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The Great Confrontation (contd)

The Great Confrontation (contd)

Author: Jasjit Singh
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: August 28, 2002
URL: http://www.indian-express.com/full_story.php?content_id=8362

Crafting a post-J&K polls Pakistan strategy

The electoral process in J&K is moving into high gear while the nine-month old military mobilisation and deployment on the borders continues. In fact, the last few days have witnessed reports of renewed fighting on the Line of Control in J&K with claims and counter-claims. Elections in J&K would mark another phase since the great confrontation after December 13 last. This requires looking at two probable scenarios in the more immediate context.

There is little doubt that given the Kashmir policy that Pakistan has pursued for the past two decades, it would try and disrupt the elections in J&K and, at the very minimum, attempt to reduce their credibility to the maximum degree possible. One of the likely scenarios for the coming weeks is that the jehadi groups now under diverse pressures in Pakistan, with or without the sanction of the ISI if not the army, may attempt a major terrorist strike or a rapid succession of terrorist strikes to provoke New Delhi into a strong reaction. This would, of course, pose very serious challenges to Indian policy and domestic political pressures could complicate the situation further.

India, of course, would have the right to use force across the frontiers in response to cross-border terrorist attacks that Musharraf claims have been stopped. But at this stage, even limited military action on the Line of Control (beyond artillery shelling), leave alone any air strikes on or across the LoC, would only serve to further Pakistan's interests since it would look for an opportunity to escalate the situation into a more widespread conflagration detracting attention from the elections. In fact, its claim would be that India was escalating the armed conflict to avoid elections and, at the very least, find an excuse for poor turnout. It is, therefore, important that we remain prepared for such a scenario and ensure that we exercise the utmost restraint if it takes the shape of reality.

The second scenario would be the more desirable one, that is, the elections go through successfully with substantive participation. Current indications provide a high degree of optimism about a much higher level of participation than in the 1996 elections (and possibly higher than the participation in Musharraf's own referendum). Near-normalcy appears to be gaining ground in the election campaigns. This itself could be a cause for the jehadi groups to put into action the first scenario. But it is also clear that pressures for de-escalation and dialogue with Pakistan would increase with time. In fact, the greater the success of elections, greater would be the demand for dialogue. The US has already been suggesting this, if for no other reason than as a concession to General Musharraf for his 'co-operation.' Musharraf has made a dialogue the benchmark for Indian reciprocity to the steps he has promised to take. The question that deserves attention is the desirable agenda for such a dialogue whenever it takes place.

Pakistan has never spelt out what would be its agenda for a dialogue on Kashmir beyond demanding that it should be solved. My own view is that both Pakistan and India have hardly any negotiating space available for any fruitful dialogue, leave alone any negotiations on the Kashmir issue. The risk with going into dialogue without a clear enunciation of the issues and principles for such a dialogue is that little progress is possible, and Islamabad would later claim that New Delhi is not serious about the dialogue or resolution of the problems.

The central principle on which any dialogue, therefore, should be predicated is that, while normalisation would be a desirable goal, stability in the bilateral relations should be the initial goal. Islamabad would argue that the Kashmir issue is the cause of instability. When looked at from New Delhi, this has some logic although due to a totally different set of reasons. But what is clear is that continuing violence is certainly a major factor detracting from stability in the bilateral relationship. The aim of any dialogue should, therefore, be to ensure the prevention and abolition of armed conflict in any form including terrorist violence that might impact on bilateral relations. This in turn would require credible deterrence as well as provisions to reduce if not eliminate the chances of conflict erupting.

It may be argued that credible deterrence can be built only against nuclear threat or against conventional war, while the real problem is the use of terror as an instrument of policy. By this time it should be clear to the strategists in Islamabad that there is space between the nuclear threshold and terrorist acts where conventional military force can be applied in a punitive role. And hence the cost of the 'low cost' strategy could be increased substantively by New Delhi at any time. Any dialogue on conflict prevention must not only address the direct sponsoring of cross-border terrorism, but the promotion of violence under the garb of 'political, moral and diplomatic' support to the 'freedom struggle' which is forbidden under the Simla Agreement. Dialogue that does not include this crucial element would remain non-productive.

At the same time, serious thought has to be given to prevention of accidents, miscalculation and pre-emptive use of force, including any surprise attack. This would require a degree of harmonisation of military and nuclear doctrines besides a serious re-examination of the LoC and its transformation into mutually agreed defensible frontiers. This approach would help to open up new opportunities for creating the space for negotiating a settlement. De-mobilisation of forces from the borders should be part of the negotiations for establishing peace and tranquility on the frontiers from all forms of cross-border violence, whether in terms of incitement or of actual physical process. The ultimate aim would be de- escalation of threat and use of armed violence.
 


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