Author: Prem Shankar Jha
Publication: Outlook
Date: June 24, 2002
Introduction: It's the second shock
for Pak's hawks, jehadis and army. And unlike with the policy reversal
on the Taliban, there's also no trade-off here.
The war clouds over South Asia seem
to have dissipated as rapidly as they had gathered. President Pervez Musharraf
has minimised the possibility of war, all but withdrawn his threat to use
nuclear weapons against India as a first-strike weapon and committed himself,
both in public and in private, to stopping the infiltration of terrorists
across the LoC. India has lifted the ban on overflights by Pakistani aircraft
and sent the warships of the Eastern Command back to the Bay of Bengal
from the Arabian Sea. By the time this appears in print, it is almost certain
that the artillery shelling across the LoC will also have died down.
Officially, New Delhi has done all
this in response to Musharraf's commitment to stop cross-border infiltration.
But after all that Indian leaders have said in recent weeks about the need
to see a change on the ground first, it is a fairly safe bet that they
are satisfied that there has been a substantial reduction in terrorist
violence and infiltration. The former, at least, is borne out by the absence
of any significant terrorist strikes in Jammu and Kashmir since May 27.
Musharraf is, therefore, keeping
his word. But for how long does he intend to do so? What's more pertinent
is how long can he afford to do so? Backed by an overwhelming international
consensus, the US and the UK have made it clear to him that they expect
the halt to be permanent. Musharraf has agreed and India has clearly come
around to the view that he means what he has said. But he won't find it
easy to live up to his commitment.
This is the second shock that he
has administered in less than eight months to Pakistan's hawks, to its
jehadis, to the religious political parties and to the army. And it is
a far greater shock than the abandonment of the Taliban. He was able to
justify his volte face in September by saying that the Americans had left
Pakistan with no choice, and that by allying itself with the US Pakistan
had strengthened its hand against India in Kashmir. Since Pakistan's Afghan
policy had in any case been intended to give it strategic depth in its
struggle with India, and since Kashmir was at the heart of this struggle,
the bargain seemed on balance an advantageous one for Pakistan.
On this occasion, there is no such
bargain that he can point to. Through British foreign secretary Jack Straw
and a interview given by Colin Powell to the BBC on May 31, the West has
made it clear to him that it will not accept the use of nuclear weapons
in a war with India. This has all but nullified the threat that Pakistan
has used for a decade to blackmail India into not retaliating against its
proxy war in Kashmir with a conventional attack. The West has also left
him in no doubt that the first step towards peace has to be the ending
of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan. Finally, the Almaty declaration
has made it clear that whereas there may be a difference between terrorism
and a freedom movement, cross-border armed support for a freedom movement
falls into the category of terrorism.
In sum, therefore, in the five decade-long,
mostly cold war over Kashmir, Pakistan has suffered its worst defeat. Musharraf
now faces the invidious task of making the defeat palatable. He is not
in a particularly good position to do so. The volte face over Afghanistan
and Al Qaeda had already made him a target of the jehadis and the super-hawks
in Pakistan. His decision to give himself five more years as president
and the widespread belief that he rigged the results of the referendum
that legitimised his bid has lost him much of the support he enjoyed among
the moderates and democrats. Today, he is politically on the defensive
and almost completely dependent on the armed forces for his power and authority.
This does not necessarily mean that
his days are numbered.As I.A. Rehman, a former editor of The Pakistan Times,
wrote recently in The Tribune, a majority of Pakistanis would probably
like to see their country end its support for cross-border infiltration
into Kashmir. Musharraf's problems may, therefore, be most acute during
the period of transition when Pakistani public opinion comes to terms with
the unattainability of one set of goals in Kashmir and finds another set
that are more within reach.
That, at any rate, must be the premise
on which India bases its policies towards Pakistan in the coming weeks.
New Delhi's first task is to institutionalise the end of cross-border infiltration
well before the end of the four to six weeks for which Musharraf asked
the jehadi organisations in PoK to suspend their operations. It may be
right in rejecting joint US-UK patrolling of the LoC, because neither country
has any idea of the terrain its soldiers will encounter. But the alternative
suggested by Atal Behari Vajpayee, of joint patrolling by Indian and Pakistani
troops, is no better. Apart from the absence of trust, this would enable
rogue elements in the Pakistan army and the ISI to give the patrolling
schedules to the jehadis and actually facilitate their infiltration into
Kashmir.
The best course of action may be
to associate the US, the UK or the UN observers with the Indian army and
give them full access to the methods by which the level of infiltration
is determined.
If infiltration remains on hold
for sometime longer, India would do well to resume the dialogue with Pakistan
that Musharraf has been urging. Both these steps would appear in Pakistan
as concessions that he has wrested from India. This will strengthen his
position marginally in the difficult transition that lies ahead.
