Author: Jonathan Ariel
Publication: Maariv International
Date: February 20, 2004
URL: http://www.maarivintl.com/dev/index.cfm?fuseaction=article&xCache=%7Bts%20%272004%2D02%2D19%2009%3A23%3A52%27%7D&articleID=3069
Introduction: Washington has gotten
whatever it's going to get out of the Iraqi campaign, and is refocusing
on its core security concerns, Al Qaida and nuclear proliferation. The
answer to both issues lies in Pakistan. The key allies are Israel and India.
The situation in Iraq is still far
from stable. However what we are seeing is
a transformation from an insurrection
primarily aimed against US troops to the beginnings of the battle for control
of post US Iraq.
Washington has realized that the
Iraqi campaign has been no more than a partial success. Saddam is gone,
and that alone justifies defining the war as being a success. Ridding the
world of a gangrenous political organ like Saddam was not the sole strategic
goal of the campaign. The administration had hoped that the sight of US
arms parading triumphantly along the shores of the Tigris and the Euphrates
would be sufficient to generate a political and cultural upheaval in the
Moslem world that would rid it of militant fundamentalism. This would have
also been the end of Al Qaida, which would have seen its pool of recruitable
human bombs begin to evaporate.
Iraq was chosen as the opening battlefield
for three reasons: military, political, and historical. The terrain was
the military one, an open flat country with relatively little natural cover
for guerrillas, almost made to order for maximizing the strengths and minimizing
the weaknesses of US military capabilities. The US, embarking on its first
unilateral major military undertaking since Vietnam, had to ensure a swift
and decisive military victory. Iraq was the best place to ensure such an
outcome.
The political reason was twofold.
It was relatively easy to sell a war against Iraq, Saddam being Saddam.
In addition, the Administration expected to uncover significant amounts
of non-conventional weaponry, enabling the US to make a point that whoever
develops such weapons without its tacit approval risked being ousted from
power. This was especially important regarding North Korea and Iran, who
together with Saddam occupied the central places in Bush's axis of evil.
Historically Baghdad was, together
with Damascus and Cairo, one of the centers of Arab power. The last Arab
caliphate was ruled from Baghdad. In order to generate the kind of cultural
and political whirlwind the Americans hoped to see uproot fundamentalism
across Arabia, the target had to be Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, or possibly
Mecca. For a variety of political considerations the most viable and convenient
target was Baghdad.
However the other aims have not
been achieved. The shock and awe did not resonate with sufficient force
across the Shatt el Arab river separating Iraq from Iran, and the hoped
for east European style peoples revolt that would rid the region of the
Ayatollahs never happened. Evidence of WMD remains elusive, probably buried
under the sands of the Syrian desert. The only way these aims may be achieved
is via a war with Syria, as discussed in a previous article.
A US invasion of Syria or Iran is
not on for now. Washington is about to go on the defensive in the Middle
East theater of the war on terror. This means enough presence in Iraq to
contain Iran and Syria, but no proactive measures beyond that.
From the two rivers to the Valley
of the Indus
This explains the recent disclosure
of Pakistan's nuclear hanky-panky. However intelligence reports suggest
that by the early nineties the CIA knew that Prof. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the
father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb had sold nuclear expertise to North Korea,
Iran and Libya.
The most likely explanation why
the Reagan, 1st Bush and Clinton administrations did nothing, despite having
concrete information that Khan was peddling nuclear technology to rogue
states, was that the US decided that he was carrying out Pakistani state
policy. Pakistan has been a US ally since the onset of the cold war, and
was the main conduit for US aid to the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet
occupation forces. Even after the USSR collapsed, orthodox thinking reigned
supreme in the foreign policy establishment.
It is becoming increasingly clear
that policy regarding Pakistan is gong to go down in history as another
great chapter of US folly. The US significantly upgraded the capabilities
of the ISI (Inter-Service-Intelligence), Pakistan's military intelligence
agency, using it as its main tool in supplying the Afghan rebels. It failed
to notice that the ISI itself had come under the command of militant Islamists,
and had become the most influential force within the Pakistani military
establishment. When Uncle Sam belatedly realized he was being had by his
erstwhile allies, he preferred to bury his head in the sand rather than
admit he had been played for a fool. As a result the ISI was able to effectively
hijack Pakistani policy. It created the Taliban, and gave them the green
light to turn Afghanistan into the base of an Islamic jihad against the
West, while professing to the US that it was the sole lever of moderation
over Mullah Omar.
One of the main supporters of the
ISI within the Pakistani military was General Pervez Musharraf, who, it
is believed, played a significant role in developing the Pakistani bomb.
Just how deep a game Musharraf himself has been playing is unclear. His
Indian neighbors have never trusted him, and have always maintained that
he is a closet Islamic militant who actively supports Islamic terrorism
in Kashmir. Their opinion is worthy of consideration.
Bush Sr. played a significant role
in creating this mess, first as head of the CIA, subsequently as Vice President
and President. His son is going to have to clean it up. The irony is delicious:
the son, considered a foreign policy ignoramus, is having to deal with
the problems created by his father, considered one of the biggest foreign
policy mavens ever to occupy the White House.
To his credit, George W Bush doesn't
ignore his problems. His lack of foreign policy expertise is turning out
to be a blessing. Never having been part of the foreign policy establishment,
he is unfettered by its conventional thinking. Moreover, it has become
increasingly clear that whatever cerebral abilities he does or does not
have, he is capable of creative thinking out of the box.
It has become clear to him that
Pakistan, ostensibly an ally in the war on terror, is more of a liability
than an asset. The recent disclosures of Pakistan's nuclear misbehavior
is the first step in dealing with this. They occurred while CIA chief Tenet
was in Islamabad. At the same time Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom
was in Delhi, signing a whole range of arms deals with India, including
the sale of Phalcon airborne radar, the sale of which was approved by the
US. This is the same radar that is used by the Arrow ABM, enabling India
to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear threat. The message, though discreetly
sent, is very clear. "The game is up, we know who you are and what you
did. Play ball or face the consequences".
The price was also named. Stop pussyfooting
around, and take out Al Qaida, which continues to exist and is gradually
rebuilding itself in the rugged North-Western Frontier area. The US sees
an opportunity to decisively eliminate Al Qaida, which is clearly relatively
weak, unable to mount an offensive against the US itself. The US takes
the possibility that Al Qaida has acquired some atomic devices seriously,
and wants to take the movement out before it can rebuild sufficient logistical
and operative capabilities to try an attack the US with one of them.
Musharraf is in a quandary. He knows
that if Pakistan doesn't clean up its act, there is a real danger of a
coordinated Indian-American offensive against it. However he knows that
convincing his countrymen of this danger is not going to be easy, least
of all in the all important North-Western frontier area. This is heavily
populated with Pushtuns, many of who do not like what the US did to the
Taliban, which was dominated by Pushtuns.
Either way, as soon as the spring
thaw begins, things will begin to happen. Either the Pakistani military
will apprehend Al Qaida terrorists, or the US military will. It may not
be the cakewalk Iraq was, given the much more rugged terrain, but it is
doable. If this happens, India will make sure that the Pakistan military
doesn't get in the way. Any attempt by al Qaida, which has transferred
many of its fighters to Iraq, to start a second front in the Middle East
would require Syrian cooperation, unlikely in view of the threat from Israel.
The US may be poised to go for the kill, trusting India and Israel to protect
its flanks.
The writer is Editor-in-Chief of
Maariv International
