Author: K. Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Times of India
Date: June 4, 2002
May 31, 2002 is likely to turn out
as fateful a day in history as September 11, 2001, when the superpower
was attacked on its home turf.
On the former day, the sole superpower
virtually yielded to nuclear blackmail by Pakistan (conveyed by its ambassador
to the UN). Instead of taking Pakistan to task as was done in 1990, the
US chose to keep silent on the issue. Worse, the US administration obliged
Pakistan by recalling its staff from the subcontinent.
Whether this was a momentary loss
of nerve on the part of Washington or a permanent cerebral stroke incapacitating
the superpower, the next few weeks will tell, as deputy secretary of state
Richard Armitage and defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld visit the subcontinent.
The advisory of US and western powers
to their nationals verged on utter panic. It also brought out two factors
which will affect the future, irrespective of any policy reversal by the
United States and possible recovery of its confidence. First, in spite
of the non-proliferation treaty, the counter-proliferation strategy and
the Security Council summit resolution of January 1992, the US and its
nuclear allies are in no position to impose nuclear discipline on Pakistan.
The message is loud and clear to
other potential rogue states that if they could clandestinely acquire nuclear
weapons, then the US and the rest of the international community would
keep off. It would confirm the potent role of nuclear weapons in international
relations.
The western leaders praised General
Musharraf for more than four months for his speech of January 12, 2002
and his commitment to stop cross-border terrorism. Then, on May 31, 2002
they spoke about the possibility of an Indo- Pak war consequent upon the
continuing cross-border terrorism. In other words, the sole superpower
and its allies were not able to prevail upon Pakistan to abide by its commitment
and invoke Security Council resolution 1373 (which mandates states not
to support terrorism).
Further, Bin Laden, Mullah Omar
and the leadership cadres of the Al-Qaida and the Taliban are today in
Pakistan and regrouping their forces. In spite of Pakistan being an ally
of the US, the terrorists were able to move from Afghanistan to Pakistan
in November-December 2001 before the Indo-Pak border stand-off began and
while the Pakistani army fully manned the Afghan border.
Out of 22 leaders of the Al-Qaida,
only two are accounted for. Most of the high profile operations of the
elite US and British forces on Afghan-Pakistan border have been futile.
The US vice-president and the director
of FBI have asserted that new terrorist threats are inevitable and cannot
be stopped. Yet, they seem oblivious of the fact that today the epicentre
of terrorism is Pakistan, from where the Al-Qaida is busy plotting new
attacks on the US.
The Al-Qaida used to proclaim that
they had defeated one superpower (the Soviet Union) and they would surely
defeat the second (the US). The US's current indulgent behaviour towards
Pakistan would appear to validate their claims.
Lastly, by giving in to Pakistani
nuclear blackmail, the US has allowed the nuclearisation of terrorism,
thereby encouraging the Al-Qaida and the jehadis to continue their terrorist
activities behind the shield of Pakistani nuclear capability. Today, the
Al-Qaida and the Taliban may have lost Afghanistan, but they have successfully
established themselves in the safe haven of Pakistan, thanks to General
Musharraf's brilliant strategy of claiming to be an ally of the US, while
in practice supporting and sustaining the operation of the terrorist groups.
This strategy is derived from the
one successfully practised by the Al-Qaida and the jehadis in the eighties
in Afghanistan. They derived their weapons, skills and other resources
from the US for the purpose of overthrowing Soviet occupation and used
them successfully against the US itself. Similarly, using General Musharraf's
professed alliance with the US, the Al-Qaida will derive the necessary
wherewithal to wage its war of terrorism.
In this respect, General Musharraf
has been hunting with the American hound even while running with the jehadi
and Al-Qaida hares.
In these circumstances, the world,
as well as India may have to adjust themselves to a new international security
paradigm in which the sole superpower does not have the will to commit
itself to a war against terrorism or towards effective countering of nuclear
blackmail. The present Indian strategy is based on certain assumptions
of superpower behaviour.
The May 31 events call for a radical
reassessment of our assumptions. The possibility of the US not pursuing
the war against terrorism or countering nuclear blackmail has to be factored
in our calculations. Many may rejoice in the sole superpower losing its
nerve and abdicating its responsibility.
Others may be disoriented by it.
For the Al-Qaida and the jehadis, this will be a morale booster and it
will be logical to expect them to initiate more terrorist attacks both
against India and the US.
The former is far more vulnerable
than the latter. It is also possible the Americans may treat this as a
temporary loss of nerve and return to their normal superpower behaviour
pattern. In that event continuity will be restored, though at significant
cost to the US image and credibility.
