high a price
to pay for the sake of inflicting terrorism on India? And, would it not
be downright foolish to annihilate a sick society and polity with nothing
less than nuclear weapons instead of getting the country to utilise its
resources-material and human-to build a nation that every citizen would
be proud of? Future generations of Pakistan may well thank President Pervez
Musharraf if he could use this moment of truth to redefine his country's
identity and re-chart its course.
It might still not be too late to
pull the two countries back from the brink of a senseless conflict that
could prove to be a disaster beyond human imagination. The use of nuclear
weapons can never be justifiable, not in desperation, and definitely not
in despair.
(Manpreet Sethi has worked extensively
on issues of nuclear proliferation and disarmament.)
