Author: Wilson John
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: September 29, 2004
Amjad Farooqi, 30, was shot dead
in a township in Sindh, Pakistan, after a five- hour gun battle on Sunday,
September 26. Two of his associates were arrested along with arms, a computer,
maps and a few CDs. President Pervez Musharraf, in Geneva, said it was
just another victory in his war on terror. Farooqi had a prize of Rs 20
million on his head after he masterminded two abortive attempts on President
Musharraf's life in December 2003 and January this year.
He was also wanted for the
murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl and several others, apart from
extortion cases and sectarian killings. He had links with the Al Qaeda
and was a known member of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a rabid group of Sunni terrorists
who were spawned by the Pakistani Army and the ISI to counter the growing
strength of the Shias in Sind in the early 1990s. He was also one of the
hijackers of the IC-814 flight in December 1999.
There are two reasons for dwelling
at such length on the killing of a terrorist mastermind who has been on
the run for the past two years. The first is to expose Pakistan leadership's
attempts to draw international sympathy and funds -- it is increasingly
portraying itself as a lone, valiant fighter against terrorists who have
taken shelter in Pakistan. Even a cursory reading of the list of terrorists,
either killed or arrested since September 11, will reveal the regularity
with which Pakistan has been successfully producing key Al Qaeda terrorists
at every turn.
There is too much of a coincidence
in the timing of such arrests and killings. Not even the best of the intelligence
agencies in the world can make such claims. It requires enormous investment
of human resources and money to develop leads, track down witnesses, infiltrate
criminal gangs and terrorist groups and produce results.
It is difficult to believe that
an impoverished nation, where police and intelligence agencies have for
long been involved with criminal and terrorist groups, could have the capability
of taking out, systematically, world's most wanted terrorists. It leaves
only one conclusion to draw: Pakistan's intelligence agencies are aware
of the whereabouts and movements of most of the terrorists and terrorist
groups active inside Pakistan.
There is an intriguing sidebar to
the story of Farooqi's killing which needs to be explored to understand
the nature of terrorist coalitions within Pakistan. Farooqi was wanted
in two assassination attempts on President Musharraf. The Army had launched
an exclusive investigation of the attempts under Corps Commander, X Corps,
which became, as the days went by, one of the biggest manhunts in recent
history.
Investigations quickly established
Farooqi as one of the masterminds of the operation and his links with Libyan
Al Qaeda operative, Abu Feraj al Libbi, Omar Sheikh, Maulana Masood Azhar
and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Investigations also revealed that Farooqi had friends
in the Pakistan Army and was in the know of the presidential security arrangements.
The orders were to capture him alive to unravel the conspiracy behind the
assassination attempts. At least, this is what the media reported, quoting
anonymous sources. Perhaps, calculated leaks?
As is clear from the news reports,
there were no attempts to capture Farooqi alive. If such an attempt was
even planned, the security forces should have launched a commando operation
in the night or early morning hours (ideal time) to capture Farooqi and
his associates who were living in a rented house. But what happened was
a pre-planned shoot-out.
It is also possible that Farooqi
could have been killed after his capture. A senior police official was
quoted in a news report saying that the killing of Farooqi was similar
to the killing of Said Akbar in Rawalpindi in the early 1950s. Akbar was
wanted in the assassination of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan. The statement
may not be too far fetched.
Two immediate inferences- both conspiracy
theories-can be drawn from this incident. First is the possibility of a
cover-up by certain persons or groups within the military-intelligence
set up in Pakistan who were planning to eliminate General Musharraf. Second
is the possibility of a cover-up by the establishment to put an end to
speculation about the veracity of the assassination attempts.
There were quite a few news reports
early this year pointing at the possibility of the assassination attempts
being stage-managed. This cannot be entirely ruled out. But it is the first
conspiracy theory which President Musharraf and his spokesmen would like
the world to believe. In the days to come, there would be stories in the
Pakistan newspapers and magazines about Farooqi's involvement with the
Al Qaeda and various other sectarian and terrorist groups. This fits well
with the present effort of the Musharraf regime to portray the President
as a lone crusader in the war on terror.
However, the reality is quite different.
President Musharraf has been supporting and sheltering terrorists since
September 11, 2001. There is ample evidence of this. The first reference
point should be the December 1999 hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight
from Kathmandu. The hijackers belonged to various terrorist groups which
were either created or supported by intelligence agencies. Farooqi was
one of them.
The three terrorists who were released
in exchange of hostages, Omar Sheikh, Masood Azhar and Mushtaq Zargar,
had the support of intelligence agencies. Azhar, along with Sheikh, set
up Jaish-e-Mohammad within days of his release while Zargar went underground.
Sheikh and Farooqi were involved in the Daniel Pearl case. There is every
possibility that both were also involved in the September 11 conspiracy.
Sheikh is known to have helped wire a certain amount to Mohammad Atta,
the main hijacker while Farooqi's involvement is yet to be disclosed.
Daniel Pearl's murder is another
critical reference point to analyse the new coalition of terror that evolved
in the aftermath of September 11 in Pakistan. The long line of accused
involved in the murder case reveals a pattern. One of the first suspects
was Sheikh Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, a radical preacher whom Pearl wanted
to interview.
Though Gilani was detained and questioned
at length, he was let off without being charged. The reason could be General
Musharraf's proximity to Gilani. The Pakistani President had patronised
Gilani in 1966 and the latter was encouraged to set up the `Climbers Club
of Pakistan', a front for training the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos
in mountain climbing.
Members of the unit were used in
1985-1987 to attack the Indian position at Bilafond Pass; they captured
two intermediate posts which were later reclaimed by the Indian troops.
While Gilani was let off, Sheikh was caught and sentenced to death (the
sentence is yet to be confirmed two years later), a ploy to keep him off
the US intelligence agencies. Several others were caught and interrogated
but none have been charged or tried.
One common point is that all the
accused either belonged to terrorist groups or Sunni sectarian organisations
like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba. They were active in helping
the fleeing Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists to regroup in Pakistan, a fact
which became clear with the arrest of a Lashkar foot soldier Fazl Karim
who revealed the existence of Al Qaeda in Karachi and the evolution of
new terror groups in Pakistan.
President Musharraf could not have
been unaware of these developments. There is no evidence to show that he
was unaware of the Al Qaeda's growing presence. There is, on the other
hand, sizeable proof to show that he knew. If Farooqi was caught alive
and handed over to the US authorities, he might have unmasked the lies.
