Author: Husain Haqqani
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: June 20, 2002
URL: http://www.indian-express.com/archive_full_story.php?content_id=4616
Introduction: It is time to prepare
Pakistani public opinion for the hard truth about terrorism, home-grown
and imported. Militants from all over the Muslim world transited through
Pakistan to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan. They have now returned
to use their former transit station as a temporary staging ground
The terrorist attack on the US consulate
in Karachi leaves no doubt that Pakistan is now a major target of groups
linked to al Qaeda. Officials may well say that the current wave of terrorism
is the price Pakistan is having to pay for supporting the United States
since September 11 last year. But in fact, the price Pakistan is paying
may be for allowing militants from all over the Muslim world to transit
to and from Afghanistan since 1979.
Officials have mentioned the possibility
of Indian complicity in the bombing. But playing the traditional South
Asian blame game without substantive evidence serves no purpose except
to divert attention from the Al Qaeda linked groups. It is time to prepare
Pakistani public opinion for the hard truth about terrorism, whether home-grown
(sectarian groups) or imported from the Middle East. Instead of facing
the challenge squarely, officials have shied away from admitting the presence
of al Qaeda in Pakistan. During the anti-Soviet resistance, militants from
all over the Muslim world transited through Pakistan to participate in
the jihad.
Some of them created covert networks
within Pakistan, taking advantage of poor law enforcement and the state's
ambiguity towards pan-Islamic militancy. Now that the al Qaeda and Taliban's
base in Afghanistan have been disrupted, they are using their former transit
station as a temporary staging ground.
If General Pervez Musharraf's commitment
to opposing terrorist groups is irreversible (as it appears to be), there
is no reason for government spokesmen to deny the existence of terrorist
groups within the country. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan have not started
merely because of Musharraf's policies, though the post-September 11 shift
in the country's stance has increased their frequency and intensity. Al
Qaeda's ally, Egyptian Jihad, bombed and destroyed the Egyptian embassy
in Islamabad on November 19, 1995. A few months earlier, on March 8, 1995,
two employees of the US Consulate in Karachi, Gary Durell and Jacqueline
Van Landingham were killed in a terrorist attack on a consulate van.
On April 22, 1996 explosive devices
were hurled on the US Information Service building in Lahore. Four Americans
and two Pakistanis working with the Union Texas oil Company were killed
on November 12, 1997, again in Karachi. On November 12, 1999 rocket attacks
targeted offices of the United States government as well as the United
Nations in Islamabad.
It is obvious terrorism has been
at work in Pakistan before and is now menacing the country with a vengeance.
Musharraf's decision to fight a multi-pronged battle -against domestic
political rivals, India and terrorism-could give the terrorists an advantage.
They have nothing to protect, only targets to destroy.
The diminishing of the recent stand-
off with India has given General Musharraf some breathing space. But despite
lessening of tensions, India appears unwilling to withdraw its troops from
the border. The recent reduction in India-Pakistan tension is based on
US verification of an end to Pakistani support for Kashmiri militancy.
Indigenous Kashmiri groups will most probably keep up their fight, as will
those al Qaeda types who are already inside India or in Jammu and Kashmir.
But helped by US intelligence, India is expected to know the extent and
nature of Pakistani support for the militants.
Pakistan could soon find that it
is having to clamp down on the militants without necessarily securing a
discussion over the future of Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf has a tough
act on his hands, one that requires political skills that he is not known
to possess. He will have to roll back the jihadi movement without seeming
to do so on American or Indian orders and without getting an immediate
quid pro quo over Kashmir. He will probably face defiance from militants
and religious parties, as well as from ideologues within the establishment.
He could pull through if he reached
out to mainstream political parties and if India eased pressure on him.
The problem is that General Musharraf hates Pakistan's politicians almost
as much as he dislikes India. Believing as he does in his good luck he
could be tempted to take on the militants and Islamist ideologues without
cutting a deal with mainstream politicians at home. He could also try to
keep up his anti-India rhetoric at least in public which may not go down
too well with hardliners on the other side of the border. The breathing
space provided by the Armitage and Rumsfeld missions could evaporate in
a very short time.
The world continues to see Kashmir
in terms of militancy and terrorism instead of as an issue of self- determination.
The legal, moral and political merit of Pakistan's position continues to
be ignored despite considerable focus-call it internationalisation-on the
question of Kashmir's future. The reason for this lies in factors that
General Musharraf, as a military man, may not be able to comprehend or
accept. Pakistan has consistently neglected non-military aspects of national
power, such as economic growth and diplomatic potential. It has an effective
military but is ineffective in most other realms. The greatest tool in
statecraft, political skills, cannot evolve in a country where politics
remain suspended for long periods.
General Muhammad Moosa, Chief of
Pakistan's Army during the 1965 war went on to become Governor of then
West Pakistan. After his retirement he was asked why he failed so miserably
as governor after such an illustrious career as a soldier. Musharraf would
do well to pay attention to General Moosa's reply: ''In the army,'' he
said, ''I was trained to locate the enemy and liquidate the enemy. In politics
I discovered that things are more complex. It is not always easy to locate
who the enemy is and sometimes you discover that you can't liquidate him
even if you locate him''.
(Husain Haqqani is currently a visiting
scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington
DC. He has served as adviser to former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and
Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan's Ambassador to Sri Lanka)
