Author: Jasjit Singh
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: August 28, 2002
URL: http://www.indian-express.com/full_story.php?content_id=8362
Crafting a post-J&K polls Pakistan
strategy
The electoral process in J&K
is moving into high gear while the nine-month old military mobilisation
and deployment on the borders continues. In fact, the last few days have
witnessed reports of renewed fighting on the Line of Control in J&K
with claims and counter-claims. Elections in J&K would mark another
phase since the great confrontation after December 13 last. This requires
looking at two probable scenarios in the more immediate context.
There is little doubt that given
the Kashmir policy that Pakistan has pursued for the past two decades,
it would try and disrupt the elections in J&K and, at the very minimum,
attempt to reduce their credibility to the maximum degree possible. One
of the likely scenarios for the coming weeks is that the jehadi groups
now under diverse pressures in Pakistan, with or without the sanction of
the ISI if not the army, may attempt a major terrorist strike or a rapid
succession of terrorist strikes to provoke New Delhi into a strong reaction.
This would, of course, pose very serious challenges to Indian policy and
domestic political pressures could complicate the situation further.
India, of course, would have the
right to use force across the frontiers in response to cross-border terrorist
attacks that Musharraf claims have been stopped. But at this stage, even
limited military action on the Line of Control (beyond artillery shelling),
leave alone any air strikes on or across the LoC, would only serve to further
Pakistan's interests since it would look for an opportunity to escalate
the situation into a more widespread conflagration detracting attention
from the elections. In fact, its claim would be that India was escalating
the armed conflict to avoid elections and, at the very least, find an excuse
for poor turnout. It is, therefore, important that we remain prepared for
such a scenario and ensure that we exercise the utmost restraint if it
takes the shape of reality.
The second scenario would be the
more desirable one, that is, the elections go through successfully with
substantive participation. Current indications provide a high degree of
optimism about a much higher level of participation than in the 1996 elections
(and possibly higher than the participation in Musharraf's own referendum).
Near-normalcy appears to be gaining ground in the election campaigns. This
itself could be a cause for the jehadi groups to put into action the first
scenario. But it is also clear that pressures for de-escalation and dialogue
with Pakistan would increase with time. In fact, the greater the success
of elections, greater would be the demand for dialogue. The US has already
been suggesting this, if for no other reason than as a concession to General
Musharraf for his 'co-operation.' Musharraf has made a dialogue the benchmark
for Indian reciprocity to the steps he has promised to take. The question
that deserves attention is the desirable agenda for such a dialogue whenever
it takes place.
Pakistan has never spelt out what
would be its agenda for a dialogue on Kashmir beyond demanding that it
should be solved. My own view is that both Pakistan and India have hardly
any negotiating space available for any fruitful dialogue, leave alone
any negotiations on the Kashmir issue. The risk with going into dialogue
without a clear enunciation of the issues and principles for such a dialogue
is that little progress is possible, and Islamabad would later claim that
New Delhi is not serious about the dialogue or resolution of the problems.
The central principle on which any
dialogue, therefore, should be predicated is that, while normalisation
would be a desirable goal, stability in the bilateral relations should
be the initial goal. Islamabad would argue that the Kashmir issue is the
cause of instability. When looked at from New Delhi, this has some logic
although due to a totally different set of reasons. But what is clear is
that continuing violence is certainly a major factor detracting from stability
in the bilateral relationship. The aim of any dialogue should, therefore,
be to ensure the prevention and abolition of armed conflict in any form
including terrorist violence that might impact on bilateral relations.
This in turn would require credible deterrence as well as provisions to
reduce if not eliminate the chances of conflict erupting.
It may be argued that credible deterrence
can be built only against nuclear threat or against conventional war, while
the real problem is the use of terror as an instrument of policy. By this
time it should be clear to the strategists in Islamabad that there is space
between the nuclear threshold and terrorist acts where conventional military
force can be applied in a punitive role. And hence the cost of the 'low
cost' strategy could be increased substantively by New Delhi at any time.
Any dialogue on conflict prevention must not only address the direct sponsoring
of cross-border terrorism, but the promotion of violence under the garb
of 'political, moral and diplomatic' support to the 'freedom struggle'
which is forbidden under the Simla Agreement. Dialogue that does not include
this crucial element would remain non-productive.
At the same time, serious thought
has to be given to prevention of accidents, miscalculation and pre-emptive
use of force, including any surprise attack. This would require a degree
of harmonisation of military and nuclear doctrines besides a serious re-examination
of the LoC and its transformation into mutually agreed defensible frontiers.
This approach would help to open up new opportunities for creating the
space for negotiating a settlement. De-mobilisation of forces from the
borders should be part of the negotiations for establishing peace and tranquility
on the frontiers from all forms of cross-border violence, whether in terms
of incitement or of actual physical process. The ultimate aim would be
de- escalation of threat and use of armed violence.