Author: V. Sudarshan
Publication: Outlook
Date: June 24, 2002
Introduction: The US seems to agree
that terrorist camps in PoK must go
Last Monday, barely 48 hours after
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage left Delhi, India announced
it was lifting all restrictions on overflights of Pakistani aircraft, informed
the Pakistani charge d'affairs that Harsh Kumar Bhasin had been earmarked
for being posted to Pakistan as high commissioner, asked naval ships along
the western seaboard with Pakistan to sail back to their stations. These
three measures were taken essentially in response to Pakistan President
Pervez Musharraf's pledge to end infiltration across the LoC.
The same day, US Secretary of State
Colin Powell told the Asia Society at New York, "Two weeks ago, we got
assurances from President Musharraf that he would cease infiltration activity
across the LoC.
We passed those assurances on to
the Indian side. And then.Armitage over this past weekend got further assurances
that cessation of activity would be visible and would be permanent and
would be followed by other activities that had to do with the dismantling
of the
camps that led to the capacity
to conduct these kinds of operations."
Thus, when hardcharging US Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld came calling on Wednesday, the US had openly
acknowledged the linkage between the process of infiltration and the factors
that encourage the process-the presence of terrorist camps-and had accepted
the principle that these had to be dismantled as well.
Clearly, a pattern of sequencing,
minutely choreographed, is beginning to emerge as the centrepiece of American
shuttle diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad. The sequencing involves
identifying what steps India could take and those Pakistan will have to
take in order to enable India to take its proposed steps. Rumsfeld came
to determine what other steps, from the menu of options available, India
would be prepared to take in order to bring about "material de-escalation,
from a military perspective, that brings down the chances of conflict".
The stress seemed to be on measures that could be easily taken but which
could as easily be reversed if Pakistan reneged.
If there were more positive signs
India sees, the next steps from New Delhi's point of view could, logically,
be from the following options:
I starting the formal process of
sending the communication (letter of agreement) that India intends to send
Bhasin as high commissioner to Islamabad;
* a reduction leading to an end
of shelling across the LoC;
* moving airplanes back from forward
deployed positions; demobilisation in sectors other than in Jammu and Kashmir;
* restoring landing rights for Pakistani
aircraft; and
* restoring rail and road links.
India made it very clear to Rumsfeld
that it would be loath to take any step till convinced that an irreversible
process of ending terrorism from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) was in
place. But there could be some complications. For instance, another terrorist
attack like the one at Kaluchak. Rumsfeld, now focused on mopping up the
dispersed Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan, knows (based on American experience
on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border) that it is not easy to check infiltration,
that there already are terrorists inside J&K and that Al Qaeda elements,
whose presence near the LoC now stands more or less confirmed, would want
to precipitate a war between India and Pakistan.
Sources say that in this light,
Rumsfeld was looking for some kind of insurance policy against an Indian
over-reaction in case of another terrorist attack.Rumsfeld wanted New Delhi
to give this aspect careful consideration and not directly and immediately
implicate Musharraf in such an event.The Indian view on this, however,
runs as follows: the best insurance against terrorism would be to close
down the camps and since operationally terrorists of various hues piggy-backed
on the resources and infrastructure generously made available to them,
the logical thing to do would be to deny terrorists the space to operate
from PoK. This would purge the area of Al Qaeda elements as well.
As Rumsfeld left to work on Musharraf,
it was not altogether clear if, once again, the US was beginning to judge
Musharraf by his words and not deeds. But as diplomacy begins to grasp
at the nitty gritty, it is clear that the US will articulate its views
far more forcefully than ever before.
