Author: B. Raman
Publication: South Asia Analysis
Group
Date: November 26, 2003
URL: http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper847.html
It would be premature and unwise
to treat the so-called cease-fire to which India and Pakistan have agreed
and which went into effect on the midnight of November 25, 2003, as the
proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. One wished it were, but one
should not have any illusions that it is.
2. For the present, unless future
developments warrant a more optimistic assessment, one has to treat it
as one more tactical phase in Pakistan's proxy war against India through
the use of terrorism and Pakistani and other jihadi mercenaries to annex
Jammu & Kashmir.
3. It is not a cease-fire in a hot
war. There was no hot war between the two. Nor is it a cease-fire
in Pakistan's proxy war against India. It has not given any assurance of
winding up the jihadi terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory.
Nor has it renounced its use of jihadi terrorism as a strategic weapon
against India.
4. The cease-fire essentially suspends
the use of trans-border and trans-Line of control (LOC) exchanges of artillery
and other fire by the security forces of the two countries. Such exchanges
were initiated by Pakistan for two tactical reasons. First, to facilitate
the infiltration of trained and armed jihadi terrorists under the protective
cover of the fire. Second, to frustrate the efforts of the Indian security
agencies to erect a border fencing in the Jammu area to prevent infiltrations.
The Indian firing used to be in retaliation for the Pakistani barrages.
5. The idea of a trans-LOC cease-fire
has from time to time been floated by Pakistan, the last occasion when
it was mooted being during President Pervez Musharraf's visit to New York
in September to attend the UN General Assembly session.
6. Indian security agencies have
always been suspect of Pakistani motives in proposing a trans-border/trans-LOC
ceasefire. They had two genuine misgivings. First, they viewed it as a
Pakistani propaganda ploy to claim that continued acts of terrorism in
J&K even after the cease-fire, proved wrong Indian allegations that
violence in J&K was due to the cross-border infiltration of Pakistani
jihadi terrorists. Second, to force the Indian security forces to refrain
from firing on infiltrators who manage to cross the border/LOC without
the need for a covering fire from the Pakistani army.
7. There are only certain sectors
where the infiltrators need protective covering fire from the Pakistani
army. There are other sectors, where they don't. Therefore, the Indian
security forces argued that any renouncing by India of its right to fire
on the infiltrators when they attempt to cross the border/LOC, even if
it be without any protective covering fire by the Pakistan Army, would
be detrimental to India's counter-terrorism operations.
8. It is not clear whether the Pakistani
announcement of an unilateral observance of a cease-fire, despite India's
openly-expressed skepticism of past Pakistani proposals in this regard
which were not followed up, was the outcome of any scenario carefully worked
out between the two countries in secret back-channel talks. Though there
is so far no definitive indication of any such secret talks, the rapidity
with which the modalities for the cease-fire have been agreed to within
48 hours does give rise to a feeling that the developments were probably
the culmination of some secret probings, directly or indirectly through
intermediaries.
9. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the Pakistani announcement has, therefore, to be viewed as
meant to force India to reciprocate lest New Delhi be viewed negatively
by the international community if it rejected it. India has reciprocated,
but has at the same time made it clear that such a cease-fire would be
durable only if it is accompanied by Pakistan giving up its use of cross-
border terrorism. The Indian Army has also made it clear that its acceptance
of the cease-fire "is without any prejudice to counter-infiltration measures
and anti-terrorist operations in J&K."
10. The cease-fire has come at a
time when Pakistan's strategic interest in keeping alive its jihadi terrorism
against India would not be affected by such a move for the following reasons:
* Pakistan already has a sufficient
number of trained and armed infiltrators inside J & K. to keep the
proxy war going for at least 12 to 18 months despite the cease-fire and
without the need for large-scale fresh infiltrations. There were 2284 infiltrations
in the year 2000; 2417 in 2001; 1400 in 2002 and 1410 upto September 30,
2003, as against 1028 during the corresponding period of last year. The
Indian Security Forces have been killing on an average 951 Pakistani and
other foreign infiltrators per annum since 1999 in counter-terrorism operations
inside J&K. Even after allowing for a certain percentage of errors
of over- estimation, it is assessed that least 2,000 well-motivated, trained
and armed Pakistani jihadi terrorists are available for Islamabad inside
J&K to keep its proxy war going.
* The Pakistani move has come on
the eve of the onset of the winter when infiltration even with protective
fire becomes difficult and hence instances of such firing tend to come
down. By observing a cease-fire during the winter months, Pakistan would
not be creating any operational disadvantages for itself.
11. The need for continued circumspection
by India is also warranted by the following indicators that wile and insincerity
continue to be important components of Pakistan's strategy relating to
not only India, but also Afghanistan:
* Under US pressure, Musharraf re-issued
his ban orders on some of the Pakistani jihadi organisations last week,
but the orders were more reflective of his strategem to ensure the continued
availability of jihadi terrorists as Pakistan's strategic weapons than
of his desire for a break with his past policy. He banned the Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JEM) under its new name and ordered the sealing of its offices all over
Pakistan except in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the Northern Areas
(Gilgit and Baltistan), but spared its leaders and trained jihadis from
arrest. He banned the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) under its new name too,
but did not seal its offices or arrest its leaders and jihadis. He
merely placed the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which contributes the largest
number of Pakistani infiltrators into India, in a so-called meaningless
watch-list. He did not even ban the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Islami (HUJI) or
place it even in the watch list.
* Despite growing American concern
over the come-back of the Taliban, he has not acted against the terrorist
infrastructure of the Taliban and Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami
in Pakistani territory.
* He has given no indication of
any willingness to hand over to India 20 terrorists wanted for various
offences in Indian courts, who have been given shelter in Pakistan. Only
one of them is from J&K.
12. While announcing on November
23, 2003, an unilateral observance of a cease-fire, Prime Minister Mir
Zafarullah Khan Jamali of Pakistan has reacted a little more positively
than Pakistan did initially to the set of confidence-building measures
(CBMs) proposed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee last month for improving
people-people contacts and communications by road, rail and sea between
the two countries, including the inauguration of a bus service between
Srinagar, the capital of J&K, and Muzzafarabad, the capital of POK.
13. In its initial reaction, Pakistan
had linked the question of talks on India's proposals for improving communications
to the resumption of a dialogue on the Kashmir issue. This linkage is absent
from its latest reaction. It had earlier accepted the idea of a Srinagar-Muzzafarabad
bus service subject to the condition that the passengers should travel
with UN documents and that the UN should play a role in the security of
the service, which were unacceptable to India. It seems to have given up
these conditions now and is merely insisting that the inauguration of the
bus service should not be interpreted to mean any move towards the recognition
of the LOC as the international border.
14. The Government of India has
described the Pakistani reactions as a whole as encouraging. Whether it
leads to a real thaw would depend on the following factors:
* Its agreeing to remove the ban
on the overflights of Indian civilian aircraft over its territory. Till
now, it has not been agreeing to it in order to create difficulties in
the Indian supply of assistance to the Government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan
and in the trade relations between India and Afghanistan.
* Its handing over the 20 terrorists
wanted by India for trial.
* Its allowing the Indian Consulate
in Karachi, which was ordered to be closed down in December,1994, to be
re-opened.
* Its banning the LET and enforcing
effectively the various ban orders on jihadi terrorist organisations.
* Its non-interference in the erection
of the border fencing in the Jammu sector.
* Its winding up the anti-India
jihadi terrorist infrastructure in its territory.
15. Interestingly, Pakistan's unilateral
declaration of a cease-fire and its more positive response to the CBMs
proposed by the Indian Prime Minster last month have come in the wake of
the recent indications of the involvement of Pakistan-based or trained
terrorists in the deteriorating situation in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in
the explosions in Istanbul, increased US pressure on it to act more firmly
against terrorists operating from its territory and the expression of Chinese
concerns over the training of Uighur terrorists in Pakistani territory
during Musharraf's recent visit to China.
16. In a candid discussion with
senior Pakistani journalists on November 20, 2003, Musharraf was reported
to have expressed his concern over the increasing negative perception of
Pakistan abroad. The Islamabad-based correspondent of "The Hindu", the
prestigious daily of Chennai, reported as follows on November 23: " Musharraf
has surprised observers here with his candid comment that with the passage
of time, the world has started suspecting Pakistan's sincerity in supporting
the war on terrorism....Musharraf said perception that he himself was supporting
extremists and terrorists was gaining widespread acceptance in the world....He
warned that Pakistan will suffer from sanctions and "they may even start
bombing our tribal areas" if this perception is not removed urgently...Musharraf
said he was shocked, when during his recent visit to China, that country's
leaders informed him that Pakistan had provided sanctuary to Chinese extremists
operating against Beijing's interests. "
17. The Pakistani move for a more
positive approach towards India came three days after it suffered a major
diplomatic set-back in the UN General Assembly when a majority of
the members abstained or absented themselves during the voting (November
20) on a resolution calling for the respect of the principle of the right
of self-determination of people. It has been on the basis of this principle
that Pakistan has been claiming J&K and moving a resolution on the
subject every year in the General Assembly, which used to be passed by
consensus.
18. This year, India, sensing a
change in the mood of the international community on this issue, insisted
on a vote on the Pakistani resolution and the desertion from its ranks
of many countries, which had supported Pakistan in the past, came as rude
shock to Islamabad. These countries have started realising that Pakistan
has been using this principle of the right of self-determination as a cover
for its use of terrorism against India under the pretext of a so-called
freedom struggle.
19. The prestigious "Friday Times"
of Lahore (November 24) quoted an unidentified Pakistani diplomat as stating
as follows: " I feel deeply disturbed at this development because it has
weakened the moral weight of a concept that Pakistan has always used in
support of its position on Kashmir."
20. Indo-Pakistan relations have
seen many ups and downs in the past due to exaggerated hopes and unwarranted
euphoria, which were ultimately belied. India should, therefore,
guard itself against a repetition of this syndrome even while being cautiously
receptive to any positive moves from Pakistan.
(The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Advisory Committee,
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com
)
