Author: Praveen Swami
Publication: The Hindu
Date: February 6, 2004
URL: http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm
Problems with India's military doctrine,
and a lack of clarity within the Union Cabinet and on its war objectives
may have undermined Operation Parakram at the very outset.
In an exclusive interview to The
Hindu , the former Chief of the Army Staff, General S. Padmanabhan, has
thrown new light on the reasons for the failure of Operation Parakram,
the massive build-up ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist
attack on Parliament House. He was responding to criticism that a slow
mobilisation of the troops "gifted" Pakistan time to prepare its defences
- and eventually meant that the Operation had to be called off.
Gen. Padmanabhan argues that significant
military gains could have been achieved in January 2002, had politicians
made the decision to go to war. These objectives, he says, could have included
"degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory
in Jammu and Kashmir. They were more achievable in January, less achievable
in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of
forces had gradually changed."
Critics of Gen. Padmanabhan's management
of Operation Parakram have argued that air strikes against terror training
camps could have been carried out within days the December 13 outrage.
The Army, in turn, said that it needed time to prepare for the escalatory
consequences of such attacks. Pakistan, Army planners believed, had an
interest in taking the conflict towards a nuclear flash-point as soon as
possible. The Army believed the best prospects of avoiding such a situation
was having forces in place that could rapidly secure war objectives.
According to Gen. Padmanabhan, the
kinds of limited strikes some were pushing for would have been "totally
futile." "If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible
he has done," he said, "you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture
his territory." "War is a serious business," he continues, "and you don't
go just like that. When December 13 happened, my strike formations were
at peace locations. At that point, I did not have the capability to mobilise
large forces to go across."
Military doctrine - problems
Part of the problem appears to have
been India's defence- oriented military doctrine, which assigns most formations
to hold ground against enemy attack. Offensive roles are largely assigned
to three strike formations, the Mathura- based 1 Corps, the Ambala-based
2 Corps and the Bhopal- based 21 Corps. Unlike these strike formations,
most other Corps can at best carry out very limited offensive tasks. India,
Gen. Padmanabhan's remarks suggest, could have ended up starting a war
from which it would have gained very little, and that too at great cost.
Doctrinal baggage, he accepts, crippled
India's early options in 2002. "You could certainly question why we are
so dependent on our strike formations," he said, and "and why my holding
Corps don't have the capability to do the same tasks from a cold start.
This is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it
will be our military doctrine." Gen. Padmanabhan's new book, "The Writing
on the Wall - India Checkmates America 2017," among other things, describes
a fictional war in which India retakes the Haji Pir pass in Pakistan-Occupied
Kashmir.
Correctives being taken
Efforts are now under way to rectify
some of these problems in doctrine identified in the course of Operation
Parakram. The present Army Chief, Gen. Nirmal C. Vij, has pushed through
an ambitious modernisation of India's ground forces. New weapons systems
are now being introduced which will allow each Corps a limited offensive
capability of its own, reducing dependence on the strike formations. India's
Special Forces are also being re- equipped to improve their ability to
operate behind enemy lines for considerable lengths of time, and could
play a key role in a future war.
It remains unclear, however, just
why the politicians who ordered the build-up finally chose not to use the
military machine they had assembled. "Everyone seems to feel that the U.S.
held us back," Gen. Padmanabhan says. "Perhaps they did; perhaps they didn't.
I don't know anything specific on this. I do know that that there was great
consternation on the other side, Pakistan, because of the huge Indian build-up.
Finally, it was a decision that had to be made by our political masters."
There are no answers, either, to
the evident confusion in policy-making that underpinned Operation Parakram.
Gen. Padmanabhan's account of decision-making suggests that India's security
establishment had not planned exactly how it would respond to a major terrorist
attack.
Nor, it would appear, did the political
leadership clearly understand the military options available, just how
long they would take to execute, and what their potential consequences
could be.
Just as important, few within the
Army seemed to have planned and prepared for a short, sharp conflict with
Pakistan, suggesting the lessons of the Kargil war remained unlearned.
