Author: Ardeshir Cowasjee
Publication: Dawn
Date: February 1, 2004
URL: http://www.dawn.com/weekly/cowas/20040201.htm
Stephen Cohen, a Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, knows
a lot about, and has a definite 'feel' for, our part of the world. It has
for long been a subject of his prolonged studies and his many writings,
his forte being South Asian security and proliferation issues.
His current project at Brookings
is a study of Pakistan's prospects as a state in the near future, and the
implications for Pakistan's neighbours and the United States given different
scenarios.
Cohen graduated from the University
of Chicago and did his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin. He has taught
history and political science at the University of Illinois, where he was
the director of its programme in arms control, disarmament, and international
security. He has served as a member of the policy planning Staff in the
US Department of State, and was a Scholar-in-Residence at the Ford Foundation,
New Delhi. Between 1985 and 1987 he made brief trips to Pakistan every
year.
His book entitled 'The Pakistan
Army' was first published in 1984. Permission for a Pakistani edition was
denied in 1985 by the pious General Ziaul Haq, his reasoning being that
'Pakistanis were too emotional' about certain issues. Cohen was cheered
by Zia's remark that he should not feel bad about the ban as banned books
had greater credibility. The second revised and updated edition was published
here in Pakistan, by OUP, in 1998.
He has written two books on India
: 'India: Emerging Power' (2001); and 'The Indian Army: Its Contribution
to the Development of a Nation' (2001).
He has produced several policy briefs
whilst at Brookings and his articles appear regularly in publications such
as 'The Washington Quarterly', the 'Journal of Strategic Studies', and,
of course, in the leading US and European newspapers.
London's Financial Times of January
15 carried an article written by Cohen entitled 'Kashmir must not fall
to the saboteurs of peace'. His prediction is that it will take six months
for us all to find out whether the forces in India and Pakistan who oppose
peace between the two 'traditional enemies' are able to sabotage the peace
process launched at Islamabad last month by our president general and Indian
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Cohen gave us six months because
by mid-year, when the weather conditions become favourable, if the hidden
hawks on our side so desire, the alleged Pakistan-based 'freedom fighters'
will easily be able to cross over into Indian-held Kashmir and be up to
their old games - and months of negotiations and talks and hopes of normalization
will be negated.
He is pessimistic as to the staying
power of the present thaw, given the past history of the two countries
and their various previous tentative approaches towards some sort of peace
which have in fact led to increasingly dangerous crises. Why should this
latest initiative, he asks, be any different? And if indeed it does fail,
the next crisis would not only bring the peace process to the point of
no return, but it would conceivably have 'nuclear overtones'.
Vajpayee takes the long-term view.
His hope is that Pakistan will somehow transform in his political lifetime
- he terms the talks in Islamabad the 'third and last chance for peace'.
Both Vajpayee and Musharraf obviously think the time is ripe for a new
approach, and Vajpayee thinks that he can bring a semblance of normality
to the subcontinent. History beckons. As said Cohen, 'he knows India will
never be counted among Asia's great states until it settles its affairs
with the weaker Pakistan...".
India, like Pakistan, has its hardliners,
its 'nay-sayers', as Cohen calls them, who regard any talks of peace as
practically treasonous, and who generally believe Pakistan will eventually
collapse, so why try to save it? The Pakistani 'nay-sayers' are unhappy
negotiating from a position of weakness and will conjure up as many obstacles
as they can.
Then we have Pervez Musharraf, with
his lack of vision, strategic or otherwise, who at home is embroiled in
sectarian, terrorist and water problems and in warding off assassination
attempts by Islamic militants on the loose who disagree with whatever it
is he thinks his country needs. He has his doubts, he may even be having
second thoughts, as does the oligarchy he represents, dubbed 'The Establishment'.
To quote Cohen, deep in pessimistic
mode as far as we are concerned: "This 80-1,000-strong group includes senior
army commanders, bureaucrats, media leaders, politicians and even some
Islamists. They know Pakistan is failing, that an economic and military
race with an expanding India is a losing proposition and that Pakistan's
friends are fair-weather. Once Afghanistan is stabilized and Al Qaeda mopped
up, the Americans will disappear, leaving Pakistan without a major ally.
The once-reliable China, alarmed
at Pakistan's support for Islamic radicals, is moving towards an understanding
with India over their border dispute even as India-China trade soars."
[As declared George Washington in his farewell address to the people of
the United States in 1796, 'It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent
alliance with any portion of the foreign world.']Our army is aware (so
Cohen has it and we must hope he is right) that it cannot win a war with
India and claim Kashmir, but, at the same time, it is reluctant to step
back, as that would mean a loss of face ('He who fears losing face has
no face to lose,' said Confucius).
Now, knowing all this (if Cohen
is right) surely the 'Establishment', its representative, Musharraf, and
the Pakistan army, will attempt to see some sort of sense and be able to
realize how critical is the situation at this point in time. The solution
is to somehow find a face-saving reason to come to an understanding with
India over a border drawn through Kashmir.
His suggestion, which will do good
to all concerned, is that there be a radical change in thinking and in
any form of peace talks - that Kashmir be treated as a human rights issue
rather than a territorial struggle. A settlement would result in a vastly
improved life for the Kashmiris, the pawns in the deadly game that has
been played for over half a century. Pakistan could claim humanitarian
grounds and a wish for nothing other than peace and tranquillity for the
bloodied Kashmiris. India's democratic status would benefit. And most important
of all, the people of Kashmir could have what they have not had since 1947
- a semblance of normal life.
Being an American, Cohen knows his
governments; and having studied and observed the two countries for so long,
he knows what he is talking about. His views should not be disregarded
by our patriotic and pious 'elite' as being the rantings of a 'buzdil'
Jew. Jews normally have what it takes to think and to comprehend. Musharraf
would do well to heed his words. But then, even if he does, can he carry
his 'Establishment' with him? Even if he does understand the stakes, he
cannot do what he should, and perhaps what he wants, alone. He needs backing
at home (he has it elsewhere). To obtain this, he needs to overturn an
entire nation's mindset in double-quick time.
We are now entangled in discussions
and conjectures about what the Father of our Bomb has or has not done -
and in the process are following the dictum of Hamish McLintock : 'If you
can't convince them, confuse them.'
We are also a prosperous nation.
We ceased work, put aside any productivity or progress, for one week in
order to properly celebrate Eid and support Kashmir.
Also, being the forward-thinking
modern nation-on-the-go that we are, unable to afford beauty contests for
our women, some of our bright sparks have organized a 'bakra beauty contest'
and ensured that, by the time the judges reach their conclusion, the winner
will be dead.
Never despair, as said Horace, so
Eid Mubarak to you all.
E-mail: arfc@cyber.net.pk
