Author: Najam Sethi
Publication: The Friday Times
Date: November 21, 2003
Last week the government of General
Pervez Musharraf announced a ban on three jihadi outfits which were earlier
banned by the United States. As if on cue, the police swooped down upon
them, "sealed" their offices and detained dozens of their activists. Their
bank accounts were ostensibly "frozen". This is supposed to be another
historic blow against extremism and terrorism. Rubbish.
General Musharraf's thunderous assertions
are sounding like a scratched 78 rpm record. Two years ago, we received
a blast of the same banalities. The Jaish i Mohammad, Sipah i Sahaba, and
Tekrik i Jafaria were "banned" by Pakistan (after they were outlawed by
the United Nations Security Council), their offices "sealed", their leaders
arrested and their empty bank accounts frozen. Soon thereafter, everyone
was released, the three parties renamed themselves as Khuddam ul Islam,
Millat i Islamia and Islami Tehrik respectively and were allowed to function,
recruit people, collect funds for jihad, publish their journals and give
rousing sermons against all infidels. In fact, Maulana Azam Tariq, the
leader of the renamed Sipah Sahaba, was encouraged to contest the 2002
general elections and "helped" to become a member of the National Assembly
so that he could duly provide "that crucial single vote" enabling Mr Zafarullah
Jamali to scrape together a government. Similarly, Allama Sajid Naqvi,
leader of the Tehrik i Jafaria, alias Islami Tehrik, was allowed to contest
elections and become a respectable member of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal.
And Mr Masood Azhar, the leader of the Jaish, alias Khuddam, was encouraged
to preach jihad and collect funds all over the country. In fact, in a brazen
display of bonhomie with the khakis, he recently preached his doctrine
of jihad in a grand mosque in the very heart of Lahore's military cantonment.
The pattern has become predictable. Whenever American pressure to clamp
down on extremism breaches a threshold noise level, Islamabad is quick
to offer a sop. In January 2002, it was President Bush and last week it
was Nancy Powell, the American Ambassador to Islamabad. In between these
two bans and many meetings of "pious people" drummed up by the government
to "tackle religious extremism", we have been subjected to gruesome sectarian
killings in Quetta and Karachi which have been squarely laid at the door
of one or another such organisation.
Meanwhile, the world is increasingly
convinced that Pakistan is the original home of radical Islam and terrorism.
A recent poll in the EU claimed that 48% of the respondents thought Pakistan
was a threat to world peace. This perception hasn't been helped by the
fact that the Musharraf government has made no effort to stop local jihadi
leaders from their violent tirades against the "West and all infidels".
What is so special about these Islamic groups that the Pakistan army cannot
countenance an end to them? Why must ordinary, moderate Pakistanis, and
the world at large, continue to pay the price for their extremism and radicalism?
When will the Pakistani state realise that the price of mollycoddling them
has become prohibitively high?
The answers are obvious enough.
Radical Islam has served to keep the Pakistan army in power (even when
it is not in office). It has provided the jihadi cannon fodder for keeping
the Kashmir issue alive, which in turn has sustained long-term hostility
with India, which in turn remains the raison d'etre of soaring defense
expenditures. Radical Islamists have also helped to weaken the thrust of
the mainstream, moderate, political parties that have come to challenge
the Pakistan's army's self-proclaimed role as the primary motive force
of this country. But will this formula work as effectively for its patrons
in the future? No.
First, radical Islamists are increasingly
forging their own national, regional and global long-term agendas that
don't square with the short-term imperatives of their military patrons.
Indeed, some of them have enormous potential to destabilize their creators
- as Mulla Umar did to Musharraf's Pakistan and Osama bin Laden has done
to the House of Saud in Arabia. Another major attack by Al Qaeda in the
US or in Britain or in Europe would likely unleash dire consequences not
just for Muslim peoples all over the world but also for Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia. Within the region too, the jihadis have enormous potential for
destabilization - as we saw when they attacked civilian targets in Kashmir
and New Delhi and provoked the Indians in December 2001 to march their
army to the border with Pakistan and threaten all- out war. Another such
attack could plunge the region into crisis and conflict. Second, the record
shows that radical Islam is incompatible with nation-building, democracy,
universal human rights and economic development - critical elements of
the new world order. It perpetuates a clash of civilizations and is inimical
to global stability. If Pakistan continues to harbour radical Islamists
in its midst the price will surely become prohibitive.
If General Pervez Musharraf can
read the writing on the wall and act to uproot extremist "Islamists", he
will do himself, the Pakistan army and the Pakistani nation great good.
But if he is guided by the same provincial notions of national security,
army infallibility and military ascendancy as in the past, then we have
all had it.
