Author: J N Dixit
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: June 7, 2002
URL: http://www.indian-express.com/archive_full_story.php?content_id=3920
It has been, politically and militarily,
a hot summer. The expectation that the political and military stand-off
between India and Pakistan, in the wake of the attack on the Indian Parliament,
could be defused because of India's high military deployment and international
pressure is not fulfilled.
On the contrary, tensions have only
increased. The Kaluchak attack and the murder of moderate Hurriyat leader,
Abdul Ghani Lone, have only exacerbated things.
In this context, it is of primary
importance to comprehend General Pervez Musharraf's mindset, as distinct
from his public persona and pronouncements since January 12 to May 27 this
year. His professional and psychological background is not just that of
an army officer but a commando.
His mindset is essentially aggressive,
operation-oriented and uninhibited about taking risks. Add to this his
deep commitment to jehad and drive to make Pakistan the most influential
Islamic nation in South and West Asia.
India should therefore have no illusions
about Musharraf's willingness to arrive at a reasonable compromise on contentious
issues. It would be relevant to mention that, after the Agra summit, the
general gave a private assessment to his inner circle on the Indian political
leadership, which he perceived as indecisive and lacking in unity.
The Indian armed forces, he felt,
although adequately equipped are not backed by an assertive political will
and therefore its morale is not very high. Evidently, he also came to the
conclusion that if a war occurs, Pakistan could certainly match, if not
defeat, India.
Pakistan's subsequent policy-making
clearly reflects these assessments, especially those that have emerged
since his January 12 speech, which has been hailed precipitately by the
world as a turning point. The substance of Pakistan's policies since January
belie this perception. Despite announcing opposition to all forms of terrorism,
Musharraf continues to maintain the distinction between the general phenomenon
of terrorism and terrorist violence in J&K. He continues to assert
that the violent movement by the jehadis here is an indigenous freedom
struggle.
Although he banned organisations
like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e- Mohammed and arrested a large number
of their cadres, he has released them all. This decision was justified
on the grounds that there was no evidence against them.
The leaders of these groups are
under comfortable house arrest. In fact, Pakistan has encouraged these
terrorist organisations to continue their operations against India under
new nomenclatures. Infiltration across the border from Pakistan- occupied
Kashmir continues with the assistance of the high command of the Pakistan
armed forces and the ISI.
With the onset of summer this infiltration
has increased markedly - as evidenced by the Kaluchak incident and the
Lone killing. Pakistan's immediate objective is to subvert the preparations
for the J&K assembly elections. Musharraf has also had to divert Pakistani
and Pushtun cadres of the Al-Qaeda, who have escaped from Afghanistan,
to some enterprises away from Pakistan as otherwise they will create major
domestic problems for him, apart from undermining his ties with the US,
which are based on commitments to neutralise these jehadi cadres. So he
has targeted J&K instead.
The alienation of J&K from India
by parallel violent and political means remains the macro-level political
objective of Musharraf's India policies.
The inescapable conclusion is that
while Musharraf cooperates with the US in its campaign against terrorism,
he will continue to sustain terrorist strikes against India. The objective
is to generate such pressure through such means, that India is compelled
to come to the negotiating table on his terms.
To ensure international support
to this undeclared objective, he utilises two leverages. First, he highlights
the Indian military build up and diplomatic pressure and argues that the
West must save him from this threat to Pakistan. Second, he harps on the
likelihood of his being compelled to use nuclear weapons against India
which will lead to India retaliating in kind, a situation that alarms all
the major powers of the world.
His strategy appears to be working,
as shown by the high level diplomatic pressure being generated on India
by the US and the UK. The UK foreign secretary, Jack Straw, came a-visiting
some days ago, and today US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
arrives in New Delhi.
Both the Russia's Vladimir Putin
and the Chinese leadership have officially advised India to remain restrained,
while assuring it that they would exert more pressure on Pakistan.
Prime Minister Vajpayee's statement
at Kupwara to the army jawans that India would take decisive action against
Pakistan has evoked an assertive and smug response from Musharraf.
Apart from affirming Pakistan's
capacity to retaliate effectively he has re-affirmed the nuclear threat.
It is clear that the West has a limited objective in preventing an Indo-Pakistan
war. It does not assign the necessary high priority which India has of
countering jehadi terrorism against Indian security.
Nor do they seem inclined to acknowledge
the link between Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and the resulting politico-military
pressure on Pakistan which India is trying to generate.
This attitude of the major powers
reduces India's options. First, it is clear that India would have to carry
on its campaign against terrorism in J&K on its own, barring general
political sympathy from the major powers.
Second, India should structure its
Pakistan policies clearly on the predication that any decisive military
option chosen by India would attract opposition from the world.
India faces a complex challenge
of sustaining its credibility as a country capable of decisive action against
Pakistan's mischief, while at the same time ensuring that domestic processes
of election and reconciliation are successfully carried out.
While we are mounting diplomatic,
political and limited military pressure on Pakistan, the litmus test would
be our being able to effectively neutralise Pakistan's long-term intentions.
Given these circumstances, there
does not seem to be any alternative to acting decisively in operational
terms against Pakistan's activities in J&K.
