Author: Farah Stockman and Victoria
Burnett
Publication: The Boston Globe
Date: March 14, 2004
URL: http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/074/nation/From_Salem_to_Pakistan_an_atomic_smuggler_s_plot+.shtml
It looked like any other package
when a mail truck carried it away from the four- story office park at 35
Congress St., along with packages from other businesses near Pickering
Wharf, like the Palmer's Cove Yacht Club and the Harbor Sweets candy store.
But the contents of this particular
parcel, mailed in September 2003, were so alarming that US special agents
secretly tracked its journey from Salem to an office in Secaucus, N.J.,
on to a warehouse in South Africa, then to an air cargo shed in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and to its final destination: a military supplier
in Islamabad, Pakistan.
Inside the box were 66 high-speed
electrical switches called triggered spark gaps, each the shape of a spool
of thread and the size of a soda can. In small numbers, they are used in
hospitals to break up kidney stones. In large numbers, they can detonate
a nuclear weapon.
The story of how a box at the North
Shore office of PerkinElmer Inc., one of about a dozen firms in the world
that produce the switches, ended up in the hands of a supplier for the
Pakistani army, provides a rare glimpse into the underworld of nuclear
smuggling.
In many respects, it is a victory
in the in-the-trenches battle to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear
weapons. Tipped off by suspicious PerkinElmer employees and an anonymous
source abroad, US officials arranged for the box's dangerous contents to
be disabled before it was shipped, tracked the package, and arrested the
alleged nuclear supplier, Israeli businessman Asher Karni.
Karni was arrested on Jan. 1 in
Colorado as he flew into the United States for a ski vacation. He was charged
in federal court in Washington, D.C., with violating US export laws.
But the case is also a disturbing
reminder of how rare it is for a nuclear smuggler to be prosecuted. Karni
seems to be the only person facing trial for selling nuclear components
to a middleman in Pakistan, which is at the center of a massive international
investigation into dozens of companies involved in nuclear black-market
trading.
Selling dual-use technology like
the switches to certain foreign companies is still legal, but it can be
hard to keep the technology from falling into the wrong hands once it goes
overseas, according to Ivan Oelrich of the Federation of American Scientists,
a nonprofit research group that tracks arms-control issues.
Manufacturers are required by law
to scrutinize their customers, flag suspicious orders, and keep track of
an ever-growing list of blacklisted companies. Despite heavy fines for
noncompliance, security specialists acknowledge that companies cannot catch
every problem order.
"You try to catch enough of it so
that you deter people," said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, who said two or three people each year
are caught trying to smuggle items that can be used for nuclear weapons.
"It's like street crime. . . . It's just a continuing battle."
Another problem is that nuclear
export controls are essentially gentleman's agreements that lack the legal
force of treaties and do not reach several countries that are nuclear suppliers,
said David Albright, a former weapons inspector at the Institute for Science
and International Security in Washington. "It's a huge problem and not
much is being done," he said. "When it comes to giving penalties, they
are often just very minor."
Into dangerous hands The case of
the switches -- a crucial and hard-to-get ingredient for a modern nuclear
weapon -- is even more disturbing because they were bound for Pakistan,
a hub for nuclear smuggling to rogue nations around the world.
In January, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who
helped developed Pakistan's nuclear bomb, confessed to selling nuclear
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. That black market will be a
key issue for Secretary of State Colin L. Powell when he travels to Pakistan
this week. Despite a probe of Khan's activities that uncovered dozens of
middlemen and businesses around the world, few have been punished.
Karni, the 50-year-old Israeli salesman
who allegedly ordered the switches from Salem, was an expert at circumventing
US export controls, US prosecutors say. His South African company, Top-Cape
Technology, often served as a middleman for foreign clients who were banned
from buying directly from US firms, according to documents filed in his
criminal case.
Karni wrote often by e-mail about
how to bypass export license requirements, even lamenting the loss of business
when restrictions on the sale of sensitive technology to India and Pakistan
were loosened in 2001, according to e-mails submitted as exhibits in his
case.
"I have not heard from you in a
long time," Karni wrote to a man who procures items for India's Vikram
Sarabhai Space Centre. "I guess now that the sanctions are off, you are
probably going directly to the manufacturer, but I still think there must
be many other opportunities [in] which we can book some orders together."
In summer 2003, Karni was contacted
by Humayun Khan, a Pakistani businessman who counts the Pakistani military
among his clients.
Humayun Khan, who is no known relation
to Abdul Qadeer Khan, allegedly asked Karni to provide 200 triggered spark
gaps -- enough, specialists say, to detonate three to 10 nuclear bombs.
Karni called companies in Europe,
including PerkinElmer's sales agent in France, asking for the items, but
was rebuffed, court records said. He wrote back that the sale was not possible
because an export license was required.
But Humayun Khan begged him to try
again. "I know it is difficult, but that's why we came to know each other,"
he wrote. "Please help negotiate with any other source."
Eyebrows raised in Salem So Karni
approached Zeki Bilmen, of Giza Technologies Inc., a company based in New
Jersey that does not face the same purchasing restrictions as a foreign
firm. Karni asked Bilmen to buy the switches and ship them to South Africa,
where Karni said they were needed at the Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto.
Bilmen agreed, even though specialists
say a hospital would need six triggered spark gaps at most. Bilmen's lawyer,
Robert Herbst, said Giza deals with thousands of products a year and did
not know enough about this one to notice that the order was unusual.
In July 2003, Bilmen placed the
order with PerkinElmer Optoelectronics, based in Salem, for 200 triggered
spark gaps, model GP-20B, for $447 each.
But the order -- on the magnitude
of a military request -- raised eyebrows in Salem, where PerkinElmer employs
a specialist to monitor sales and make sure they comply with all regulations.
"It was such a huge quantity. A
hospital buys one or two," said Daniel Sutherby, a PerkinElmer spokesman.
PerkinElmer contacted US officials,
who told the company they already were tracking Karni's request, following
an anonymous tip from South Africa, according to Sutherby.
Under the direction of special agents
with the Department of Commerce, PerkinElmer moved to fill the order as
though nothing was wrong. But before the first shipment of 66 switches
was sent to New Jersey in September, PerkinElmer employees permanently
disabled the devices.
US investigators tracked the package
across three continents, until it arrived a month later at Khan's office
in a run-down commercial complex in Islamabad. For the last leg of the
journey, the package was labeled "scientific equipment" and addressed to
"AJKMC Lithography Aid Society." No public record could be found in Pakistan
of such an organization.
David Poole, a special agent with
the US Department of Commerce, told the court he thinks AJKMC Lithography
Aid Society is an organization that prints copies of the Koran. In other
court documents, US investigators say "AJKMC" are the initials of the "All
Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference," a Pakistani opposition party that
supports extremist fighters in Kashmir, a disputed terroritory between
Pakistan and India.
Lack of punishment In a recent interview
with the Globe, Humayun Khan said he had no idea why the package had been
shipped to his street address or what AJKMC Lithography is. He also denied
ever having seen the package and said he knew nothing about it.
He acknowledged that he had dealt
with Karni on the attempted purchase of sensors to guide aircraft and wireless
communications equipment, but denied buying the switches. He said the flurry
of e-mails sent in his name had come from a rogue employee who has since
disappeared. Khan said he has been put on a blacklist by the US Commerce
Department and is no longer able to import goods from the United States,
a restriction he called rash and unfair.
Karni was arrested Jan. 1 when he
flew to the United States for a ski vacation with his family, and was released
on bail into the supervision of a Maryland rabbi. His lawyer, Alyza Lewin,
declined to comment on his case.
Others accused of involvement in
underground nuclear sales to Pakistan have avoided harsh penalties.
Even Abdul Qadeer Khan, who confessed
to helping three countries pursue a nuclear bomb, has been pardoned by
Pakistan's president and allowed to keep the money he made from the deals.
Milhollin said the lack of punishment
is outrageous because the wares that nuclear smugglers sell threaten the
lives of far more people than the act of an ordinary criminal: "They are
basically businessmen. They sit down and calculate their risks. If you
raise the chances of conviction, they are going to alter their behavior."
Back at PerkinElmer in Salem, many
feel their role in solving the case is just part of the business. "Employees
talked about the incident around the water coolers for a day or so," Sutherby
said. "But then everyone went back to their daily routines."
Victoria Burnett reported from Islamabad.
Ross Kerber of the Globe staff contributed to this report. Farah Stockman
can be reached at fstockman@globe.com.
