Author: Michael Krepon
Publication: YaleGlobal
Date: February 9, 2004
URL: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3285
When A. Q. Khan, the 'father of
Pakistan's nuclear bomb', spoke publicly last week, he urged the world
to believe that only he - not his president or his country's government
- was responsible for selling technology and know-how to aspiring bomb
makers in Libya, North Korea, and Iran. Yet despite Khan's best efforts,
says nuclear arms expert Michael Krepon, his story does not ring true.
Pakistan's government and military had full knowledge of Khan's extensive
production and transportation network, Krepon says, but to stave off any
serious repercussions Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf has
refused to punish Khan or even conduct a full investigation into the matter.
In Washington - where the Bush administration named Khan's best customers
as members of the 'axis of evil' just two years ago - the muted reaction
to Khan's admission and Musharraf's leniency sends a worrisome message
to potential proliferators: if you get caught, just make sure you're in
a country that has been deemed an 'ally' in the US-led war on terror. -
YaleGlobal
The US says in effect: It's OK to
proliferate if you are an ally in the War on Terror
A.Q. Khan got off lightly, sending
disturbing messages about US and Pakistani attitudes toward proliferation.
After setting himself up as the Wal- Mart for nuclear weapon shoppers in
Libya, Iran, North Korea, and others who have yet to be identified, Khan,
the self-proclaimed father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, has admitted
guilt as charged by Pakistani General-turned- President Pervez Musharraf.
In quick succession, a penitent Khan met with the khaki-clad President
and went on Pakistani television to take all the blame and to absolve the
Army. Musharraf then suggested leniency to his Cabinet, which readily agreed.
The President wasted no time issuing a pardon in light of Khan's heroic
service to the nation and, for good measure, allowed Khan to keep the fortune
in money and real estate he amassed from his illicit nuclear commerce.
Meanwhile, Musharraf continues to
hound former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to pay back to the nation her
fortune of ill-gotten gains derived from corrupt government contracting.
There are two morals for the proliferators
of nuclear and missile technology - if that is the right word for this
strange story. The first is don't get caught. Khan's real estate holdings
were no secret in Pakistan, nor was his penchant for foreign travel. Foreign
intelligence services long-suspected Khan's dealings, as well as the difficulties
his lab at Kahuta was having in producing nuclear warheads and missiles.
Pakistani officials responded to
questions about nuclear transactions with blanket denials. This defense
began to unravel when US intelligence agencies pieced together the existence
of a uranium enrichment program in North Korea. Suddenly, the question
of what Pyongyang got in return for bailing out the Khan Research Labs
by transferring No Dong missiles could be answered with certainty: The
Pakistani cargo plane that picked up the missiles, which were then re-labeled
as the indigenously-built 'Ghauri', was engaged in barter transactions
that involved the provision of centrifuge technology.
Soon thereafter, Iran's uranium
enrichment program, which was publicly revealed by an opposition group
to the ruling ayatollahs, became the center of international attention.
It was implausible enough for Tehran to claim it needed nuclear power for
electricity, but there's no way that enriched uranium can be used to light
street lamps. With clear evidence of an intent to acquire the entire fuel
cycle necessary for bomb making, Iran's ayatollahs decided to take the
heat off, to freeze the program temporarily, and to allow inspectors from
the International Atomic Energy Agency to gain extensive access to plants
under construction. Iranian officials also confirmed what the inspectors
could plainly infer - that the centrifuges came from Pakistani sources.
Next it was Libya's turn. After
a shipment of centrifuge parts was intercepted in the fall of 2003 headed
for Libya, Muammar Qaddafi decided to come clean. In return for a lifting
of sanctions and the prospect of foreign direct investment, he invited
US and British officials to close down and cart out his bomb-making project.
More equipment from A.Q. Khan's netherworld of nuclear commerce was uncovered.
The most extraordinary find, as reported by the New York Times, were actual
blueprints of a nuclear warhead of Chinese parentage that was given to
Pakistan by Beijing to help the Khan Research Labs out of an earlier jam.
At this point, Pakistan's flat denials
of illicit nuclear commerce were shredded beyond repair. Under heavy pressure
by the United States to roll up Khan's network and to acknowledge misdeeds,
Musharraf set in motion the investigation and public humiliation of Pakistan's
national hero. Which leads to moral number two for future proliferators:
Be an indispensable ally to the United States in the global war on terror.
If A.Q. Khan resided in another
country, or if Pakistan were led by the religious leaders who are eager
to unseat Musharraf, the Bush administration's response would have been
far different. But Washington knew that a public trial of Khan would have
put a club in the hands of Musharraf's many enemies while risking the disclosure
of official government and high-level Army support for some of his transactions
Khan confessed to missteps driven
by Islamic solidarity - an explanation that conveniently overlooks the
money he pocketed and his dealings with North Korea. Two other rationales
for Pakistan's nuclear commerce - paying back governments that helped to
finance the program and seeking foreign assistance to overcome problems
with domestic production lines - were also behind Khan's travels. These
transactions surely required the authorization and full consent of army
chiefs, prime ministers, and a president or two. The quick choreography
of Khan's confession and pardon, as well as Washington's muted response,
point to a mutual desire not to delve publicly into history.
In return for this pact not to question
Khan's fiction that he, alone, was to blame, the Bush administration appears
satisfied to roll up his supply network while Pakistani officials conduct
a more thorough housecleaning at his lab. Musharraf will again promise
that these transactions will not happen again. He gave Secretary of State
Colin Powell a pledge of 400 percent on this score after US intelligence
tracked the delivery of centrifuge parts to North Korea in the fall of
2002. Khan's shipment to Libya was intercepted one year later. If future
transactions occur for reasons of state - that is, to repay foreign governments
that have called in their notes or to overcome production bottlenecks -
the Bush administration will have a tough decision to make. Musharraf and
his advisers will cross this bridge if they have to, but they have good
reason to presume that Bush would be forgiving, as long as Pakistan makes
progress in cleaning up messes, and as long as its support remains essential
in nabbing Osama bin Laden and the remnants of his al Qaeda network.
What is the net effect of the A.Q.
Khan affair on global efforts to stop and reverse proliferation? The good
news is that A.Q. Khan is no longer a player, that venality and Islamic
solidarity are no longer acceptable drivers for proliferation in Musharraf's
Pakistan, and that a very successful network of covert transactions is
being put out of business. The number of states seeking nuclear weapons
and missiles to carry them has been reduced significantly. Saddam is gone,
and Libya has decided to go straight. This leaves Iran, which has agreed
to a temporary freeze on fissile material production, and North Korea,
which might be amenable to a deal - if and when the Bush administration
is prepared to offer one.
The bad news is Khan has proved
that extraordinarily damaging blueprints and parts can be surreptitiously
exchanged for cash, and that this information can fit into CD-ROMs as well
as military cargo planes. Covert supply networks can be reconstituted,
but the market is likely to shift from sophisticated nuclear weapons to
crude forms of nuclear terrorism. Global controls and safeguards on dangerous
nuclear material are more essential than ever - and this work has barely
begun.
Michael Krepon is founding president
(1989-2000) of the Henry L. Stimson Center and author of "Cooperative Threat
Reduction, Missile Defense and the Nuclear Future" (Palgrave, 2003).
