Author: Christopher Preble and
Subodh Atal
Publication: Chicago-Sun Times
Date: October 11, 2004
URL: http://www.suntimes.com/output/otherviews/cst-edt-ref111.html
As the presidential election moves
into its final weeks, neither candidate has mentioned a vital threat to
national security: the vulnerabilities of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Iraq's
supposed nuclear program proved to be non-existent, but Pakistan's nuclear
weapons and technology are very real. If the United States is serious about
keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's
most dangerous terrorists, it must demand a full accounting of Pakistan's
nuclear proliferation activities.
Soon after Sept. 11, amid reports
that Pakistani nuclear scientists had links to Osama bin Laden, President
Pervez Musharraf declared that he had complete control over the country's
arsenal. However, it is now known that Pakistan's nuclear technology was
being exported to North Korea as late as spring 2002, and to Libya in the
fall of 2003. Thus, either Musharraf was not in control of Pakistan's nuclear
program or he was using it in ways that contradict U.S. policy toward at
least two dangerous countries.
Musharraf blamed Pakistan's leading
nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, for the technology exports, claiming
Khan was leading a rogue operation for personal gain. That explanation
strains credulity, given Musharraf's tight control over the Pakistani military.
That fact -- coupled with the recognition
that al-Qaida has sympathizers in Pakistan's military, intelligence, nuclear
and political establishments -- should have prompted the Bush administration
to demand that Pakistan unravel the full details of its proliferation network.
Instead, the Bush administration
supported Musharraf's assertion last February that the proliferation network
was Pakistan's ''internal matter.'' Absent U.S. pressure, Musharraf has
refused to cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency investigations
into the network. The two presidential candidates have been strangely silent
on this matter.
The White House may be giving Musharraf
a pass, since his regime has recently taken significant steps in eliminating
some of the al-Qaida cells in Pakistan. However, al-Qaida-affiliated groups
such as Jaish-e-Mohammed continue to operate in Pakistan. So does the much
larger Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has some terrorist ties, and which may still
have relations with al-Qaida. According to al-Qaida expert Peter Bergen,
such groups may be responsible for hiding al-Qaida fugitives, including
bin Laden himself. There have also been persistent reports that elements
of Pakistan's military and intelligence services are facilitating the Taliban's
quest to regain some of its power in Afghanistan. Significantly, former
Pakistani intelligence chiefs such as Hamid Gul and Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed
have worked against U.S. interests and have helped shape the Pakistani
regime's policy directions.
Some have advised against pressuring
Musharraf too much, out of concern that he might be overthrown by a new
government far more hostile to U.S. interests. That is a legitimate concern.
But Musharraf, under pressure from the Bush administration, has cooperated
in the war on terrorism by aiding in the overthrow of the Taliban and by
attacking al-Qaida cells inside Pakistan. If he can survive those steps,
which are unpopular with the Pakistanis, there is little reason to believe
that an international effort to understand the details of Khan's nuclear
network would lead to Musharraf's downfall.
While we should be mindful of potential
scenarios for Pakistan, including what might happen if Musharraf loses
his grip on power, the threat of the proliferation of Pakistani nuclear
technology already has materialized. We cannot know the extent of that
threat without a full accounting of the Khan network's operations. It is
irresponsible to defer to Musharraf and a Pakistani establishment that
has, at best, suspect loyalties on a matter of the utmost importance to
American national security.
A more responsible U.S. policy would
honestly acknowledge the Pakistan problem and lead a multinational drive
to pressure Pakistan to provide a complete, verifiable accounting of its
nuclear proliferation activities. Though Western powers have had differences
of opinion regarding the threats posed by various actors, no one should
proceed under the illusion that al-Qaida affiliates in possession of nuclear
weapons do not pose a clear and present danger.
U.S. acquiescence in Musharraf's
coverup was crucial to forestalling such an international effort. Both
President Bush and Sen. John Kerry should be asked about Pakistan during
the final debate. It is vital that the American people appreciate the gravity
of the situation and have a clear understanding of the candidates' plans
to tackle the problem.
Christopher Preble is director of
foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Subodh Atal is an independent
foreign policy analyst.
