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Pakistan ISI's eastward operations

Pakistan ISI's eastward operations

Author: Anil Bhat
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: October 19, 2002

The loss of erstwhile East Pakistan was a rude shock to the military establishment of Pakistan - one from which it is still smarting. It also amounted to a loss of foothold in that region for the purpose of motivating and arming India's North-Eastern insurgent groups in collusion with China through Myanmar.

While initially, till the Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was in power, there was no scope to re-establish this foothold. But just after his assassination in 1975, under Bangladesh National Party's Major General Ziaur Rehman's rule, the opportunity came. Soon, it was business as usual for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The late 1980s was a period when the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) had developed into a serious menace - extorting money by terrorising and killing with impunity, penetrating all departments of the State Government under the benign eye of the ruling Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and support from All Assam Students Union (AASU), and networking with other insurgent groups like the NSCN, PLA, UNLF and even the Khalistanis and the LTTE. It was also involved with the not-so-friendly neighbouring countries for sanctuary, small-arms and training. With the election process in Assam and Mr Hiteswar Saikia getting into the fray despite a number of his close relatives being attacked or killed, the situation was ready to be exploited. It was in this period that photographs of ULFA's top leaders posing in Dhaka were first seen. Mr Saikia got elected and was appointed the Chief Minister. The swearing-in of his ministers took a few days.

It was at this stage, when everyone was wondering about the whereabouts of the ULFA's top leadership, when the organisation struck with a spate of kidnappings which included a Russian engineer working for Oil India. Mr Saikia then appealed to the entire cross section of the Assamese society to give their opinion on what action should be taken. The kidnappings, particularly of the foreigner, did not go down well with the people, and soon he was able to muster public opinion in favour of another operation against ULFA. This time he promised all possible assistance to the Army from his newly elected Government, including effective real- time intelligence right from block-level party workers upwards.

Thus, Operation Rhino was launched on September 15, 1991, and it saw the Army in hot pursuit of a reorganised ULFA. By the first week of January, 1992, the ULFA announced yet another total surrender, giving birth to a new abbreviation - SULFA (Surrendered ULFA) - quite a favourite with them as found in their captured camps.

Those days this writer was the Defence Ministry and Army spokesperson who, after setting up a new regional office at Imphal, had moved to Guwahati to set up another one there. I got to meet the recently surrendered ULFA spokesperson as well as another top level leaders and conveyed to both the disadvantages of their friends taking sanctuary in Bangladesh. First, that they would lose a lot of extorted money and freedom of operation; second, they would invite condemnation from the Assamese people whose great support they claimed for having compromised their earlier cause against Bangladeshis infiltrating into Assam. Worse, the ISI would use them to make an entry into the North-Eastern region. Thus, by May, 1993, the Central and State intelligence agencies had confirmed the entry of the ISI throughout the North-East.

The first incident which had the ISI playing its trademark roles was in December, 1992, just after the Babri Masjid was knocked down, and a communal situation was created in Assam. The Army was called out but not given any direction. A few months later at Lilong, about 40 km from Imphal, is an area where Manipuri Muslims have lived in complete amity with the Meiteis. A tense situation was created there, too. There were reports from Nagaland of the presence of ISI operatives in Dimapur. One had never imagined any kind of friendship between Naga hostiles and the ISI but the lure of money and sophisticated weapons was too strong.

Soon, the NSCN was using AK-47 assault rifles instead of the old Chinese M series carbines. The ULFA enjoyed the benefits of ISI's largesse and, of course, motivation, which was evident from their more aggressive attacks. The rest is recent history.
 


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