Author: Anil Bhat
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: October 19, 2002
The loss of erstwhile East Pakistan
was a rude shock to the military establishment of Pakistan - one from which
it is still smarting. It also amounted to a loss of foothold in that region
for the purpose of motivating and arming India's North-Eastern insurgent
groups in collusion with China through Myanmar.
While initially, till the Awami
League under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was in power, there was no scope to
re-establish this foothold. But just after his assassination in 1975, under
Bangladesh National Party's Major General Ziaur Rehman's rule, the opportunity
came. Soon, it was business as usual for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI).
The late 1980s was a period when
the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) had developed into a serious
menace - extorting money by terrorising and killing with impunity, penetrating
all departments of the State Government under the benign eye of the ruling
Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and support from All Assam Students Union (AASU),
and networking with other insurgent groups like the NSCN, PLA, UNLF and
even the Khalistanis and the LTTE. It was also involved with the not-so-friendly
neighbouring countries for sanctuary, small-arms and training. With the
election process in Assam and Mr Hiteswar Saikia getting into the fray
despite a number of his close relatives being attacked or killed, the situation
was ready to be exploited. It was in this period that photographs of ULFA's
top leaders posing in Dhaka were first seen. Mr Saikia got elected and
was appointed the Chief Minister. The swearing-in of his ministers took
a few days.
It was at this stage, when everyone
was wondering about the whereabouts of the ULFA's top leadership, when
the organisation struck with a spate of kidnappings which included a Russian
engineer working for Oil India. Mr Saikia then appealed to the entire cross
section of the Assamese society to give their opinion on what action should
be taken. The kidnappings, particularly of the foreigner, did not go down
well with the people, and soon he was able to muster public opinion in
favour of another operation against ULFA. This time he promised all possible
assistance to the Army from his newly elected Government, including effective
real- time intelligence right from block-level party workers upwards.
Thus, Operation Rhino was launched
on September 15, 1991, and it saw the Army in hot pursuit of a reorganised
ULFA. By the first week of January, 1992, the ULFA announced yet another
total surrender, giving birth to a new abbreviation - SULFA (Surrendered
ULFA) - quite a favourite with them as found in their captured camps.
Those days this writer was the Defence
Ministry and Army spokesperson who, after setting up a new regional office
at Imphal, had moved to Guwahati to set up another one there. I got to
meet the recently surrendered ULFA spokesperson as well as another top
level leaders and conveyed to both the disadvantages of their friends taking
sanctuary in Bangladesh. First, that they would lose a lot of extorted
money and freedom of operation; second, they would invite condemnation
from the Assamese people whose great support they claimed for having compromised
their earlier cause against Bangladeshis infiltrating into Assam. Worse,
the ISI would use them to make an entry into the North-Eastern region.
Thus, by May, 1993, the Central and State intelligence agencies had confirmed
the entry of the ISI throughout the North-East.
The first incident which had the
ISI playing its trademark roles was in December, 1992, just after the Babri
Masjid was knocked down, and a communal situation was created in Assam.
The Army was called out but not given any direction. A few months later
at Lilong, about 40 km from Imphal, is an area where Manipuri Muslims have
lived in complete amity with the Meiteis. A tense situation was created
there, too. There were reports from Nagaland of the presence of ISI operatives
in Dimapur. One had never imagined any kind of friendship between Naga
hostiles and the ISI but the lure of money and sophisticated weapons was
too strong.
Soon, the NSCN was using AK-47 assault
rifles instead of the old Chinese M series carbines. The ULFA enjoyed the
benefits of ISI's largesse and, of course, motivation, which was evident
from their more aggressive attacks. The rest is recent history.