Author: Amir Mir
Publication: Outlook
Date: June 10, 2002
Introduction: It's delayed, but
a U-turn on Kashmir will happen. But can President Musharraf survive it?
Facing imminent international isolation,
and fearing Pakistan is in danger of squandering its gains accruing from
the war against terror, President Pervez Musharraf is mulling yet another
U-turn on his foreign policy: abandoning the jehadis operating in Kashmir.
Sources in the military establishment say this great leap forward could
have been already taken had it not been for intense opposition from jehadis
and, presumably, those in the Pakistani society who support them.
Neither Pakistan nor Musharraf have
any delusions about the sudden change in the global tide against them:
both the US and UK have condemned Pakistan's recent missile tests, and
increasingly shown signs of accepting New Delhi's claims of Islamabad fomenting
terrorism across the LoC.
Military sources say international
big boys are also dangling the carrot. In recent weeks, they say, US assistant
secretary of state Christina Rocca and British foreign secretary Jack Straw
have held out credible assurances that India would reciprocate in equal
degree to any dramatic shift in Pakistan's Kashmir policy. "At the same
time," says one of them, "the Pakistani foreign office was told that US
deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, being sent to South Asia early
next month, would not arrive in Islamabad until Pakistan took necessary
steps to stop cross-border terrorism. Only after this, it was conveyed,
could the US pressure India to pull back its troops."
That's precisely why diplomatic
circles in Islamabad were expecting Musharraf to announce in his May 27
speech a ceasefire with India. Kashmiri jehadi groups were then to emulate
the President in their Kashmir operations. Government circles also hinted
to journalists that his speech would be ground-breaking.
But this wasn't to be, largely due
to the jehadis' furious manoeuvrings. Worried over reports that the Pakistani
army had already started stopping the mujahideen from entering Kashmir,
Jamaat-e-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad had decided, sources in militant
circles say, to contact religious parties and launch a countrywide movement
against Musharraf's possible compromise on May 27. A day before, say the
sources, Qazi confided in his partymen that Islamabad had sought his support
on the contemplated ceasefire.
Perhaps such opposition activities
persuaded Gen Musharraf to depute two ISI men to set up an emergency meeting
with the Pakistani chapter of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
and the jehadis a few hours before the speech. The participants were informed
that Musharraf planned to announce a ceasefire on behalf of the Pakistan
army, which should be followed by a similar ceasefire announcement by the
United Jehad Council (UJC) in Kashmir.
The participants from the APHC (Pakistan
chapter) included Altaf Qadri of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front,
Ghulam Mohammad Safi of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Siddiq Ganai of the People's
League, Ashraf Saraf of the Muslim Conference, Yousaf Naseem of the People's
Conference and Mir Tahir Masood of the Ittehadul Muslimeen. Those from
the jehadi organisations included Syed Salahuddin of the Hizbul Mujahideen,
Bakhat Zameen Khan of the Al-Badr Mujahideen, Commander Osman of the Hizbul
Momineen, and General Abdullah of the Jamiatul Mujahideen.
But the proposal angered the jehadi
commanders; almost all voiced their opposition to it, even refusing to
take the soft drinks on offer as a mark of protest. "We're being stabbed
in the back and abandoned by Pakistan in the same way as it did with the
Taliban," one of them told the presidential aides. Only Mir Tahir Masood
supported the ceasefire idea.
The aides tried their best to convince
Salahuddin, the UJC chairman. Salahuddin was enraged at the suggestion,
accusing Musharraf of pushing the mujahideen into a Tora Bora and Kunduz-like
situation in which Indians would butcher the mujahideen.The meeting's organisers
tried to pacify him saying the world community would guarantee against
bloodletting. Salahuddin, then, reportedly countered, "What happened after
we announced the ceasefire in July 2000? They tried to create differences
among us and also killed two out of the five commanders who had announced
the ceasefire."
Sources say it was a veritable revolt.
Some commanders offered to leave 'Azad' Kashmir, claiming they would even
then continue their struggle. With the meeting ending in a fiasco, a few
hours later, Gen Musharraf addressed the nation, promising to fulfill his
previous commitments-"Our territory will not be used for terrorism in any
part of the world and we condemn terrorism in any part of the world"-and
yet deciding against announcing the ceasefire.
Senior political analyst and former
editor Hussain Naqi senses a rethink in Islamabad over Kashmir. Yet he
cautions, "This change would be more problematic for Pakistan than the
U-turn it took on the Afghan policy post-September 11, ending support to
the Taliban and joining hands with the US in the war against terrorism."
Sources say the focus of Pakistan's
'modified security strategy' would be to continue persuading the pro-Kashmiri
jehadi leadership that the solution to the Kashmir problem lies in a political
and diplomatic dialogue. Intelligence agencies say a large number of the
5,000 mujahideen who're considered motivated supporters of the Kashmiri
movement now operate completely out of the government's control. The success
of any change in the Kashmir policy depends greatly on the response of
jehadi groups.
A senior Pakistani official with
a vast experience of Kashmir says some of these jehadi groups could have
been responsible for targeting civilians in Kashmir, hoping to provoke
India into retaliating against Pakistan. This, the official says, would
harden positions at home and render impossible for the government to counter
those committed to the Kashmir cause. An Indo-Pak war could also plunge
the region into a crisis, persuade the US to evacuate its troops and consequently
relieve pressure from Al Qaeda and Taliban activists on the run.
There's also a section in government
circles that would want Musharraf to tread warily and obtain guarantees
of a quid pro quo for any shift in the country's Kashmir policy. Pointing
to his January 12 speech, they say Musharraf's conciliatory gestures only
emboldened India to raise its pitch, and insist for action upon the Most
Wanted list New Delhi had submitted. Perhaps this is the reason why Musharraf
struck a belligerent tone-his reference to attacks on Muslims, Christians,
Sikhs and scheduled castes have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani
religio-militant quarters-hoping to manage international guarantees for
persuading jehadi commanders to agree to his new Kashmir policy.
But there's no denying that change
is on the anvil. That the government is gradually distancing itself from
the jehadis can be gleaned from the fact that it has blocked the wireless
communication system used by militants on both sides of the LoC.The militants
fighting in Kashmir now have no links with their base camps or with other
ultras in Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for us). Under these
circumstances, the worried commanders of Pakistan-based militant groups
are trying to evolve a new strategy to continue their armed struggle in
Kashmir.
