Author: Michael Krepon
Publication: The New York Times
Date: June 4, 2002
Over the weekend, the likelihood
of a war between India and Pakistan receded slightly. Secretary of State
Colin Powell has confirmed that orders have been relayed to Pakistani forces
manning border posts to stop infiltration by militants across the Line
of Control dividing Kashmir, as President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan
promised on May 27. As a result, Indian leaders are now willing to give
American diplomacy more time to turn General Musharraf's pledge into a
permanent commitment.
With Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld traveling to the region
in the next few days, the essential elements of a move back from the nuclear
precipice are now in plain view. These steps need to be taken quickly,
however, because spoilers are now in Kashmir who would like nothing better
than to spark a war that destabilizes Pakistan, kills Hindus and disrupts
American military operations against the Qaeda network.
General Musharraf's announcement
that infiltration has ended clearly implies what is well known but cannot
be publicly acknowledged by his government - that the Pakistani Army and
intelligence services have long provided logistical and military support
for these crossings.
His pledge to end this assistance
is an important start, but it is insufficient. Militancy cannot be turned
on and off like a spigot to accommodate political pressures. His promise
will mean little unless he is willing to close down the training camps
and staging areas for militants on the Pakistani side of the Kashmir border.
Since operations that originate from these camps could lead to war, nothing
short of immediate action by the Pakistani Army to dismantle the camps,
with monitoring by the United States and India, will foster stability in
the area.
Pakistan's proposal to add international
monitors along the Line of Control would not make the 450-mile border harder
to infiltrate. Much of this terrain is quite rugged, and most of the crossings
by militants happen at night. Before the current deployment of forces to
the border, the Indian Army maintained more than six divisions with approximately
70,000 troops along this divide and was still unable to stop infiltration.
Nonetheless, even a symbolic increase in international peacekeepers - there
are now a few dozen in place - could usefully signal the international
community's determination that Pakistan put an end to the incursion into
Indian territory.
Even now, it is clear to Pakistani
military leaders that another loss on the battlefield - should India retaliate
against border crossing with conventional warfare, much less a nuclear
strike - would further damage the army's standing, which has fared poorly
in previous wars with India.
It is also clear that the Pakistanis
would have to fight another war essentially alone because the United States
and China are now more strongly opposed than in the past to Pakistan's
links to terrorist organizations. Finally, most Kashmiris, on whose behalf
this war would ostensibly be waged, want to see an end to terrorist activities
that are destroying their already weakened economy.
The reduction of tension in Kashmir
also requires positive steps from India. With the verifiable closure of
the Pakistani militant camps, India should begin a phased demobilization
of troops from the border areas. The last phase would be a reduction of
forces on the Line of Control after the state elections in Indian Kashmir
this fall. Equally important are a resumption of substantive dialogue over
the Kashmir issue and new efforts at nuclear risk reduction. The framework
for a structured dialogue has already been agreed to in previous bilateral
discussions dating back to the mid-1990's.
This outcome requires that the United
States play a sustained, proactive role in South Asia, a role that it has
been very reluctant to take on until now. For a start, Washington needs
to help India monitor whether Pakistan is fulfilling its pledges. Nuclear
security, the successful prosecution of the war against Al Qaeda and regional
stability in South Asia all demand demonstrable changes in Pakistan's failed
Kashmir policy.
(Michael Krepon is founding president
of the Henry L. Stimson Center.)
