Author: Irfan Husain
Publication: Dawn, Pakistan
Date: June 15, 2002
URL: http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/arc-mazdak.htm
As Pakistan is caught between the
rock of American political and economic pressure and the hard place of
Indian military threats, policy-makers in Islamabad need to ponder where
their ill-conceived plans have led the nation.
In a private enterprise, the chief
executive would have been hauled over the coals by shareholders if his
policies had cost the company the huge losses we have incurred as a nation.
Unfortunately, the citizens of Pakistan have very little say in the formulation
of the grand strategies that impinge both directly and indirectly on the
lives.
Even when they get to vote for their
leaders, they find that the military is the ultimate arbiter of their fate,
as elected governments and parliaments are turfed out at the whim of the
general of the day.
Since Pakistan's earliest days,
the army has played a preponderant role in matters pertaining to internal
and external security as well as foreign affairs. Even when GHQ has not
been running the country directly, it has been the key player in determining
the contours of our external relations, especially with India, Afghanistan,
China and the United States.
The Foreign Office has largely been
reduced to the status of a messenger boy, as it has executed policies its
career professionals have not always agreed with. Even elected prime ministers
have often been left out of the decision-making loop. The Kargil fiasco
is a case in point: it seems that in the army briefing, Nawaz Sharif was
given the impression that the operation was to be a short, sharp incursion
with total deniability. In the event, it was evident that the whole action
had been planned and executed by the army.
So here we are now, with over five
decades, two-and-a-half wars, thousands of lives and billions of dollars
squandered on a policy that has clearly failed. The question is, where
do we go from here? Do we lick our wounds, pick up the pieces and get on
with life? Or do we sit and sulk, bemoaning the injustice of life and swearing
vengeance against India and the West for having forced us to abandon a
failed policy that had become the end-all and be-all of our existence?
The answer will determine whether
Pakistan is to emerge from its self-imposed isolation and rejoin the community
of nations as a modern, forward-looking country, or remain a pariah that
breeds and exports religious extremism and terrorism. The recent arrest
of an alleged American terrorist in Chicago underlines the dangers of following
the second path: Padilla is known to have spent time in Pakistan where
he is supposed to have received bomb-making training. Many Pakistanis will
scoff at the American allegations, but the fact is that Pakistan is hardly
a tourist attraction for the likes of Padilla.
Whatever his motives in spending
time in our country, it was not the beauty of our mountains or the charm
of Moghul monuments that drew him to Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. It is
a fact that over the years, Pakistan has attained the dubious distinction
of being one of the favorite destinations of desperate and fanatical men
with murder in their hearts.
After the recent nerve-jangling
stand-off between the two South Asian nuclear powers and the desperate
efforts of world leaders to head off yet another war over Kashmir, policy-makers
in Islamabad have to realize that we can no longer sustain our present
course. In diplomatic, economic and military terms, we have reached the
end of the road in Kashmir. Isolated as never before, fiscally kept afloat
by transfusions of aid, and unable to finance our crippling military expenditure
for much longer, it is time to re-examine our single-point Kashmir agenda
and take some hard decisions.
Individuals can afford to base their
actions on emotions; nations do so at their grave peril. National interest
must be the underlying factor in decision-making; the ability to achieve
a goal must be another crucial ingredient. Thus when Zia had delusions
of grandeur and declared Central Asia to be part of Pakistan's sphere of
influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he was clearly over-
reaching. But to attain his dream, it was essential for Islamabad to control
Afghanistan, and hence our open-ended support for the Taliban.
Once the Soviet army had pulled
out of Afghanistan, both our hawkish military planners and the foreign
and local holy warriors who fought for them were convinced that their success
could be replicated in Kashmir. If one of the greatest war machines in
the world could be humbled, they reasoned, why could they not defeat the
Indians?
Taking advantage of the purely indigenous
revolt that broke out in Indian Kashmir in 1989, Pakistani, Arab and Afghan
jihadis began to control the struggle. Well-financed militant organizations
in Pakistan sent in arms and volunteers with covert official support. Training
camps were set up in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan and funds were openly raised
for the Kashmiri jihad.
The blowback from Afghanistan and
Kashmir caused massive disruption and hundreds of terror attacks within
Pakistan, but successive governments, both civilian and military, considered
this a price worth paying for solving the dispute in our favour once and
for all.
But 9/11 changed the equation decisively:
New Delhi raised the stakes in the knowledge that their military action
would meet with American approval. All of a sudden, armed militancy would
no longer be distinguished from terrorism, and the random killing of civilians
would be opposed by whatever means a state could muster. If the Americans
could come across half the globe to engage the Taliban, the Indians argued
that they could do the same with the Pakistanis on their borders. Despite
General Musharaf's new-found popularity in Washington, the Indian argument
has won the day.
There are many shrill voices in
Pakistan calling for an outright rejection of Musharaf's decision to halt
cross-border incursions as this is tantamount to a U-turn on Kashmir. These
people talk of 'national honour' and the 'inalienable right of the Kashmiris
to determine their future'. But what of the inalienable right of the people
of Pakistan to peace and prosperity? By impoverishing and isolating ourselves,
how have we helped the people of Kashmir? As a matter of fact, we have
made life more difficult for them.
If Musharaf can call off the zealots
who are using Pakistan as a base, and stamp out their activities within
our borders, I will certainly support him.
