Author: V. Sudarshan
Publication: Outlook
Date: June 10, 2002
Introduction: Pervez Musharraf is
beginning to feel the heat as the West hardens its stance against Pakistan
On May 29, two days after Pakistan
President Pervez Musharraf declared in a televised address that "there
is nothing happening across the LoC", British foreign secretary Jack Straw
was closeted with foreign minister Jaswant Singh in Delhi's Hyderabad House,
summarily dismissing Islamabad's claims. "Pakistan in our view (the US
and the UK)," said Straw, "is the cause for the present situation." Claiming
to have been blunt during his meeting with Musharraf earlier in the week,
Straw told Singh that "the focus was Pakistan and what it would have to
do to deal with terrorism."
In some ways, it was deja vu, a
replay of January's fervent diplomatic activities amidst impassioned war
rhetoric and eyeball-to-eyeball massing of troops on the Indo-Pak border.
But what has definitely changed
since then is the swing in the world opinion against Pakistan, and its
palpable reluctance to believe in Musharraf's January 12 promises to curb
cross- border terrorism. No longer are there pleas to give Musharraf more
time, no longer are world leaders interceding on his behalf to express
empathy for the challenges he faces at home. The message rings loud and
clear: Musharraf must act now, or countenance international isolation.
It's precisely this message US defence
secretary Donald Rumsfeld is expected to convey to New Delhi on his trip
here on June 9, two days after US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage
arrives. Diplomatic sources say the specifics of what Musharraf will have
to do haven't been discussed yet, but to nudge the General in the right
direction, the British, as part of the EU, told him that no verifiable
change in the ground situation would make it difficult for the EU to release
promised loans to Pakistan. In other words, threats of economic squeeze
are expected to prod Musharraf into taking action that cajoling and coaxing
failed to achieve.
This too is a step forward from
the stalemate of the months following the January 12 speech. Post-Kaluchak,
South Block felt the US and the UK were under the illusion that no extra
pressure needed to be brought upon Musharraf, that Islamabad believed India
was desperate for an exit strategy after massing its troops on the border.
In what appears to have been carefully-calibrated cries of retaliation
against Kaluchak, the world leaders were prompted to work the telephone
lines: US national security adviser Condoleeza Rice called her Indian counterpart
Brajesh Mishra on May 14, President Bush talked to Prime Minister A.B.
Vajpayee the next day, secretary
of state Colin Powell spoke to Jaswant Singh on May 16, as did Rice on
May 17. The same day in Washington, Indian ambassador to the US Lalit Mansingh
met Armitage, and Vajpayee wrote to Bush on May 20. Powell had another
chat with Singh on May 24.
In some ways, threats of retaliation
against Islamabad mounted pressure on the US-and the West-to end its public
equivocation on Musharraf or face the grim possibility of watching India
attacking Pakistan and throwing in disarray its pursuit of Al Qaeda militants.
The US did precisely that after Hurriyat leader Abdul Ghani Lone was killed
in Srinagar. Expressing his anger for the first time in public, Powell
told cnn on May 26: "We have got to get back from the edge.... And it begins
with stopping the infiltration across the LoC... And now we have to watch
and see whether that action is truly stopped in a manner that all of us
can see and detect, and especially the Indians can see and detect. The
Indians have given us reason to believe that if that line of control infiltration
action stops, then it will be possible to take other steps of de- escalatory
nature."
But diplomatic sources say Powell's
allusion to de-escalation would be confined to steps like restoring overflight
facilities, sending diplomats back to Islamabad-and not demobilisation
and dialogue."Those will come only at the end, when we are completely satisfied
that our concerns have been fully met," says a senior diplomat. Gone now
are also Washington's attempts to elicit a commitment from India to resume
dialogue with Pakistan, if infiltration stops. Says another diplomat: "The
earlier formulation meant that you were rewarding terrorism by giving something
on a platter. Now the linkage rejection has been accepted by our interlocutors."
That Washington's equivocation on
Musharraf has ended can also be discerned in Powell's conversation with
him. Powell told Musharraf bluntly that "with the presence of US troops
in Pakistan, he could not presume he had bought an insurance policy". Powell
also threatened Musharraf with freezing of loans from the EU, and that
"everything would be washed away", were he to not curb terrorism. The change
in the international opinion was reflected in the West's response to Musharraf's
May 27 speech. No longer was he praised. Instead, the big boys wanted to
see evidence of an end to export of terror from Pakistan. Says a diplomatic
source: "The Pakistani government would certainly not want to feel embarrassed
in front of the international community, especially after the anti- Pakistan
rhetoric from virtually every country that matters."
What has made Washington harden
its stance against Musharraf? Diplomatic sources say Washington feels disappointed
at Pakistan's inadequate cooperation in hunting down Taliban and Al Qaeda
operatives. Consequently, it was goaded by frustration to pressure Musharrraf
on Indian demands. Easing of Indo-Pak tensions would benefit the US as
well. As Rumsfeld declared last week: "We could be getting a lot more help
from the Pakistanis.... They have forces along the Indian borders that
we could use along the Afghan border." Adds a diplomat: "Musharraf is now
beginning to feel the heat. The world will now determine if it is time
to change the whole approach to Pakistan."
But that's easier said than done,
largely because the fundamental approach is to prop up Musharraf and yet,
simultaneously, curb the problem of infiltration for the moment. This is
typically a yo-yo situation: Musharraf could think he can retreat this
time to rally back later.
No wonder, Jaswant Singh in his
press conference last week emphasised that India was looking for a permanent
dismantling of Pakistan's terrorist apparatus. This effectively means that
India wants an end to support and sustenance to terrorist activities and
individuals inside Pakistan-training facilities and supply of arms for
terrorist purposes; cross-border terrorism or infiltration; Islamabad's
encouragement to jehadi groups and individuals to subvert the constitutional
system in the Valley.
The West's emphasis is on the third
aspect of India's concerns. Even if Musharraf capitulates, the gain would
be at best temporary, as he would retain the capacity to switch terrorism
off and on. But the West believes that even this could lead to demobilisation
and dialogue. As more foreign dignitaries make a beeline for New Delhi,
India needs to see action rather than more assurances.
(V. Sudarshan With A.K. Sen in Washington)
