Author: Michael Krepon
Publication: India Today
Date: June 10, 2002
Introduction: Kashmiri Muslims as
a second front against India? Musharraf is wrong.
The crisis between India and Pakistan
is the most dangerous confrontation since Soviet ships steamed towards
the US naval blockade of Cuba in 1962. There are no trustworthy lines of
communication between Delhi and Islamabad. Both the Pakistani president
and Indian prime minister lack face-saving exits from this confrontation.
For the first time ever, nuclear-capable missiles are being readied for
use in 40-plus degree heat. Wild men remain in place in Jammu and Kashmir
eager to spark a conflict that destabilises Pakistan, kills Hindus and
disrupts US military operations. Confident Indian predictions that the
nuclear threshold will not be crossed in case of another war presume that
both adversaries are following the same script, that command and control
arrangements will hold, and that accidents will not happen. Yet, every
war on the subcontinent has been marked by costly miscalculations and unpleasant
surprises.
The politics associated with terrorism
as an instrument of state policy as well as the political situation on
the ground in Kashmir are changing, and failure by Pakistan's military
leaders to understand these changes could have devastating consequences.
Pakistan has every right to continue to employ political, diplomatic and
moral means in pursuit of its preferred outcome in Kashmir. The essence
of the problem lies elsewhere, in the provision of military, material,
logistical and intelligence support for those seeking to cross the Line
of Control (LOC). Many, if not most, Kashmiris who once supported militancy
are now seeking a dignified, honourable exit from violence. They no longer
support the influx of Pakistanis and Afghans who create havoc on the ground,
nor do they look kindly on militant leaders based in Pakistan who remain
ready to fight to the last Kashmiri. If Pakistan's military leaders and
intelligence chiefs still believe that Kashmiri Muslims will open a second
front against India in the event of another war, they are likely to be
sadly mistaken again.
Pakistani President General Pervez
Musharraf's declaration that infiltration has ceased is certainly welcome,
but what he views as an important concession is by itself unlikely to prevent
war at this late juncture. The cessation of infiltration in the absence
of steps taken to dismantle the training camps and staging areas on the
Pakistani side of the Kashmir divide constitutes a mere turn of the spigot.
This step alone, which is readily reversible, does not signal a change
of course. But to publicly acknowledge the camps and to close them would
be to belie Pakistani disclaimers.
What matters most at this late hour
is not what Musharraf says, but what he does on the ground. The days when
Pakistani leaders could differentiate between bad terrorists and good freedom
fighters have now passed into history. Infiltration is no longer a spigot
that can be turned on and off in order to leverage a more favourable political
outcome. In the event of another catalytic act of violence-perhaps in conjunction
with the diplomatic efforts of foreign visitors-the way for Musharraf to
insulate Pakistan from the consequences is to take concrete, visible steps
to dismantle the infrastructure of infiltration on his side of the Kashmir
divide. In the absence of these steps, Pakistani disclaimers of responsibility
will lack credibility.
Similarly, Pakistan's invitation
to foreign observers to monitor the loc is useful but insufficient to avert
a war. If the six Indian Army divisions that are usually positioned along
the loc cannot stop infiltration, a smattering of foreign monitors will
only serve cosmetic purposes. Far more meaningful would be unilateral,
collaborative or cooperative measures that would confirm the closure of
camps and staging areas for infiltration. Parallel Indo-US surveillance
could serve these purposes.
A war can be prevented if Musharraf
and the Pakistani leadership understand that their hopeful scenarios for
another war do not conform to ground and political realities. At this crucial
juncture, false hopes cannot be confused with hard analysis. A war that
Pakistan loses would discredit the army and further endanger the country's
future. India's leaders must also understand that their hopeful scenarios
could be dashed by events beyond their control. Indian perceptions of Pakistan's
"red lines" are not hard and fast. They are inferential and relative. For
instance, when asked where Pakistan's red lines were, all but one of those
I interviewed in India last month expressed confident knowledge-but their
answers differed. When would the seizure of territory result in the crossing
of a Pakistani red line? Doesn't this depend on the territory seized and
the depth of incursion? How is the Indian Government to know?
It is difficult to mete out punishment
or to seize territory with perfect understanding of the tolerance level
of an adversary. Had both India and Pakistan known such tolerance levels,
they would not now be poised for war.
(Michael Krepon is the founding
president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, USA.)
