Author: JN Dixit
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: January 5, 2003
URL: http://www.hindustantimes.com/on/ads/ht_story_right_panel_ads.htm?
General Pervez Musharraf has one
utility for India that cannot and should not be denied. Since becoming
a player in the power structure of Pakistan from late 1998 onwards, he
has repeatedly performed the task of giving India, and the world at large,
clear assessments about the efficacy or otherwise of India's Pakistan policy.
The latest example of this is his
public pronouncements to Pakistani Air Force officers. He said India was
compelled to act with restraint against Pakistan in 2002 because of his
clear signals both to New Delhi and major world powers that the slightest
aggressive military action by it, even of crossing the Line of Control
(LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, would have immediately attracted a nuclear
retaliation from Islamabad.
India did not have the capacity
or the stomach to face the prospect. The basic predicament and image of
India that emerged as a consequence is that of a state not being able to
give a tangible and effective response to calculated provocation by a smug
adversary.
One must go beyond this most recent
statement of Musharraf about Pakistan's successful politico-military strategy
vis-à-vis India, anchored in its nuclear capacities, to understand
the continuity as well as objectives of his policies.
In the mid-80s, during Operation
Brasstacks, president Zia-ul-Haq had conveyed Pakistan's intention of exercising
the nuclear option to then Indian Ambassador in Islamabad SK Singh.
Senior government figures threatened
to use nuclear weapons against India in 1999 during the Kargil conflict.
Confident about Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities, Musharraf as chief
of the army staff was opposed to initiatives regarding normalisation of
bilateral ties even before the Kargil conflict.
He was not supportive of Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in February 1999. Soon after overthrowing
prime minister Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf publicly asserted more than once
that Pakistan had to pull back from the LoC during the Kargil conflict
only because of US pressure; otherwise Pakistan would have taken the conflict
to its victorious end by whatever means possible.
Musharraf boasted to a group of
civilian officials and politicians in Peshawar in early December that he
had achieved a political and military victory against India without firing
a single short, despite New Delhi's massive military build-up on the border.
At the same time, he made India spend nearly $8 billion on a futile military
exercise because the Indian military build-up did not in any way dilute
Pakistan's policy of full support to the separatist movement in Jammu and
Kashmir.
There are fairly reliable reports
that after returning from the failed Agra Summit in July 2001, Musharraf
gave an informal briefing to his senior retired military colleagues in
which he gave the categorical assessment that India was a soft and fragmented
state which cannot take any effective action against Pakistan and that
it was only a matter of time before Pakistan's Kashmir policy succeeded.
Musharraf's objectives in this pattern
of statements and claims are clear.
Firstly, he is conveying a message
to India that in any emerging conflict situation between the two countries,
Pakistan will not be inhibited in using its nuclear weapons in the light
of its declared option of first use.
Secondly, the same message is conveyed
to major powers and the international community with the additional objective
of generating pressures on them to restrain India through diplomatic, political
and economic means.
Thirdly, he is conveying an assurance
to his domestic audience, particularly to the military establishment and
'Islampasand' parties, that despite his falling in line with the US against
the Taliban and Al- Qaeda under unavoidable compulsions, he has not changed
his strong and firm anti-India policies, particularly on the Kashmir issue.
More importantly, he is not going to change this policy because he can
sustain this policy due to the nuclear weapon capability.
The absence of any critical response
from the major powers of the world to his assertions about using nuclear
weapons has also given him the handle to convince domestic political circles
that the world is supportive of Pakistan's nuclear strategies and capacities.
Pakistani experts have not hesitated
to point out that there has not been any effective political criticism
or pressure on Pakistan about its developing nuclear and missile technologies
and weapons systems in collaboration with China and North Korea. In general
terms, Musharraf has achieved his objectives and fulfilled his motivations,
more or less.
The twin dimensions of the consequence
of this state of India- Pakistan confrontation require examination. To
what extent are Indian claims valid about having succeeded in exercising
coercive diplomacy in 2002 and what should be the Indian response to Musharraf's
politico-strategic posture based on his nuclear and missile capabilities?
It is clear that in substance India's
expensive exercise in coercive diplomacy had only minimum and marginal
success. The massive military deployment under "Operation Parakram" only
resulted in some piecemeal cosmetic public pronouncement by Musharraf.
It did not translate into any reduction
of cross-border terrorism engineered from Pakistan nor did the various
political and military steps that New Delhi took lead to any change in
Musharraf's subversive anti-India policies.
Even more unfortunate is the fact
that while India's assertive but
cosmetic military posture resulted
in high political pressure being exerted on it to remain restrained, there
was no parallel operational pressure on Musharraf to control Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and its cohorts from acting against India.
The key argument in the advice to
India for restraint was exactly the
point being asserted now by Musharraf
-- if India takes any effective action it will result in a nuclear war.
There are some reports that though
the Indian military establishment was poised to launch operations against
Pakistan in mid-January 2002 and then again in mid-June, pressure from
the US and its allies compelled it to shelve the plan. This gives substance
to the rationale being articulated by Musharraf since October 2002.
The inescapable conclusion is neither
India's diplomacy nor its military posture served its interests in any
meaningful manner.
It is important that New Delhi structure
its response to Musharraf's postures and possible international attitudes
towards his policies.
First and foremost, New Delhi must
fashion its military and strategic doctrines in relation to Pakistan on
a categorical assumption that Pakistan will resort to weapons of mass destruction
against India at any moment where it feels that not only its existence
is threatened but even its image or military credibility is challenged.
Once this becomes the fulcrum of
its defence policy, India should first consolidate and then augment its
nuclear weapon and missile capabilities, signaling clearly a devastating
retaliation against Pakistan -- a signal that should be tangible enough
for Pakistan to take note of.
It is equally important that India
should convey to the US and other major world powers that given Musharraf's
declared claims, assertions and intentions regarding his weapons capabilities,
the world should not expect India to remain restrained.
At some point Musharraf's bluff
would have to be called. That point may not be too far. At certain thresholds
in political affairs, reason has to be replaced by use of structured force
as the final arbiter for resolving issues.
(The writer is a former Indian foreign
secretary)
